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As
practical

traditionally interpreted, Socrates in Plato's early dialogues believes virtue

wisdom, valuable primarily

as a

means

to happiness, but

nothing to say about what constitutes happiness.

which Socrates believes happiness
knowledge.

also

II

shows

I

that virtue in Plato's

Euthvdemus

that the value Socrates attributes to

though Socrates does argue

it

consists in being virtuous and virtue

it

or

is

is

philosophical

of Socrates' claims.

introduces the exegetic problem and summarizes

shows

little

defend a novel interpretation on

My interpretation makes better sense of all

Chapter
Chapter

I

he has

is

my

solution.

knowledge of good and bad.

there

is

It

instrumental. However,

that virtue is necessary for happiness,

he does not consider

instrumentally sufficient for happiness.

In the

Apology and

happiness and that
sufficiency-claim

it

Crito however, Socrates claims that virtue

cannot be taken away, as Chapter

comes from

is

sufficient for

,

III

shows.

I

argue that the

Socrates' belief that virtue's intrinsi c value

viii

makes

its

possessor happy, supporting this with other evidence from the Apology and Crito

Based on

this evidence,

I

conclude that virtue

is

.

for Socrates the sole intrinsic good.

Chapter IV shows that Socrates thinks he possesses knowledge of good and bad.
Socrates expresses a paramount desire to philosophize, even after death

must therefore expect

that philosophizing will yield further results.

Socrates' sole ultimate end,

I

conclude that virtue

in Plato's early

if possible;

Given

he

that virtue is

dialogues consists in

philosophical knowledge, including but not limited to knowledge of good and bad.

Chapter

V

shows

that Socrates' belief in the invulnerability of the virtuous

cannot be fully explained unless he believes that death cannot take away one's

knowledge.

I

show

this interpretation.

that Socrates' claims about death in the

I

also

show how my

can be used to corroborate Chapter

Ill's

Apology and Crito uphold

interpretation of Socrates'

views about death

main conclusion.

Tying together Socrates' views on

virtue, death,

and philosophy, Chapter VI

explains Socrates' belief that injuring others injures the agent:

pool of potential interlocutors, injuring others

knowledge.

IX

fails to

By

maximize

diminishing one's

one's philosophical

8

CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ABSTRACT
LIST OF

ABBREVIATIONS

••

CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION
j

Notes
II.

12

THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND BAD
Introduction

jg

The Worthlessness of Wealth etc
The Worth of Wisdom
No Such Thing as Luck: The Argument at Eud. 279c5-280b3
More Resources Do Not Mean Greater Success: The Argument
at

Eud. 280b5-281e5

Problems

III.

1

21

24
25

32

Which Wisdom is Inherently Helpful
Passage Out of the Labyrinth: Knowledge of Good and Bad
Wisdom Alone is Not Instrumentally Sufficient for Success

35

Notes

42

in Specifying

VIRTUE AS THE ULTIMATE END

IN

THE APOLOGY AND CRITO

Introduction

Why Attend to

37
39

59
59

Virtue?

59

Consolation for the Virtuous: Their Invulnerability

61

The Virtuous Risk and Do Not Risk

62

"Injuries"

Do the Virtuous Risk Living Unlivable Lives?
May the Virtuous Be Made Unhappy "by Accident"?
Do the Virtuous Risk Losing Minor Intrinsic Goods?

63

Only Instrumentally Good, is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness?
The Virtuous Risk Losing Extrinsic but Not Intrinsic Goods
The Virtuous Do Not Fear the Many At All: Virtue Cannot Be Taken Away
Goodness of Soul as the Sole Ultimate End
Can Bodily Deterioration Make the Virtuous Unhappy?

66

Notes

79

If

x

64

64
68
72
75

76

8

IV.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUE PAR EXCELLENCE

90

Introduction

Philosophizing

90
at

All Costs

90

The Good Socrates Thinks He Already Has

94

Socrates Considers Himself "Good"

95

He Knows What Virtue Is
Thinks He Knows the Good and the Bad

Socrates Thinks
Socrates

Socrates' Self-Assessment

97
108

108

Socrates' Confidence in the Justness/Goodness of His Actions

Socrates' Confidence in the Face of Death

15

.. 1

1 1

Socrates' Confidence in His Ability to Deliberate Effectively.... 120

V.

Nonexpert, "Elenctic" Knowledge?

122

Disavowals of Knowledge

126

Conclusion

129

Notes

131

THE VALUE OF DEATH

158

Notes
VI.

167

CONCLUSION

172

How Does

172

A

Injuring Others Injure Oneself?

174

Sketch of a Solution

Conclusion

178

Notes

180

APPENDICES
A.

OBEDIENCE AND SOCRATES’ REASON FOR PHILOSOPHIZING

1

B.

THE INSTRUMENTAL LIMITATIONS OF VIRTUE

203

C.

SOCRATES' ENDORSEMENT OF THE LAWS' SPEECH

208

D.

THE TEACHABILITY OF VIRTUE

211

E.

THE BASIS OF SOCRATES' CONFIDENCE

IN

THE GORGIAS

82

217
224

BIBLIOGRAPHY

xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Cm.

Apology
Charmides

Cto.

Crito

Eud.

Euthydemus

Eup.

Euthyphro

G.

Gorgias

HMa.

Hippias Major

HMi.

Hippias Minor

Lch.

Laches

Lw.

Laws

Ly.

Lysis

Mo.
Mx.

Meno

Pdo.
Pdr.

Phaedo
Phaedrus

Pro.

Protagoras

R.

Republic

So.

Sophist

Ap.

Menexenus

Sy.

Symposium

Th.

Theaetetus

xii

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

According

dominant

to a

way of interpreting

for almost a century

and

that is

Plato's early dialogues' that has

now

been

almost universally accepted

2
,

the

character Socrates treats virtue simply as a highly reliable, if
not necessary and
sufficient, instrumental

means

for living a

good

life.

will call this

I

understanding Socratic virtue the Traditional Interpretation.
virtue

is

typically identified either with practical

wisdom

(or,

On

way of

this interpretation,

more

specifically,

knowledge of good and bad") or with some other 4 condition of the soul
or disposes

its

possessor to

make morally

This interpretation has a

lot

that

empowers

and/or prudentially correct decisions.

of exegetic value.

Socrates' continual exhortation to everyone

—and

his

It is

own

supposed to account for
personal

commitment

—

(i)

to

value the possession of virtue higher than any other of the conventionally accepted

means
good

to

—

happiness like health and wealth;

sc.,

the

(ii)

Socrates' belief that virtue

most valuable instrumental means

to happiness;

the only consideration that decision-making requires

virtuous

—

sc., in

commitment
refute those

is

who

lack self-knowledge; (v) Socrates'

the greatest

Socrates' belief that

whether or not one's actions are

accordance with knowledge of good and bad;

to self-knowledge as a kind of profitable

(iii)

is

(iv) Socrates'

"wisdom" and

commitment

his mission to

to philosophical

discussion as a search for the knowledge of good and bad.

Having thus explained

Socrates' understanding of virtue,

appear to hold that Socrates either was not committed

1

to

most Traditionalists

any particular view about what

is

intrinsically

This

is

good or did not bother

what makes a prominent

"says very

little

that

is

to express (or to express fully)

any such view.

Traditionalist like Terry Penner 5 state that Socrates

6
useful" about the nature of happiness (1992a,
146). This also

presumably why team-scholars Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith
explicitly decide against entering into the debate over

intrinsically

good, except to say, with everyone

intrinsically

good (1994, 104

1987, 4

n. 2; cf.

famously attributes a form of hedonism
actually the only early dialogue in

view of what

is

cf.

1977,

,

not

commit himself to any

explicitly

Some

specific

the questions

whose answer he

9

final chapter

who

that particular
8

14);

1

its

and many disagree with Irwin over

hedonism only

to the

many who

Traditionalists hold not only that Socrates does

have such a view

to

is still

Alexander Nehamas 1987, 36 with

The

Indeed, even Terence Irwin,

view about the nature of happiness, but

and honestly professes not

is

to Socrates, believes that the Protagoras is

the Protagoras preferring instead to attribute

Socrates shows are in a muddle.

Socrates happiness

which Socrates commits himself to

happiness (1995, 91;

one point

what Socrates considers

else, that for

n. 7).

at

is

—

that this, after

that he

all, is

seeking and so disavows knowing (see,

one of

e.g.,

46).

of Gregory Vlastos's 1991 book

is

an unparalleled tour de

force against the long-standing interpretation of Socratic virtue as a merely instrumental

means

to happiness.

Interpretation has to

has.

The main

But

it is

noteworthy that Vlastos's objection to the Traditional

do not so much with what

is

as with

what kind of value

it

difference, therefore, between his and the typical Traditionalist

interpretation of Socratic virtue

"supreme"

10

virtue

intrinsic

value— to

is that

Vlastos assigns intrinsic value

—

in fact,

the very thing that, under the Traditional Interpretation,

2

has an intrinsic value that Socrates either

fails to

does not bother to express) or believes

zero.

some reason

knowledge" or

some combination of the

Traditionalist

It is

sense of

makes,

who

to the

two),

11

(or

or

is

by (apparently) limiting virtue

conduct recognized as best by such knowledge (or

Vlastos has kept one foot firmly planted in the

camp.

well

known

that the Traditional Interpretation has difficulty

some of the most important and most famous claims about
particularly in the

Apology and

the Crito

.

where he seems

has virtue as self-sufficiently happy and invulnerable to

appears to treat virtue either as an ultimate end that
life

know

So, in spite of the difference, there

for classifying Vlastos as a Traditionalist:

either to "moral

to

is

specify (because he does not

or as having quite a bit

any other disposition

all

by

making

literal

virtue that Socrates

to regard the

all injury.

person

Socrates thus

itself is sufficient for a

good

more instrumental power than knowledge of good and bad

to act)

would appear

to have,

even by his

own

lights.

There

is

of course the possibility that Socrates' various claims about virtue are inconsistent. But

we

potentially

have much

to lose if

we

accept this possibility without

trying hard to

first

reconstruct a consistent view. Plato himself seems to have recognized the principle of

charity

when he made

Socrates struggle to understand Protagoras' Truth and say,

surely likely that a wise
13

(Th. 152b).*

If,

man

not

trifle

with words;

however, a consistent view

result requires that

we

attribute to Socrates

is

let us,

therefore, follow

impossible given the

him

"It is

closely"

facts, or if the

an obviously absurd view, then

admit failure and say that he probably just made inconsistent claims, as

is

end-

we must

possible even

for the wise.

E’ikos

pevtoi G090V avbpa

pf)

AqpeTv EuaKoAou 0 f|Ocop£v ouv auTco.

3

Several scholars attempt to save the traditional sort
of interpretation by
interpreting the problematic texts in such a

way

that Socrates

does not quite mean what

he appears to be saying in those texts; for instance, some
scholars think that some of the
texts in question are intentionally hyperbolic.

One

scholar attempts to save the

Traditional Interpretation by suggesting that virtue for Socrates

and bad, the only
knowledge.

1

'’

intrinsic

Another scholar suggests

among

historical Socrates,

that Socrates says things incompatible with the

virtue

is

I

should conclude that

knowledge of good and bad

Crito.

and

and probably representative of the

was

it

Plato

who

invented the idea that

16

—

particularly the

Apology and

others— suggest a more appealing

satisfactory sense of

and be charitable toward

Traditional Interpretation

is

all

among

whenever Socrates

some kind of practical wisdom

some

such a

17

state ).

way

or

that

this is

the ultimate goals.

believe, is the misimpression that

in a certain

we

I

show

will

that

make

are to

fundamentally mistaken in concluding that Socrates thinks

interpreted as being

one to behave

.

of Socrates' statements. The

of virtue primarily as a means to other ultimate goals;

is

if

the Crito but

interpretation that

fundamentally from the Traditional Interpretation. But, further,

these dialogues absolutely require this alternative interpretation

virtue

that since the latter

.

will argue that the early dialogues

also isolated passages in several

differs

Apology and

Plato's very first writings

we

knowledge of good

good, and a means to nothing but the maintenance of that

Traditional Interpretation primarily in the

are probably

is

is

mistaken, even

The source of this mistake,

talks

of virtue he has

other state of soul that

beneficial for

This widespread impression

is

4

if this

empowers

one (or the behavior

in

I

mind

or disposes

that issues

from

expressed most succinctly by Penner,

who

thinks that for Socrates

"[.

.

the goodness of a

.]

good human being

is

goodness

at

something, namely, getting happiness" (1992a, 135; Penner's
emphasis).
I

am

far

from denying

that Socrates often speaks of virtue in precisely this
way.

In fact, a substantial portion of this paper

the Traditional Interpretation as

it

is

is

devoted to defending an important part of

commonly

presented: viz., the part that interprets

Socrates as often identifying virtue with knowledge of good and bad.

simply assume this
evidence for

it;

is

so or present

it

all

scholars

as a fact without also presenting adequate textual

while other scholars reject or question

often unstated or not clearly or completely presented.

and interpret

Many

it

because such evidence

One aim of this paper

is

is to

so

supply

textual evidence for this part of the Traditional Interpretation.

But there

is

abundant evidence

in the early dialogues for thinking that Socrates

does not consistently talk of virtue as though

bad or some such

it

were limited

facility for acting correctly; in fact, the

talk represents only a derivative understanding

virtue par excellence

.

Recognizing

this

to

knowledge of good and

evidence indicates that that

of virtue rather than his conception of

evidence and interpreting

it

correctly are

essential for a clear understanding of Socrates' often inscrutable arguments and views

about virtue and happiness. In some very crucial passages, he pretty clearly
as not only as an ultimate end, but the sole ultimate end.

his

meaning

entirely if we suppose that Socrates

knowledge of good and bad or
mistaken

if

we suppose

of soul). There

is

to

some other

is

And when

he does

treats virtue

so,

we

miss

limiting virtue simply to the

disposition to act (and

we

are

still

more

that "virtue" there refers to a kind of action rather than to a state

no question

that Socrates

does not often take pains to make clear the

relevant distinctions; indeed, he never explicitly

5

makes note

of the tact that he uses the

term virtue" (or "wisdom")

knowledge

as a whole,

in different

ways

sometimes referring

—sometimes

referring to philosophical

to only that part

of it that

achieving further ends. But Plato gives us every reason to think that

is

helpful in

we must

understand such a distinction in Socrates' various uses of the term "virtue".

According

to the Traditional Interpretation, there are

which Socrates has

little

to say: for

how

example,

exactly

generally) doing injustice against one's self-interest

19
,

is

some important

matters on

harming others or (more

what specific kinds of behavior

does knowledge of good and bad prescribe and what does

it

prohibit

20
,

what exactly

does happiness consist in? The Traditional Interpretation actually blocks our way

toward

tilling in these

role.

When

gaps because

it

assigns to virtue only or primarily an instrumental

the Traditional Interpretation

replaced with a

is

understanding of Socrates' use of "virtue" and "wisdom",
position to see

what Socrates' answers

to these questions

we

more

are in a

What

is

What

virtue par excellence?

is

knowledge of good and bad? What explains
of the virtuous?

And

here, in outline,

is

my

more favorable

must have been.

Here, then, are the main questions about Socratic ethics that

paper:

careful

happiness?

What

is

I

confront in this

the value of

Socrates' confidence in the invulnerability

answer

to

them: Socrates certainly

considers knowledge of good and bad "virtue", and he evidently would not consider one
virtuous if one did not have such knowledge. But virtue par excellence

view, limited to knowledge of good and bad;
philosophical knowledge.

And

helpful in any attempt to live a

so important to acquire

it.

it

includes that as well as

although knowledge of good and bad

good

life,

that

is

not ultimately

why

is

is

all

not, in his

other

inherently

Socrates thinks

it is

In fact, the only interest Socrates has in actively applying

6

knowledge of good and

bad—assuming he

philosophical knowledge: having as
end.

One of his

human

(enough

that

in the

is

hope of gaining more

as possible

not particularly worried at the prospect of

has. This confident attitude,

I

to

view

accumulate

in the

much more

all

explicit than

it

is

view of happiness and

in the former.

be the same as virtue (29e, 36c)

22

—

philosophical truth (79d, 66bc), as

I

will

show

is in

Phronesis

the

is

Phaedo the

"true virtue" in the

is

that this is the nature

Symposium

In the

the

good

24

middle dialogues,

—consider

173e-174a);

25

the greatest

good

it is

the goodness of a

human

life

same

view

as

is

Apology seems

to

on

(212a;

cf.

good person

R.

that cannot be

in the Crito refers to,

quite explicit that philosophers

when

—those who know

philosophical knowledge the sole ultimate end (Pdo. 66b; Th.

is

never to attain the truth (Pdo.
26

As much

the

(44d).

the "greatest and utmost of bad things"

83cd).

is

of virtue par excellence in the early

what "phronesis"

is

in the

soul's fastening

taken away (Ap. 30cd, 4 Id); this also

is

only in the

true virtue

—which

is

it

if

that in the latter the

dialogues too: philosophical knowledge

Socrates says that

—

the knowledge he could desire.

middle dialogues. The only difference

6.504b-505a).

either

degree of happiness) which can never be taken away, or

In the early dialogues Socrates'

his

comes

argue,

from his expectation that he will inevitably be allowed the chance

—

ultimate

he has already accumulated a substantial share of such knowledge

to attain a satisfactory

hereafter

is his

or other unfortunate forces from being able to accumulate

more knowledge than he already
from his opinion

it— is

much of such knowledge

peculiarities is that he

being prevented by

acquires

as possible, Socrates and

all

philosophers

want

to escape ordinary

and the satisfaction of appetites required by partnership with the body (Pdo.

7

64de; R. 7.517cd, 9.571e-572a, 9.58 lde; Th. 173e;
Pdr. 249cd). Socrates actually

announces a desire

escape

to

—god

willing

truth (Pdo. 66de, 81a; Th. 176a). In the

— from

life itself in

Symposium Diotima
.

order better to pursue the
expresses, and Socrates

says (212b) he agrees with, the philosopher’s opinion
of a good
life

[.

.]— at viewing

.

course,

that

is

the Beautiful Itself—that

indeed worth living

it is

at

any point)" (21

apprehension of the Form ot Beauty

that

argue,

apprehending Forms

when

human"

is

it

is

is

worth living for a human

Id).

valuable as a

Diotima

means

is

mean only

is

that philosophizing results in

act correctly; for he is evidently prepared to philosophize at

goodness (4 Id;

to living well; the idea

"the greatest

best for

him

to die

I

will

good

knowledge of how

for a

to

aU costs (28e-29a, 29d),

is

a

Pdo. 107c8-d2, Pdr. 248c). In the Apology he even

cf.

,

suggests that death could be "the greatest of

is

of

not here suggesting

and philosophizing has secured for him sufficient "goodness" that nothing bad
threat to this

point in

(if,

the end itself (cf. "teAos" at 210e, 21 lb7). Nor,

Socrates in the Apology says that philosophizing

(38a), does he

life: "It is at this

all

the goods" (29a; cf. Pdo. 64a) and that

it

and thereby be "released from troubles (cxTTriAAdxQai

upaypoiTcov}" (Ap. 4

1

d; cf.

Pdo. 84b3-4 with 67b 1 0). Such forms of expression are

not coincidentally similar to Socrates' statements about death in the Phaedo; they

express the same views.

It is

difficult to see

plain similarities

what on the Traditional Interpretation we

between Socrates' statements

in the

attention to soul, and truth and his statements in the

that

would otherwise be so

*6VTau0a toO

quto to

.

.

.

make of the

Phaedo about phronesis, death,

Apology about

natural given such similarities

(3io u

are to

—

these.

viz., that

A conclusion

Socrates in both

elnEp ttou aAAoQi, (3icotov dv0pcbTTcp, 0 ecouevco

kcxAov.

8

dialogues

expressing the very same views about the value of
phronesis, death, and

is

attention to

soul—cannot

evidently be so readily accepted by the Traditionalist,

who

holds either that Socrates in the Apology has no particular
view on what has intrinsic
value or that he

is

Athenians. But

if the

it

hard to see

is

not concerned with expressing such views in his speech
to the

how

statements, though so similar, are not to be interpreted similarly,

Plato could have expected his readers to avoid what on this

assumption would be a potentially huge interpretive
Socrates of the

its

solution

I

error:

attributing the

Apology and Socrates of the Phaedo The

severity of this

.

leave to the Traditionalist to ponder with no further

same views

to

problem and

comment

here.

Socrates, in accordance with ordinary ancient Greek usage, conceives of virtue
as

what makes us good (Lch. 190b, Cm. 161a, G. 506d, Mo. 87e;

sometimes

infers

One problem

from

this that virtue

for us English readers

and understandably

so, since

it

is

cf.

makes us ophelimoi (Mo. 87e;
that the

word

most often appears

is

to

cf.

Eud. 292c-e).

often translated as "beneficial",

imply instrumental goodness

need not be so interpreted, as may be seen by observing, with Donald Zeyl,

goods are by definition considered "ophelimoi"

We

must not simply presume from

he has

in

mind only instrumental

being happy

here

mean

"is profitable

that being

Some

scholars

28

(Pro. 333d-334a, G. 499d,

It

.

that ail

Mo.

27

87e).

Socrates' use of instrumental-sounding language that

value; in the Republic for example, Socrates says that
,

{AugiteAeT}" (1.354a), and

happy

He

R. 10.609bc).

results in

some

it is

pretty clear that he does not

further good.

appear to think that Socrates' 'Function Argument'

in

Book

I

of

29

the Republic (353d-354a)

reason our virtue

—

the

shows

that,

according to Socrates of the early dialogues,

good condition of our soul

9

—

is

valuable

is

that without

it

we

the

cannot deliberate well and manage our affairs well.
According to Socrates, such
scholars explain, those activities are the "function" of
the soul, suggesting that in

Socrates view that

ergon as

is

function

the extent of the soul's value for us. Translating
Socrates'

helps this interpretation somewhat: generally,

speaker says ot something,

Its

function

as that thing's sole or primary purpose

connotation;

in

mind,

meant

it is

to

it

may

.

is

.

.

But

whatever

in ancient

fills in

when an English

the blank

easier to see that Socrates' argument at R. 1.353d-354a

it)

(R.

1

But

,353c).

this

thing's virtue is valuable only or

If a thing's

reason to value

it

possessing

its

It

is

may be

even primarily as a means.

is

regardless of whatever products

it

it

to

may

its

may be

(arguably) intrinsically valuable are the

But

this,

intrinsic value.

some would

In fact,

increasing; our time

its

argue, the

intrinsic value is

would perhaps be

to

better spent

10

would

mean,

in this condition

Some

that a

—be

believe

true that the virtue or

same
its

as those that

make

more

or

passengers to and from

argue, should not distract our attention

some might

automobile as a means, the more

it

it

we may have some

—being

perform some function well, such as transporting

the grocery store.

from

it

It

it

31

intrinsically valuable,

passionately that such a thing has intrinsic value.

make

so that

true that a thing will not be

helpful in achieving. Consider a vintage automobile in mint condition.

virtues that

is

virtue (or instrumentally as productive as

virtue

kept

not necessarily

does not mean, nor does Socrates take

its

understood

If that is

.

imply that the only or main reason we must value goodness of soul

instrumentally productive without

allow

is

Greek, "ergon" has no such

simply mean product or perhaps peculiar product

can be used to help perform correct actions.

be with

.",

word

that

away

one uses such an

diminished or kept from

waxing and polishing

it.

This,

I

believe,

is

just

how

Socrates views the soul: there

intrinsically valuable for

requires us to

make use

it (i.e.,

us) to be

ol the soul as a

And

in.

means

to

is

a certain condition that

is

it

although partnership with the body

making choices concerning

the

satisfaction of appetites, such uses interfere with our ability to increase our soul's
intrinsic value.

Our time would be

better spent contemplating the forms.

In fact, quite generally, Socrates thinks that the

good has nothing

do with an extrinsic purpose toward which

to

Socrates observes in

because
lies in

it

Book

I

of the Republic

can be used for food or

being used, or that

these ends as

much

primary way

its

to

,

that a

sheep

make money does

own good may

it

may be

not

mean

be maximized by

its

in

may

which a thing

is

be applied. As

instrumentally good

that the sheep's

good

being applied toward

as possible (345cd). Similarly, though a soul (just as a person)

may

certainly be used as an instrument in an attempt to achieve further ends, the use to

which a soul

(or a person)

may

be put

is

not, according to Socrates, the extent

goodness. Since for Socrates one's soul and one's self are one and the same,

ultimate

good consists not

in

some purpose toward which he

but in the intrinsic goodness of his soul.

33

In this

or his soul

way, Socrates' view

may

of its
a person's

be applied,

reflects traditional

ancient Greek thought (as well perhaps as ours) about ultimate ends: Plato represents

the typical

Greek as being inclined

at

an intuitive level to identify her or his ultimate

end either as happiness or as being as good a person as possible without recognizing
,

any significant difference between the two concepts.

11

34

Notes
1

By "early dialogues" I mean at least the Apology Charmides
E uthydemus Euthyphro, Hippias Minor Ion, Laches Lysis and
.

,

.

Crito

.

Protagoras

For the
accept a traditional division between 'early' and 'middle'
Platonic dialogues. Since the Gorgias and Meno are usually
considered 'transitional'
between the early and middle dialogues, I do not treat them as early,
though many
scholars do (see, e.g., Penner 1987, 263 n. 1). The Euthydemus
also (though less
commonly than the Gorgias and Meno ) is considered a 'transitional' dialogue. But I
use
only those passages of it that are commonly thought to be representative
of views
.

purposes of this paper,

.

,

I

and

arguments belonging
"

Prominent,

to the early dialogues.

fairly recent expositors

of the interpretation include Guthrie 1971,
92-94; 1995, 67ff.; Brickhouse and Smith
1989, 156ff.; 1994, 105ff., 206ff.; Reeve 1989, 124ff.; Penner 1992a, 134ff.; Annas
1996, 1191; Reshotko 2001. See also A. Taylor 1956, 26-28. Irwin 1977, 303 n. 69
137,

1

j>9,

142-147, 149

n. 3;

Irwin 1977,

8,

some prominent scholars who apparently would have rejected the interpretation,
which I would add Allen 1996; I think, however, that it is wrong to include Guthrie
lists

1971 on this

to

list.

3

Guthrie 1971, 133-134; Irwin 1977, 89; 1986, 210; Penner 1992a, 135;
Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 71; Annas 1999, 97.
4

Or additional. A few Traditionalists apparently hold that for Socrates virtue
knowledge of good and bad plus some disposition like endurance or fortitude; see
Devereux 1992, 774ff. Santas 1993, 48 thinks that this is true "at least" in the Meno

is

.

5

Penner certainly says

instrumental

means

that he thinks Socrates does not consider virtue a

to happiness

(150

interpretation, he starts speaking as

n. 14).

But when Penner turns

though the interpretation he

is

mere

to support this

trying to support

is

rather that Socrates considers the activities involved in soul-care—viz., inquiry, testing,

examining, thinking, discrimination

—

as principal ingredients of happiness.

Now since

knowledge of good and bad, I do not see how
Penner supports the former interpretation even if he is correct about the latter. (I argue
against the latter interpretation in Appendix A.)
Penner 1992b also suggests that Eud. 279d-280b implies that for Socrates "[. .]
wisdom is happiness" (13 n. 24). It is unclear what Penner thinks this means, and as far
Penner thinks that virtue for Socrates

is

.

as

I

know he nowhere
6

offers a defense of this interpretation.

Klosko 1987 discusses how incomplete

Socrates' views

on happiness

in the

early dialogues appear to be (see particularly 253-254, 258).
7

Oddly, however, they do end up presenting what appears

question. See

my

Chapter

II n.

52.

12

to

be an answer to the

g

Penner 1997, 128 ff agrees

that Socrates accepts the form of hedonism
Socrates introduces there, but disagrees with Irwin over
what kind of hedonism Socrates
introduces. Penner s hedonism seems so broad that
it could include any eudaimonistic
axiology.
.

Only in my Chapter II n. 3 do
attribution of hedonism to Socrates.
9

A

I

present any kind of direct response to Irwin's

revised version of a 1984 paper.

It is ti

ue that Vlastos distinguishes moral knowledge

—

which he sometimes
virtue— from "technical" knowledge (in, e.g., 1994, 109126), and many Traditionalists (e.g., Penner 1992a) would say that virtue is a technical
(as well as moral) knowledge. But it is pretty clear that Vlastos's
distinction marks a
(see

my

n.

11) identifies as

difference in objects rather than a 'functional' difference.

And although Vlastos 1991
65) speaks as though Socrates does not think virtue is
instrumental ly good, I see no reason why he would want to hold this; when he does
speak thus, I suspect he is speaking hyperbolically in order to put in high relief his
sometimes

(e.g.,

217

n.

disagreement with Irwin's view, which

is

that virtue's good, according to Socrates,

is

purely instrumental.

In Chapter III n. 13, 1 explain the uncertainty concerning what exactly is
view of Socratic virtue. Just the fact that Vlastos has not bothered to present
clearly his view on what is Socratic virtue suggests that his does not differ
fundamentally from the Traditionalist view.

Vlastos's

12

See Irwin 1977, 100-101; 1995, 59-60, 73-74; Vlastos 1978, 128-130; Klosko
1987, 254-255; Santas 1993, 38; Annas 1993, 65.
1

'

1903

Whenever

texts,

I

quote Plato,

I

use

my own translations,

except in the case of the Gorgias where

I

based on Burnet's 1900-

use Dodds 1959, of the Phaedo

where

I

use Burnet 1911, and of the Euthyphro Apology and Crito where

1924.

I

abbreviate the

,

of Abbreviations,

titles

,

I

use Burnet

of Plato's works using a nonstandard method; see

my

List

p. xii.

14

One scholar has suggested that what explains the difference in Socrates'
between the Apology and Crito and the other early dialogues is that in the
former two works "questions of life and death are under consideration" whereas in other
dialogues "his concern is with ethical matters in general" (Klosko 1987, 259-260; cf.
Guthrie 1975, 99 and Benson 2000, 236).
attitude

15

Zeyl 1982, 236-237

(cf.

Vlastos 1978, 131).

Iam

not certain that

I

have

accurately expressed Zeyl's interpretation: Sometimes he seems to regard the "exercise"
of knowledge of good and bad rather than the knowledge itself— as the ultimate end.

—

16

Kahn

1996, 8 8ff.

13

8
1

con fl ation of virtue as a state of soul and virtue as
a kind of behavior is
ai
common even in the literature that is supposed to explain Socratic
virtue. Vlastos
1978 is a good example: he alternates without comment,
and apparently unwittingly,
from speaking of virtue as though it were a way of acting
or living (129) to speaking of
it as though it were some kind of
order in the soul (130) or moral knowledge
(131) or
the soul's state of perfection (131).

J

1

He comes

my

puzzle. See
19

n.

closest to doing so,

believe, only in presenting a philosophical

I

33.

Irwin 1977, 58-61, 129-130; Santas 1993, 44; Vlastos
1991, 196-197.

20

Santas 1993, 48ff. and Annas 1999, 42, e.g., both raise the question
of what
exactly does correct use of goods consist in according to Socrates in
the Euthydemus
It is

some

true that Socrates offers

never to do injustice,

we

specifics: e.g.,

seek out punishment for ourselves;

seem only

sake of what are

.

harm anyone; we are
when we do injustice we are to
obey our superiors; we are to
are never to

are not to return evil for evil;

control our appetites so that
'specifics'

we

we

we

are always to

require as

little as possible to satisfy them. But such
need for an answer to the original question: For the
be doing all these things? Why are these particular

to intensify the

we supposed

to

kinds of action necessary for happiness, according to Socrates?
2

among

Even

if

a Traditionalist were to (a

ultimate ends, one

la,

perhaps, Vlastos) place virtue also

cannot use such an interpretation to give an adequate
answer to these questions because virtue will still, on such an interpretation, be just
still

knowledge of good and bad.
See Chapter
untranslated.

I

III n. 1.

In this paper

I

leave "phronesis" and

agree with Burnet (1924, 12) that

with "wisdom {sophia}". If this

is true,

it is,

its

in Plato, roughly

cognates

synonymous

"phronimos" should not be translated as

"sensible" or "prudent" (pace West and West 1998, 70 n. 33; cf. Kahn 1996 and Chapter
IV n. 24); for this seems to imply a distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom
which is found explicitly only in Aristotle and which, more importantly for my purpose,

would beg important questions. Since "phronesis" seems
with connotations that are not obvious,

however, there
mind, while

is

one English word

at the

same time

it

should for

in Plato to

now be

that adequately captures

retaining the

Greek term's

left

be a technical term

untranslated.

what

I

If,

believe Plato has in

original connotations,

it is

"mindfulness".
23

Likewise, a person's badness

is

explained in terms of bad "nurturing

{Tpocprj}" of or bad "attention {peAetti}" to the soul (Pdo. 81b-e); a badly nurtured
soul

is

one

that has not throughout life attempted to attain pure philosophical

knowledge, while avoiding bodily

affairs as

much

as possible.

The

"attention

{ettiueAeioc}" to soul (or self) that Socrates values so highly (107cd, 115b)

is

obviously

attention to philosophical learning and the avoidance of bodily affairs that that attention

14

requires (see

14e-

1

l

15a). Accordingly, his exhortation to

phronimos as possible" (107d) is simply an exhortation
as defined at 79d
as possible.

—

We

cannot

become

"as

to acquire as

good and

as

much phronesis—

Pdo. 68-69 lead us to conclude that for Socrates
virtue par
from "phronesis". In that passage "true virtue" is considered
as
distinct from phronesis; but the former refers to
"being pure {KaOapois}" from bodily
pleasures and pains (69c), sc. not being agitated or controlled
by appetite for or fear of
them (68c, 68d, 68e-69a). That is what Socrates says the many
excellence

let

distinct

is

call "virtue" (68c5, c8not what Socrates himself calls "virtue". The point of the
passage is that the
philosopher satisfies more than anyone even the popular conception
of virtue,
particularly not fearing death (cf. R. 6.484d-487a).
9),

The suggestion, however, that phronesis precedes being pure (phronesis is
a
{KaOapqos}" thing at Pdo. 69c) does seem incongruous with Socrates'

purifying
earlier

claim that being pure

a prerequisite of phronesis (67ab). The solution to this
not that "phronesis" at 69c refers to "simply a clear-minded understanding
of what is
truly valuable" (a la Rowe 1993, 151), as though it here refers to knowledge
of good

and bad.

is

far simpler to

suppose rather that "phronesis" at 69c refers to the
sc., attention—to learning rather than to bodily affairs.
(Philosophers
the phronimoi (62cd). "Phronimos" can mean simply "attentive", as
Ap. 25c, 28d, 29e.) The point that only with phronesis do we acquire "virtue" (Pdo.
It is

philosopher's mindfulness

69a-c)

same

the

is

is

—

at

as the point that only the philosophers are "virtuous" (68b-d).

"Phronesis", however, in the

sense

strict

is

apprehension of forms, which

is

supposed

to

come from

the philosopher's mindful/attentive disposition. (Rowe, by the way, wrongly
suggests that the stricter form of phronesis is according to Socrates impossible during

Socrates explicitly acknowledges that

life.

(74b);

we

knowledge of forms evidently comes

here have knowledge of (some) forms

degrees and

in

is

never "purely" or

"sufficiently" attained until after death (see 65e, 66b, 66de, 67a, 68ab).)
24

That Socrates thinks separation of soul from body

apprehend clearly the forms— is

at last to

—and

of philosophers but of
sophist

all

humans

is

manifest, for example, in his instructing Cebes to

"[.

.

he

is

sophron

cos

if

.]

TaxiOTa}"

—

to

pursue

(Pdo. 61b,

me

as quickly as possible

my emphasis).

he knows what

the consequent ability

in the interest not just

"If

he

is

tell Euenus the
{av ococppovq, epe

sophron" here means

if

he

Sicokeiv
is

wise

him ("Sophron" is usually translated as
"temperate"; but it can likewise be used as just a synonym for "phronimos", cf. Lch.
197a and Pro. 332a-333b.) Socrates is only sarcastically assuming that Euenus is a
philosopher sc., one who would share Socrates' longing for death. (On Socrates'
(cf.

62d4)

sc., if

is

Rood

for

.

—

sarcasm
that if

in the passage, cf.

Rowe

1993.)

What

is

serious,

Euenus were sophron then Euenus would share

opinion that the philosopher's goal

is

however,

is

the suggestion

Socrates' longing. For Socrates'

objectively and universally the best, see also R.

9.580d-583a.
25
1

think that "the

more

elegant {KoqvpoTEpoi}" at R. 6.505b refers to

philosophers, in spite of the criticism Socrates presents there against the view that the

good

is

phronesis, and in spite of the subsequent cryptic account of "the

15

Good"

according to which

it is distinct from knowledge
(6.508e-509a). It is clear from other
passages in the Republic that philosophers consider
philosophical knowledge
knowledge of forms (called "phronesis" at Pdo. 79d) —the
sole

ultimate end: living on

the Islands of the Blest

a

is

metaphor

for life completely

absorbed in philosophical
contemplation (R. 7.519c); the one who has attained such a life
would rather suffer
"anything whatsoever {otiouv}" than to return to a life in
which he is forced to think

on other matters
pursues the

I suspect that when Socrates
is made to say that every soul
(6.505d) he just means that every soul aims ultimately at knowledge

(7.5 16d).

Good

of the Form of Goodness.
26

27

28

Obviously Socrates considers himself a true philosopher (95c).
Zeyl 1982, 230

n. 21.

Thompson

1901, 104

makes

the

same observation.

Penner 1992a, 134-135; Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 113-114; cf Zeyl 1982

235ff.
29
I

Although the matter

of the Republic with the

I

(

do not deny

Nicomachean Ethics
31

We

is

'early'

highly controversial,

many

1999,

1

it

think,

Book

that the term evidently acquired this sense in Aristotle's system

1097b24ff.); but that

must guard against the

is

another matter.

'opposite' mistake as well: viz., inferring

fact that Socrates considers virtue intrinsically valuable that

considered

Traditionalists group

dialogues and Books II-X with the 'middle' dialogues.

valuable as a means. Allen 1996, 165 appears to do just

comes dangerously

close to

making

this

from the

he could not have also

mistake

when

that.

Annas

she argues that in

the Republic the philosophers' love of philosophical

"undermining" their willingness to apply
It is

that

important to see that although Socrates

knowledge is represented as
knowledge to practical problems (104ff.).

in the

Republic does represent the

philosophers as recognizing no intrinsic value in bodily matters, this does not imply that
they do not recognize the instrumental value of the bodily actions that knowledge of the

good sometimes

requires. In fact, philosophers are represented as fully appreciating the

necessity of satisfying bodily appetites to a certain extent (R. 9.58 le).
32

33

See

my

Chapter IV

n.

16 and Pdo.

1

15d, 107c+115b.

Treating instrumental goodness as though

it

were the only type of good

is

exactly what generates a philosophical puzzle that Plato raises in different forms in

Lw. 963). The vexing
In what (way) does the
question of the second protreptic passage of the Euthydemus
good condition of soul
positing
the
may be answered by
political art make men good?
several dialogues (Eud. 291 d

ff.,

HMa. 296d-297d,

—

R. 6.505bc,

—

as the ultimate aim/product of the art (as Socrates does elsewhere, e.g., at Eup. 2d-3a

and G. 464c, 502e, 503a,
good, not good

at

some

5

1

3de): the art

further activity.

makes them—their souls— be intrinsically
(Of course it achieves this ultimate aim by

16

first

making them good

using the instrumental goods.) Thus a solution to the
puzzle is
assumption that Penner 1992a, 135 thinks that Socrates
accepts,
viz. that a person's being good always is being
good at something.

found by

at

rej ecting the

This explains
other

when he has

why

Plato uses both concepts or sometimes one instead of
the
his characters discuss ultimate ends. So, for example,
in the

Laches

parents are portrayed as being concerned for their children's
goodness (179ab;
20b, Mo. 94b), in the Lysis (207d ff.) they are concerned for their
happiness,

cf.

and

Euthydemus "being happy" and "being

a

good man"

interchangeably (282e).

17

are both used, apparently

Ap.
in the

CHAPTER II
THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND BAD

Introduction

I

want

to begin

by developing a good understanding of what kind of value

Socrates thinks knowledge ol good and bad has.

what productive power he thinks
avoids the mistake

we

him

is

it

want

first to

is

focus particularly on

very important to see that he carefully

—of supposing

result in the agent's happiness.

knowledge of good and bad
understood,

has; for

often attributed to

knower of the good always

is

it

I

that actions

performed by a

Socrates does not think that

instrumental ly sufficient for happiness.

Once

this matter

will be better able to understand Socrates' bold claims about the

invulnerability of the virtuous (Ap. 30cd, 4 Id; Cto. 44d) and to consider whether

Socrates really believes that virtue

that all there is to virtue is

I

think, if

Let

me

one

starts

as Socrates sees

I

"instrumentally good".

make
I

my choice

liberal use

confuse the two,

I

attempt

Socrates' views

assume

this

in the

explain the

come

to light

Euthydemus

.

of some modern terminology. In the

that Socrates grasps the distinction

When

between the

Socrates and his interlocutor appear

think that this shows only that sometimes Socrates takes advantage

of the tendency to confuse them (apparently mischievously, but

pedagogic reasons)

on

first to

of the terms "intrinsically good" and

concepts that these modern terms pick out.

to

it.

I

with the so-called protreptic passages

begin by explaining

following discussion,

valuable primarily as an instrumental means and

knowledge of good and bad. So

knowledge of good and bad
best,

is

—

I

think ultimately for

a tendency that English and ancient Greek speakers share.

18

—

Because the distinction appears

Book
uses

1

II,

it

it

might be concluded

in the early dialogues.

the distinction

is

that

But

we

my

to

be made explicitly only as

Republic

cannot assume that Socrates understands and

assumption that Socrates understands and uses

well-founded on language he uses throughout the early dialogues

language that requires this assumption; without

what Socrates

'early' as

says.

claims will likewise

Commentators who
fail to

it,

we

cannot

sense of much of

make

use the distinction to explain Socrates'

fail to

supply explanations that are both accurate and free of

confusion.

In particular, there is at least

one passage

in the early

dialogues that makes

it

clear in quite explicit terms that Socrates discerns the concept of intrinsic goodness.

This passage occurs in the Protagoras a dialogue that
,

to

is

almost universally considered

be in the very earliest group of dialogues that Plato wrote.
as things are pleasant, are they not,

"...

Inasmuch

else

comes from them)?" (351c)/ Protagoras

2

Socrates asks the sophist,

inasmuch as

that,

replies (35 led) that

simply that "the pleasant things

all

to say

are bad,

and some are neither good nor bad. Socrates then repeats

(if

nothing

he does not know

are good", since

whether

good

some

are good,

some

his original question.
3

clearly in

"...

an attempt

to clarify

it

for Protagoras

Are things not good inasmuch

itself is

not [the] good" (351e)/

the sole intrinsic

good?

5

6 qSea
aAAo;
aTTo(3f]OETai
*.

.

1?

.

kcx0

He

4

who

apparently has not understood

it:

as they are pleasant? I'm asking whethei pleasure

His question

is: Is

pleasure an intrinsic

good— in

fact,

(351d)
pretty clearly thinks that Protagoras' observation

eotiv,

apa koto toOto ouk aya6d,

Ka 0’ ooov f]5ea eotiv,

e’i

pf]

e’i

ti car’

qutodv

ouk dya0d, xqv nSovqv auTqv spcoxcov

ouk aya0ov eotiv.

19

is

ei

irrelevant to the question he

intrinsic value is also

made

is

asking. That Socrates' question

clear

is

about the bearer of

by the subsequent discussion wherein Socrates and

Protagoras agree (35 le) to assume for the sake of
argument that pleasure and the good
are

same

the

:

some pleasures

Socrates later shows himself agreeing with Protagoras'
sentiment that
are

bad

(in spite

are intrinsically good): this

is

of the

fact that,

because some pleasures are overall

cause an amount of intrinsic disvalue that their

compensate for (354cd).
the early dialogues

clear

is

6

So there

meant

according to their hypothesis, they

no reason

is

own
to

to grasp the concept

up what he considers a muddle

that the

bad— that

they

is,

(supposed) intrinsic value does not

doubt that the Socrates character of

of intrinsic goodness; he uses

many

all

it

to

suffer due to their acceptance of a

certain version of hedonism.

I

turn

now to

the protreptic passages of the

Euthvdemus

.

It is

here that

given the most in-depth treatment of the value of knowledge of good and bad
as

I

will presently explain, of

dialogue).

its

never being characterized explicitly as such

The views and arguments presented

considered genuinely 'Socratic'; that

strictly 'Platonic'

is

supposed

to

is,

in spite

in these

we

(in spite,

in this

passages are generally

of apparent

flirtations

with supposedly

concepts in other parts of the dialogue, his conversation with Cleinias

cohere quite nicely with what he says about virtue and happiness

dialogues of the

are

'early'

in the

period. In fact, assumptions and conclusions from the protreptic

passages of the Euthvdemus are quite
the early dialogues believes.

commonly

7

20

cited as evidence for

what Socrates of

—

The Worthlessness of Wealth
In the first protreptic passage of the

etc.

Euthvdemus Socrates
.

arrives at a

conclusion about the value of possessions such as wealth,
health, beauty, and physical
or political power.

He

states the conclusion in at least three different

ways: Such

possessions "themselves by themselves are [not] by nature good"
(28 Id).* "Themselves

by themselves", they are not "worth anything {ouBevos a£ia}" (281de). 8
None of

them

is

either

may

themselves,

it

disvalue) at

all.

context.

good or bad (28 le;
look like he

But

to

is

cf.

292b).

9

When

focusing on just these statements

concluding that wealth

be properly understood,

we must

etc.

have no value (or

of course read the statements

in

10

Socrates seems not to want to claim that wealth

granted that sometimes wealth

etc. benefit

must be used (280d) and used

disvalue; they are bad

when used

they would be used incorrectly

would be

better,

more

is

meant

280e-281a). So,

it

They

beneficial (28 1 b-d).)

seems, Socrates

deny

13

is

willing to grant that they have

14

instrumental value.

.

.

.

auTa yE kq 0 auTa

tte^ukev

21

ayaQa.

.

.

.

etc. to

where

—poverty

etc.

when used

they are not used

it,

it is

They sometimes have

are of value, then,

if

It is

11

For wealth

(In fact, in those cases

sometimes. The kind of value that they have, when they have

*

12

that.

without wisdom), their "opposites"

They have no value and no disvalue only

correctly.

to

correctly (280e).

incorrectly (280e).

(i.e.,

never have any value.

us and sometimes they do not (280b);

not reasonable to think his conclusion at 281de

benefit us, they

etc.

at all

(280d,

some value

appears to be

Is his

value?

It

conclusion

may

etc.

have no

to express the

real interest in expressing here.

view

order to recognize this,

it

that

is

wisdom

is

is

Nor

is

the only thing that

the purpose of 28 le

is

intrinsically good.

prima

well

18

?" (279a)

of "good things"

is

16

In

in

facie reason tor thinking that the

possessions are being considered only in their role as instruments by which
for the listing

(cf.

two things about how the "possessions"

helpful to notice

the passage are treated. First, there

happy;

intrinsic

15
well be that Socrates believes that they have no intrinsic
value.
But this

view Socrates has no
292b)

281de, then, supposed to be that wealth

at

prompted by the question

we become

"How would we

and the suggestion "By our having many good things"

do

19

(ibid.).*

Second, the mere possession of these "good things" cannot be what happiness consists
in; for

(i.e.,

it is

agreed that

we

will not be

happy unless the possession of them benefits us

does us good) (280b): just being healthy,

closer to being

make

happy (280d); we must somehow "make use

correct use of

concluding that

it

is

it)

for

it

to help us at all

mentioned

in

instrumentally good. In spite of this,

grant that health (e.g.) has

some

so greatly overshadowed by

goodness

it

20

of' our being healthy (and

So we appear

.

to

have some grounds

its

it

(besides happiness) are at best only

it is

intrinsic

possible that Socrates

goodness; but

potential extrinsic value

might have

is

negligible.

A

if so,

is

even here willing

such goodness

—good and bad—

1

they are of instrumental use in achieving happiness."

.

.

TTcbg

av

eu TtpaTTOipEV; ap’

av

22

e’i

The

any

therefore,

inasmuch as

protreptic passages,

rmTv ttoAAcx

KayaOa

to

evidently

is

that

more cautious conclusion,

that these possessions are, at least here, being entertained as "goods" only

*.

for

a presupposition of the entire passage (not something argued for)

that all the possessions

intrinsic

simply assumed not to get us any

e.g., is

Ei'q;

is

therefore, provide us with

no clear information on Socrates' views about which

possessions have and which do not have intrinsic value (aside perhaps from
the view
that

happiness has intrinsic value).

Keeping

in

mind, then, that the value

that

is

the focus of the passage

is

instrumental value, the real point of Socrates' conclusion at 281de appears to be that

when

the possessions of wealth etc. are considered just by themselves,

it

cannot

(contrary to popular opinion) be determined whether such possessions 22 are going to be
beneficial or harmful

abstract'

—

—

or neither

to their possessor; just

—they have no determinable value

disvalue

come from how

22

—

'in

the

Their instrumental value and

they are used, and this will depend on factors extrinsic to the

possessions themselves. Let us

Possession

or disvalue.

by themselves

make use of the following

as technical terms:

X helps a person P in achieving a goal G

=df.

X

increases P's ability

to achieve G.

X

obstructs P's achievement of

Socrates in the

first

protreptic passage

G
is

=df.

X

decreases P's ability to achieve G.

saying that sometimes wealth

etc. will

be used

correctly and thus be helpful in the sense defined above; sometimes they will be used

incorrectly

used

at all

and thus be obstructive

in the

sense defined; and sometimes they will not be

and thus be neither helpful nor obstructive. (The instrumental value of the

"opposite" possessions (poverty etc.) would also depend on extrinsic facts:

if

wisdom

were not also present, these "opposite" possessions would presumably be instrumental^
good;

or, at

any

rate, in

circumstances where wisdom was not present their instrumental

value would be greater than the instrumental value that wealth

23

etc.

would have

in the

same circumstances.) This seems

to be

what Socrates means

"themselves by themselves" they are neither good nor bad

in saying (281de) that

24

The Worth of Wisdom
But

that

not

is

all

that Socrates

related point about the value of

only thing that

is

good,

25

One

is

When

Wisdom, Socrates seems

to think,

that

is

It is

fail to

use

is

important to recognize that that does not

—

that

wisdom

make

a

is

the

unlike these others not

wisdom can never be

cannot be used incorrectly (280a7-8).

none of the possessions except wisdom

here in showing

is

would probably even want

use the other possessions, one cannot

fail to

also wants to

he says (28 le, 292b) that wisdom

ever helpful, but because only

gets the impression that he

point

wisdom.

He

to establish.

he seems to mean that wisdom

because none of the others
obstructive.

wants

to say that

wisdom

if

whereas one may

one has

Socrates'

it.

inherently helpful.

mean— nor is

guarantees improvement,

if

Socrates interested

improvement

is

defined in
27

terms of one's actual progress toward a goal as opposed to one's potential for progress.^

He does

think that the addition of wisdom results in actual progress toward achieving a

goal or product in

all

those cases in which one already possesses the necessary

equipment (tools or raw material)
in question.

But

in those cases in

acknowledge

would

certainly

"use".

Can we suppose

that

for satisfactory

achievement of the goal or product

which one lacks the necessary equipment, Socrates

wisdom by

that he thinks that

itself is

of no use

at all, in this

sense of

even an expert aulos-player can do well

aulos-playing without an aulos, or that a skilled writer can do well

at

at

writing without a

writing instrument and material to write on, or that a wise pilot can do well

at sailing

materials
without a ship or without sailors? There clearly are certain instruments and

24

that

one must already possess

in

order even to begin progress toward the
goal.

And

Socrates explicitly acknowledges this in asking
the question:
It all

the crattsmen

one's

own work,

were equipped with all the things for the purpose
of each
but they didn't use them, then would those
men do well

because

ot the possession

because they possess all the th ings that there
the craftsman possess ? (280c, my emphasis)*

So when Socrates
is

(at

280ab) talks as though ah

we need

to

the appropriate kind of wisdom, the principle of
charity

means

that

it

is all

we need

o nce

we

seems

at

wisdom

for Socrates is

achieving goals than the possession of certain equipment
benefit in possessing the necessary equipment without

wisdom without

We

should not,

no more necessary

And just

is.

wisdom

cf.

at

no

(281b), so too there

is

no

is

first protreptic.

come only with good

wisdom

brings with

it

fortune. Irwin (1986,

1995, 55-56) interprets the conclusion of 279c5-280b3 to be:

makes us

is

for

Eud. 279c5-280b3

believe, suppose that Socrates thinks

those 'goods' that are usually thought to

203;

as there

the necessary equipment. This conclusion

Thing as Luck: The Argument
I

achieving a goal

to require that he just

supported by a closer consideration of the two main arguments of the

No Such

a need that

already possess the other instruments and materials

necessary for achieving the goal. 29 So

benefit in possessing

do well

is

Wisdom

always

fortunate in having the materials necessary to begin an endeavor ("antecedent

good fortune",

e.g., (in the

case of writing) having a good pen and good paper to write

with) and in not encountering incapacitating forces in the process of

("subsequent good fortune",

*oi

e.g., (in

bqpioupyo'i TidvTEs,

si

some endeavor

the case of sailing) not encountering unavoidably,

auxoTg

Eirj

navTa to

ETTiTrjbEia TrapEOKEu-

auToh; qf|, ap’ av outoi
aopsva EKaaTcp e’is to eoutou spyov, xP<T>vto
TravTa
a 5eT KEKTfjabai tov
eTev
oti
KEKTqpEvoi
KTqoiv,
upaTToiEV 5ia Tqv

Bqpioupyov;

25

eu

overpowering storms

at sea).

Irwin says the conclusion

false

is

because wisdom does

not supply the raw materials and enabling
circumstances necessary for success.
true that Socrates concludes the following

It is

from the argument about

eutuchia" (usually translated "good fortune" or
"success")

wisdom

whom

present, for the one to

is

eutuchia" (280b).* But does this

mean

it is

present there

at

is

that Socrates thinks

279c5-280b3: "When

no additional need of

he has shown that as long as

one has wisdom one has no need of those resources sometimes
thought
only by good fortune?

A careful

technical term suggests that that

argument appears

analysis of the argument and

is

its

to

be provided

most prominent

not what Socrates thinks. First, here

is

how the

to go:

One

has the most eutuchia in achieving a goal G 30 given any circumstances
if and only if one is wise about how to achieve G.
1

.

If (1),

2.

then

Therefore,

3.

(3).

One who

is

wise about

how

additional eutuchia in order to achieve
If (1),

4.

then

Therefore,
not

list

5.

C

to achieve

G as well

as

C

G does not need any
allows.

(5).

In listing the necessary conditions for doing well in life

one need

eutuchia in addition to wisdom.

Understanding the argument turns on understanding what Socrates means by
"eutuchia". First,

we

cannot suppose that by "eutuchia" Socrates here means a supply

or supplier of 'goods' like wealth etc.

political status,

For wealth, health, beauty, strength, social and

temperance, justice, courage are

introduced, and then eutuchia

to

31

is

all

posited in addition to them, as though

be something over and above these. Also,

if

*
.

.

.

it

is

were supposed

Socrates were conceiving of eutuchia as

a supply or supplier of goods, then one of Socrates'

protreptic (either

mentioned before eutuchia

two main arguments

279c5-280b3 or 280b5-281e5) would be superfluous:

in the first

at

279c5-280b3

oocpiag Tiapouoris, cb av TTaprj, ppSev ttpogSeToOcxi euTuxiag.

26

.

.

.

he deals with the question of eutuchia, and

goods on the
the

at

280b5-281e5 he deals with the other

eutuchia were nothing but a supply or
supplier of the other goods on

list; if

then there would be no need to deal with
eutuchia separately, as he clearly does.

list,

Furthermore, in the examples Socrates uses in his
argument
situations

compared

in

each example are both supposed

except for wisdom: Cleinias
better than another,

person better

at

do we have a difference

in

is

wisdom,

in the

same elements

in neither

what makes one

asked which of two situations

the only difference between the

an expert concerning a problem (a battle or an

Except for a difference

to involve all the

better than another,

sea-faring than another; then Cleinias

it

279c5-280b3 the two

asked to consider what makes one person play the
aulos

is

what makes one person write

he would prefer to be in

at

two was

illness) that the

two

that

one contained

situations share.

of any of the two of situations imagined

supply of goods that are usually thought to be conferred

by good fortune. This suggests

that Socrates

does not mean to be talking about eutuchia

as a supply or supplier of goods like wealth etc.

I

suggest that by "eutuchia" Socrates simply means what

person's doing better than another

same; so

is

just to

may

"to

when both

is

responsible for one

face circumstances that are otherwise the

have eutuchia {eutuxps Elvai}" (279el-2, 4-5) concerning some

have an advantage

at

performing the activity

—an advantage

that

activity

an observer

consider mysterious. Socrates does load the deck somewhat by keeping everything

constant in the examples except for wisdom. But one question that he does not beg
the question that appears to be the focus of his argument: whether

the circumstances imagined could intervene and affect the

unfavorably

—

in

one of the situations

in

some

outcome

is

force outside

—

either favorably or

each pair of imagined scenarios. Socrates does

27

not, for

example, make Cleinias simply assume

that

no god could intervene and

guarantee success or failure in one of the situations;
Cleinias responses
that

make

clear

he does not believe in any such force.
In order to appreciate the point Socrates

understand the

way many

is

trying to establish,

it is

important to

ancient Greeks thought eutuchia operated. First,

we must

think that according to most ancient Greeks to succeed
because of eutuchia

succeed by c hance in our modern, quasi-scientific way of putting
,

Sometimes things just go
to

it

my

way.

But

this is not

be peculiar to me; for chance can bless anyone

chance:

it

is

random But eutuchia
.

for

was not random chance or coincidence

32
It

.

at one's birth in

wealth, social status often

seem

some people

That of course

most ancient Greeks

supposedly allotted to one

to

.

something that

it.

I

to

can truly say.

necessarily meant

is

is

was

not

the nature of

in Socrates'

and

Plato's time

was most often thought of as a good

much

be allotted

the

one

to

same way
at birth

as health, strength,

33
.

are consistently better off than others because of a

According

to this belief,

more favorable

allotment of eutuchia received

at birth,

and they are better off even given the exact same

circumstances as others. Even

we may

speak in

than any, no wealthier,

the

same or no

escapes danger

wins

in

equal.

etc.

—

his circumstances

this

way: 'So-and-so

else

lucks out

Contrary to this

He always

would have been injured or ruined by

any game of sheer chance, whereas everyone

He always just

no healthier

and other "advantages" are otherwise

better than anyone's. He's just luckier than everyone.

when anyone

is

else's

it.

He always

wins and losses are pretty

,j4
.

common way

of thinking, Socrates wants to suggest that the

only force that causes one of two people to fare better

28

in

otherwise similar

circumstances

wisdom. There

is

is

no such thing as

this mysterious, supernatural favor

with which some people are supposedly more blessed
throughout their lives than others.
This,

I

take

it,

is

what makes him say what may seem very odd

eutuchia (279a).
stretching the

It is

important to see that in asserting this Socrates

meaning of the ancient Greek term.

It is

mundane

35

In the passage, Socrates has Cleinias consider

source: namely, wisdom. But Socrates

ancient Greek speakers

According

to

Noel Robertson,

'happenstance':

bad.

what a person

The two ideas

us to Pindar

"not only

(

would have considered

"TYCHE
'attains'

[.

on

.

can

.]

.

not abusing or

unidentifiable, and

not using "eutuchia" in a

mean

.]''

way

that

even altogether novel. 36

either 'success' or 'fortune',

own, or whatever

his

"is"

an alternative, more

illegitimate or

are not necessarily distinct[.

Olympian

is

is

wisdom

true that, in the typical ancient

Greek mind, eutuchia was divine (though usually nonpersonal,
capricious).

at first: that

'befalls'

him of good

or

(1970b, 1100). Robertson refers

12.1-5) who, Robertson explains, ascribes to the divinity Tyche

good fortune divinely bestowed

[.

.

such as navigation, warfare, and government[.

presumably what makes Irwin acknowledge
understand eutuchia so that

it

but also success

.]

.

.]."

won by

skill, in

This fact about the term

that "Socrates'

matters

is

argument requires us

to

implies success, but not necessarily success resulting from

'

sheer luck. His use of eutuchia does not introduce any fallacy into 279c-280a" (1995,
'

362

38

n. 10).

So Socrates did not mean

to

deny

that

some people

start

off in a (in

some

sense)

potentially better position than others because of a better supply of health, wealth, etc.

Nor

did he

because, as

mean

we

to

deny

that

some people

say, 'chance [sc.

in

some cases

random chance] favors

29

are potentially better off

them': he

would

certainly

acknowledge, for example, that
auto accidents

not always the wise

is

it

does not mean that

C

a c han g e in

—

we

call

usually thought to

it

C

but

now

resources in

'(C+f )'— which

come with good

mean

that

subtract

instead in (C+t

C

we

from

is

And

is

who narrowly

C some

by

who

win, and in

escape injury. So by (3) Socrates

is

fortune'.

to achieve

).

just like

G

C

Surely

but contains

we could imagine

better; but, then,

Socrates point

is

that the

of the resources

it

were

if there

more of the resources
that such a

G

he will be achieving

not

knowledgeable use of

inC.

39

Nor by

cannot imagine that the wise person would do worse

if

(3)

does he

we were

to

already has because of 'good fortune'

40

making,

finally,

not always the wise

sufficient for doing as well as possible

resulting in (C-f ).

Socrates

it is

cannot imagine that the wise person would do better

change would allow the agent
in

in a lottery

It is

clear that in order to form an objection against the point

we must

(5) Socrates

not propose changing the original set of circumstances C.

does not mean that a certain supply of wealth

etc. is

not

necessary for achieving happiness. The eutuchia under consideration here was never

conceived as a supply or supplier of goods

like

wealth

etc.

Since Socrates thinks he has

accounted for what makes certain people do better given the same circumstances
he thinks he has eliminated 'good luck'

—he concludes simply

speak of eutuchia anymore, unless

just a reference to

it is

Concerning eutuchia Socrates wants only

that there

is

to establish that if a

wise person

etc.) as

person, nothing (like 'bad luck' or a less amount of 'good luck') can cause

successful

is

41

In

no need

to

is

an unwise

him

to

do

any complicated endeavor, what makes people

not luck but the relevant knowledge. In order to be as advantaged as

30

since

wisdom.

placed in the exact same circumstances (with the same equipment

worse than the unwise person.

—

possible in a given set of circumstances
addition to his

wisdom and

fate;

some

force that

i.e.,

something external

to

works outside of the laws of nature

(or

outside the usual operation ot such laws'): divine dispensation
or grace; good

good

luck.

like these ever

42

Socrates

is

trying to

of the resources

in that situation;

that at every

complex

activity

knowledge.

Wisdom

is

43

is

same

superstition that mysterious forces

is

something over and above

that

doing

correct/skillful use

what makes people successful

is

not luck but the relevant

what makes one more advantaged than another

same circumstances (279e);

what makes hers a more pleasing

risk (279e-280a).

—

he wants to replace the superstition with the view

goal where both must deal with the

wisdom

overcome the

account for some people being more successful than others

as well as possible in a given situation

the

the wise person does not need something in

the resources already in C,

all

those circumstances: the aid ot

at least

C

The point

is

in

achieving a

the wise person's

fate to share than another's

when both

face

not that the wise will always do better than

unwise; random chance sometimes favors fools; sometimes the necessary resources

even begin working toward the goal are not present.

44

The point

has a kind of advantage unlike any that another possession

Now

Socrates does in conclusion state that

(280a, 281b, 282a), suggesting that

interpreting this conclusion

makes

it

we must keep

it

wisdom

may

results in "correct" action

the agent "do well" (279el). But in

in context: Socrates

correct action in those circumstances consists

n. 31), that

chances of being truly fortunate[.

.

Socrates

.]";

but

the wise person

supply.

people do as well as possible given the circumstances they are in

and Smith do (1994, 120

is that

to

in.

is

—and

So we may conclude,

arguing "that

we need

31

means only

that

that is

wise

what

as Brickhouse

wisdom maximizes

one’s

not qualify this conclusion, as this

pair of

commentators do, by adding:

needed for right action[.

.

"[.

.

.]

assuming the possession of the equipment

for in every set of circumstances there

right action rnt hose circumstances

.

We need only keep

in

mind

equipment

is

for

that right action does

not guarantee progress toward the goal.

M ore Resources Do N ot M ean Greater Success: The Argument
But

in the

next stage of the passage—the argument

Socrates not suggest that the correct use of 'goods'

wisdom, since

made

claims are

[.

it

.

W]e

.

sort

at

at

Eud. 280b5-281e5

280b5-281e5—does

is sufficient for

happiness, and that

guarantees correct use, guarantees happiness? After
in

summing up

the following

that argument:

are spirited about being happy, and

all

all,

we

appear to become of that

from using the things and using them

correctly[.

Wisdom] alone of the

makes

.

.].

(282a2-4‘* cf 280el-

4)

[.

.

.

eutuchia[.

When

.

(282cd;

.].

+

cf.

things that are

the

human happy and have

290d7, 291b6, 292c 1, e5) 45

read out of context these claims certainly appear to state sufficient conditions for

happiness.

closely

46

That they are not intended as such becomes clear when we consider more

what Socrates

is

doing

The statement

at

282a2-4, even

in the

argument.

when

read out of context,

may

legitimately be

interpreted as stating only necessary conditions for happiness. Socrates' point

using possessions
using them

is

not sufficient for happiness

sufficient for happiness "if'

is

become happy "from"

—

sc.

only from

—

sc.

if

is

that

one does not use them correctly;

only

—using them

if

—they are used

correctly.

correctly:

Socrates

is

we

placing a

suScdpovEs psv sTvai Trpo0upoupE0a TravTss, Ecpavqpsv Se toioOtoi
yiyvopsvoi ek toO xpffoQai te toT$ TTpaypaoiv Kai op0cbs xP0°9 ai
*.

.

.

-

'.

.

0pCOTTOV.

aoq)i'a]

[f]

.

.

.

povov tgov ovtcov Eubaipova kou eutuxt]

.
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•

ttoieIv

•

•

tov av-

further necessary condition

conditions. (This point

The claim
are,

I

think,

at

is

on becoming happy, not completing the

clearer in

282cd

is

it

of necessary

original formulation at 280el-4.)

a lot easier to misread. But the following
considerations

what Socrates has

person happy

its

list

in

mind.

would be something

anything can properly be said to 'make' a

If

that

is

inherently helpful in the sense

I

defined

above: something that by itself always adds to one's ability to
become happy.
not only

is

inherently helpful but actually guarantees optimal use of resources.

course whenever someone becomes happy,

we may acknowledge

the sole contributor to that person's happiness; tor there

necessary. But

always

is

Wisdom

we must

whenever

it is

also

acknowledge

that in

that

Of

wisdom was

were other conditions

such a case wisdom was

—

that

as

not

were

it

present— that which caused optimal use of the person's

available resources, and this in turn

was what made

the person

happy (even though

optimal use of available resources does not always result in happiness). So
properly say, of a happy person that of all her possessions
,

it

we may

was her wisdom

that

'made' her happy; just as, of all the things that might have contributed to making a body

healthy,

we

are inclined to say that the doctor

though the doctor could not have made
assistance.

It is

the doctor

is

is

it

about

who

'made'

it is

it

healthy, even

healthy without the proper instruments or

she

who

47

33

—who

is

owed

the

brought about the optimal use of

in this case sufficient

primarily responsible for happiness, and this

282cd.

the one

primarily responsible for health

—because
was necessary— and

credit for bringing

resources that

who

it

was

is all

—

for health.

that Socrates

So too wisdom

means by

his claim at

Socrates'

main point

instrumental goods:

not.

it is

is

to

make

useful in a

us recognize that

way

in

wisdom

is

which the other possibly useful things

Socrates believes that of all the potentially useful things,
only

names good and

beneficial

because

materials that given one's situation one

correctly— sc., to use those materials

in

(i) it

is

unique among
are

wisdom deserves

alone never allows one to misuse the

able to use, and

alone causes one to act

(ii) it

such a way that one will reach the goal to the

greatest extent possible given one s circumstances.

8

mean

(This does not

that

wisdom

always causes one to reach a satisfactory achievement of the goal.) Having wisdom
therefore always at least as

good

as (and usually better than) lacking

49
it.

is

Although

certain other useful things are just as necessary for satisfactory achievement as

is,

the

no other useful thing can guarantee the best use of the materials available

wisdom

for use.

Also, for every useful thing other than wisdom, there are circumstances in which lack of

it

would be

(e.g.) is

better than possession of it. (In the pursuit of certain goals, lack of wealth

sometimes better than wealth; sometimes wealth

makes one

(e.g.,

when one

is

unwise)

less able to achieve one's goal.)

Socrates attempts to prove his point about

wisdom with

the following

considerations: For any goal or product that can successfully be achieved only by

complex

50

set

of activities, there seems

to exist a

knowledge

that

is

some

knowledge not

simply of the nature of the goal but of how (best) to go about achieving that goal. To do
well at achieving any such goal, one needs to have this relevant knowledge (28 lab,

282a5-6).

51

If

one lacks the relevant knowledge, doing well

be practically (see
will (almost

n.

always

50) impossible (even

—

see

n.

if

one happens

50) turn out that a person

34

at

achieving one's goal will

in fact to

who

is

achieve

it).

wise/learned in the

So

it

relevant

knowledge does

better at achieving the goal than the
unwise/unlearned person

(279e-280a). Socrates strictly speaking has given no
proof, since some important
questions seem to have been begged; but

all

Socrates

is

interested in doing

is

showing

his interlocutor that he agrees with Socrates' point.

Problems

in Specifying

Which Wisdom

is

Inherently Helpful

But should the considerations Socrates raised have convinced
Cleinias of the
conclusion

that,

I

say, Socrates

be used incorrectly?

we need

"wisdom,"

of wisdom that

is

I

is after: viz.,

that

wisdom

never harmful and cannot

suggest that in order to understand Socrates' conclusion about

mind a

to see that he has in

particular kind of

wisdom 53

wisdom

that

it is

is

obviously

54

depending on
if

one

is

55

never harmful and cannot be incorrectly used.

how

is

it

is

used (7.5 1 8e-5

56
1

not wise about the good, one's

such

that,

Of all

when we

58

But

9a).

Even

wisdom

57
is

if

is

not

We may
men who

are

are provided with

it is

this distinction

all

one

is

wise about everything

else,

of no benefit (6.505b), and can of

the knowledges, only

the goal specific to that knowledge,

incorrectly used.

it

Like the other things, wisdom can be either useful or harmful

course even be harmful.

bad

the kind

For

false.

think immediately of the passage in the Republic where Socrates speaks of

wise but vicious.

—

peculiar to the specific goal of being happy. For, if by "wisdom" he

simply means any sort of wisdom, then his conclusion
true of all

is

knowledge of the good and

the

the necessary equipment for achieving

always instrumentally good and cannot be

between knowledge of the good and the other
59

knowledges

is

fully appreciated

The hypothesis
his point in the

by Socrates

that Socrates has in

Euthydemus

that

wisdom

is

'already' in the early dialogues.

mind not just any wisdom, when he makes
never harmful,

35

is

confirmed by the second

protreptic passage. After the conclusion at

281de (and

after

he resumes his discussion

with Cleinias), Socrates asks (288e) what sort of knowledge
the

it

way

will

described in the

first protreptic; for

always be beneficial

also given all the

knowledge

way

in this

equipment necessary

that will benefit us in

not true of every knowledge that having

even

if

we imagine

be a knowledge/art that

lets

we

are

for achieving the goal of the particular

ff.).

Socrates and Cleinias seem in the end not to have discovered

though they do conclude that

each case

that in

60

(288e

in question)

(i.e.,

is

it

is it

it

us

it

in that dialogue,

cannot be a knowledge/art simply of making, but must

know how

to use

what we make or acquire (289b, 290d).

Socrates ultimately rejects (292e) as unsatisfactory the suggestion that, since

all

the

other artisans hand over their works to be ruled by the practitioner of the political

{TToAiTiKri} or kingly art (291c), that art

is

the "cause of correct action {q

opOcbs TtpaTTEiv}" (291c) and what "makes
ttoieIv}" (29 Id).

all

things useful

ama

{TtdvTa xPhoipa

But the "labyrinth" (29 1 b7) or "impasse" (293al)

that is subsequently

generated appears to be due to Socrates' misinterpretation of their conclusion
protreptic: Socrates' mistake is to say (292b) that Cleinias

that "nothing other than

aAAo
art to

f|

some

[sort of]

ETriaTfmqv Tiva}" and

be the knowledge they

the uniquely beneficial

When

this

now

knowledge

to interpret

seek,

its

is

good {dya0ov

is in

mean

.

.

.

in the first

(at

ou8ev

place, Socrates goes

281 de)

slvai

that, for the kingly

peculiar product must be knowledge

knowledge of the kind discussed

confusion

and he had agreed

(292b7-cl) this to

tou

—

sc.,

in the first protreptic.

on

to point out (292c) that the

Cleinias nor
peculiar product of the kingly art cannot be just any knowledge; but neither

Crito can think of what

knowledge

this

could be other than the kingly

36

art (particularly

'

since ex hypothesi none of them
’

is

"good" except the kingly one) (292d); 61 but

response does not answer the question,

postpones

it

ad infinitum.

by saying that

it is

a

making men good;

still

is

the kingly art a

(Socrates acknowledges that

knowledge of how

we must

(292d) that

What

to

for otherwise,

we

still

we may answer

make men good

explain what the kingly

art

will not

knowledge

this

of?, but only

the question

(292cd); but he points out

makes men good

at,

other than at

have an answer to the original

question.)

Socrates

is

even before the puzzle

the

knowledge

(wealth, etc.)

us

ot

how to

— how

—making us good

act correctly

how

—how

to

be happy.

and Cleinias had agreed

was agreed

to

himself had

That

is

the

is

63
.

another question.

that nothing but

way

sufficiently clear right

up

is

art

benefiting

(These were features of the

their search in the first place!)
64

Socrates

knowledge

be good only as an instrumental means

made

peculiar product

Its

using the instrumental goods

exactly this correct use consists in

The kingly

correctly to use the instrumental goods

on which Cleinias and Socrates premised (29 led)

that he

main question of the puzzle. But

protreptic passage they have lost sight of:

to live well,

at

to the

generated, they had the beginnings of a satisfactory answer

is

which by the end of the second
is

answer

right to require an

was wrong

good. In

is

to happiness,

until his presentation

66

fact,

art

What

to suggest

knowledge

as Socrates

of the "labyrinth".

out of Socrates' labyrinth; and Plato meant for us to find

66
it.

Passage Out of the Labyrinth: Knowledge of Good and Bad

In the

Charmides however, Socrates does claim

Critias' help) the

is

,

knowledge whose peculiar

67

to

have discovered (with

product {ergon}

knowledge of the good and the bad (174b), which Socrates

37

is

our benefit (174d):

at the

it

end of the Laches

appears to think

is

knowledge sought

"virtue altogether

in the

whose peculiar product

is

our benefit (Eud. 288e, 292a),

of the good and bad

’

his interlocutors

were seeking

in the

knowledgeable about the good
70

by knowing

how

and gods. That doing well
bad

is

the

view

and Socrates

knowledge

is

to

is

it

the

is

reasonable to conclude

knowledge

that Socrates

second protreptic of the Euthvdemus

the Laches, Socrates says (199de) that

Eud. 279a)

the

second protreptic of the Euthvdemus was
precisely the one

C harmides knowledge

that the

{oupfTaoa apexf]}" (199de). Since

it

is

be able

and

68

Indeed, in

.

the peculiar province 69 of the one

"to

provide himself with the good things"

to act "correctly" (cf. Eud. 280a,

at life is the peculiar

(cf.

291c) toward humans

business of the knowledge of good and

that Socrates expresses in the Protagoras too (see particularly

356d

ff.);

conversation with Protagoras pretty clearly thinks that such

in his

virtue (whether or not he also thinks that

it

consists of parts) (see

particularly 360d).

We here may think of cases where someone could use their knowledge of good
and bad

to bring

of good and bad
this sort in the

about the bad, rather than the good.

is

Is this

not a case where knowledge

obstructive and incorrectly used? Socrates discusses cases of just

Hippias Minor

71
.

But he

is

commonly

interpreted there to be entertaining

the possibility of such cases only for the sake of argument; for in other early dialogues

(Ap. 26a4, Pro. 345de, 352c; G. 460bc, 509e), he seems to think
(attempt to) do or bring about what one

know what
seems

to

is

good.

72

knows

to

it

is

be overall bad and

impossible to

at the

(This view has of course been widely criticized; but

be the considered view of Socrates in the early dialogues.)

intended lesson of the Hippias Minor (as well as of R. 1.333e-334a),

38

same time
it

really

In fact, the

'

I

believe,

is

that

to

the

knowledge of good and bad

from other knowledges inasmuch as

differs

to use the others to reach goals that are

opposed

helpful in achieving. This

made

is

the lesson

garden-variety craft-knowledge

is

to the goals that they are

explicit in the

sufficient for happiness,

is

with the raw materials and instruments of those

But ultimately,
rather,

make

is

it

hu man nature

impossible for a

it

what he or she knows
bad. If

to use

this is not

it

to

in addition to the nature

74

be overall bad

to

.

wish something

knowledge of good and bad

to

possible

sometimes

Charmides no amount of
:

however well-supplied one

crafts.

be a difference

human knowledgeable

to

were possible

supposed

is

it

knowledges per

in the

se

:

of knowledge of good and bad that

about good and bad to do or bring about

For no human wishes things that are overall
that is overall bad, then

it

would be possible

do or bring about an overall bad

thing.

In the case

of the other knowledges, the limits of human nature do not prevent a knowledge from
being used for ends that are contrary to the usual goal associated with that knowledge: a

person knowledgeable about medicine can use her knowledge to make people

because
the

it

is

not necessarily in her very nature to wish others health. But

good and the bad and

if she also

knew

that

making others

thing (for her), then she could not use medicine to

know

that

it

was contrary

to her 'innate'

Wisdom Alone
Before concluding

want

is

make

others

would be an

ill,

bad

overall

because she would

of the protreptic passages of the Euthydemus

I

have drawn,

toward happiness

39

—

let

,

I

viz. that Socrates

does not speak of wisdom in these passages as though the application of it
in actual progress

knew

Sufficient for Success

briefly to return to an important conclusion that

always results

she

wish for the overall good.

Not Instrumentally

my exegesis

ill

if

ill,

in action

alone, in actual achievement of

happiness. Having seen that that
that

is

the

(Eud. 291c;

cf.

in a better position to appreciate

my

quite telling and important in this context that
Socrates speaks of all

It is

the other arts and

knowledges as handing over

G. 5 1 7d-5

frustrating conclusion of

is

probably the knowledge of good and bad

is

buzz of other early dialogues, we are

conclusion.

product

wisdom

which

works

to the rule

there

is

good reason

second protreptic,

is

supposed to be the

1

8a),

our benefit. Especially

for every art there are

their

in light

to think, in spite

art at all,

have considered the subordinate

strikes

it

arts'

art

whose

me

art

of the
peculiar

of Socrates' apparent realization (280c)

equipment and/or materials necessary

and even for applying the

of the kingly

that

for achieving the art's

as highly plausible that Socrates

work

would

handing-over of their works to the supposedly

superordinate political art to be not simply necessary for the correct use of those works,
but necessary for achieving the latter

of that

art.

art's

The works of several of the

work

(sc.,

happiness) through the application

involve and, in

arts

some

cases, constitute the

gathering of highly technical information. Consider the "art" of medicine: in order to

know which
the body's

(if

good

any) dietary regimens are necessary and which are best for achieving

(health, strength, beauty),

the various possible regimens; in

knowledge of how
level.

some

certain nutrients

In fact, dietary science

is

necessary to

know

cases surely (maybe in

(fat,

was not

it

the consequences of

all), this

protein, etc.) affect the

body

at

nearly as effective in achieving

requires

a biochemical

its

peculiar

product before the advent of biochemistry.

Now Socrates thought that in order to be a knower of good and bad,
to

know how good

are the consequences of possible courses of action.

know whether and how good going on

one needs

But

in order to

a particular diet will be for a person in trying to

40

achieve ultimately not health but happiness, one needs
to

of that diet will be; and that

knowledgeable

in

courses of action,

surely

many

is

is

medicine. So in order to be a knower of the goodness of
certain
it

seems

that

one must have

reliable information about

to

likely be.

This means that

if

be achieved by the application of knowledge of good and bad, the input

suggested by Eud. 291c.

to

medicine and

other subjects; for one must have reliable information of what the

of many other knowledges

bad

the consequences

information that can be provided only by someone

consequences of possible courses of action will be or
happiness

know what

76

is

a prerequisite. That Socrates recognized that

Since, then, he recognizes that using

choose one's best options does not inherently

is

certainly

knowledge of good and

result in success, the instrumental

value of that knowledge cannot in Socrates' view be so great as to guarantee happiness.

41

Notes

The passage in question is the well-known one wherein Glaucon distinguishes
between three "forms" of goodness (2.357b-d). In fact, whether Glaucon even makes a
distinction here between intrinsic and extrinsic good is a subject of no small
controversy. See Sachs 1963 and White 1984.
2

sophistication of style and character-development cause

Its

placed late in this earliest group. Even

if this is true,

there

it

to be

no reason

is

to

commonly

suppose

that

Plato had less of a grasp on the concept of intrinsic goodness before writing the

Protagoras

.

Irwin says 351c7-e8 shows that Protagoras and the
Socrates

is

recognizes

describing (1995, 81-82, 86). That
at least in the

case of the

many

is

But

it.

I

to;

real

doubt that Protagoras, even
in

in the guise

under which

question any more than the

assume the view

(ibid.) that they

Irwin

after Socrates' repetition (35 le)

he shows no sign that he follows what Socrates

immediately suggests

view

from

(86), the dissent arises not

of his original question, recognizes the view

supposed

"reject" the

As

disagreement but just from failure to recognize the view
Socrates presents

many

not strictly speaking true.

is

many

are

saying, but instead

as a hypothesis

(which allows

the discussion to proceed without the old sophist having to admit that he does not yet

understand what Socrates
Socrates has in

mind

but this does not

recognizes

it

mean

as the

is

up

to).

To be

sure, Protagoras understands the

insofar as Protagoras

able (351 e4-6) to reformulate

is

that Protagoras understands

view about the good

its

view
it

accurately;

implications or even that he

he himself accepts.

that

view so that
the many see that they in fact accept it, but actually gives there a defense of the view
(82, 367 n. 27). One reason Irwin gives for that interpretation is that Protagoras and the
Irwin thinks that Socrates

later

(353cl-354e2) not only

clarifies the

other sophists later accept the view: "If the defense of hedonism had been addressed
only to the many," Irwin argues, "Protagoras would have been given no reason to accept

But Irwin seems simply to have assumed that Protagoras'
were different from the many's. In fact, Socrates'
exclamation at 351 c2-3 rather indicates that Protagoras in this case (and on the subject
of incontinence, in spite of 352e-353b) is one of the many. (This may actually be why
Socrates proffers the question to Protagoras in the first place: he thinks that it is a view

hedonism" (367

n. 27).

original reasons for his dissent

that Protagoras really accepts.) If so, there

would not have allowed Protagoras
all

As

far as

tries to

make

along really accepted.

353cl-354e2 he only

is

no reason

as well as the
I

can

its

tell,

many

to think that

353cl-354e2

to recognize the view they had

Socrates never defends the view; at

implications clear, giving his listeners four

implications if
separate reminders (354bc, 354d, 354de, 355a) that they may avoid the
(358ab), are
sophists
the
all
they reject the view, in spite of which the many, as well as

depicted as eager to continue holding
4

it.

do not
true (as C. Taylor 1991 points out) that the two questions
of
introduction
the
particularly,
have the same meaning; but the context

It is

necessarily

the questions "I'm saying this

—

(ToOto toivuv AEyco}.

42

.

and the intervening

participle "[I'm] asking {epcoTcbv}.

."—indicate that Socrates is here using them to
express the same proposition. It is also true that the
previous questions (at 351 b7-cl
and 351 c4) do not at first appear to be the same and do not
appear to require the
stronger reading that Socrates' final question here seems
to require (see C. Taylor ad
.

But none of this entails that Socrates did not in fact have in
mind
whole while. In fact, as I argue, there is good indication to conclude
loc.).

this question the

that this

is

the

question he has had in mind.

The

of the two questions

latter

An

difficult to reflect in English.
if

pleasure itself

reading
the

is

is

35 le has in Greek an inherent ambiguity that is
alternate way of translating the Greek is: "I'm asking

not a good thing"

at

(cf.

the correct one in this context

same question (351 c4-5 351 e2 ),
,

C. Taylor 1991, 168). That the stronger
is

made

clear

by Socrates' other formulations of

Protagoras' response at 351e4-6, and their

subsequent discussion. C. Taylor's 1991 treatment (164-170) of what view Socrates
has
in mind in the passage is unnecessarily noncommittal.
5

Penner,

e.g., interprets

(1997, 126) the question thus.

This is the exact same position of G. 499c-e, except in the Gorgias there is no
agreement, even for the sake of argument, about what things are intrinsically good.
7

Most scholars in the last century have classified the Euthvdemus as an early
dialogue (contrast Chance 1992, 4-5). Most also agree that it belongs to the later end of
the early period. Some scholars divide the early period into two further groups,
distinguishing from the earliest dialogues another group that

between

is

in

some sense

group and the traditionally 'middle' group. The
Gorgias and the Meno are typical examples of supposedly 'transitional' dialogues. The
Euthvdemus also is often placed in such a 'transitional' group. Many (e.g., Fine 1999,
’transitional’

that earliest

Kahn 1996, Penner 1992a, Vlastos 1991)
Irwin 1977 and 1995 (e.g.) thinks
8

We find this

by Alcibiades
9

Cf.

Euthvdemus

it

think that

earlier than the

it

is later

Gorgias

statement worded almost the same

than (e.g.) the Gorgias

;

.

way and

attributed to Socrates

in Sy. 216e.

Mo.
is to

88c.

However

Mo. 87e-89a,

of the supposed retraction of

more generally because

its

in the

provocatively similar the

I

keep

my references to

conclusions

Meno

at

97a

ff.

first

protreptic in the

the latter in the notes. Because

(on which see

my

elements of supposedly unsocratic

n. 51),

and

(strictly

Platonic) philosophy are so enmeshed with its more traditionally Socratic elements,
cannot at this point convincingly use passages in this dialogue in support of my
interpretation of Socrates of the early dialogues.

only for those interested

in the

I

refer to

them not

comparisons. Since the Gorgias too

transitional between early and middle dialogues,

interpretation of the early dialogues.

43

I

do not depend on

1

for support, but
is
it

often considered
tor support of

my

3

As I will explain, Socrates later, in the second protreptic
passages, seems to
misinterpret these conclusions (possibly intentionally
to create a philosophical puzzle
for the young Cleinias) in just the way I here
warn against.
11

Cf.

Mo. 87e-88a,

Cf.

Mo.

88a,

Mo.

88a,

12

1

88d.

e.

Some scholars (e.g., Ferejohn 1984, 116-117; Santas 1993,
47-48) are puzzled by the fact that in both the Euthvdemus
(281c) and the Meno (88b)
passages Socrates includes the virtues of courage and temperance
among the supposed
"goods" that may harm (cf. R. 6.491b); for elsewhere in the early
dialogues (notably at
Lch. 192d and Cm. 169b) Socrates treats all virtues as incapable of
being harmful, for
otherwise they would not be "admirable"
would not be virtues But we
Cf.

e.

—

to

conclude that the Euthydemus and

Socrates treats

Meno

are not forced

!

from the other early dialogues in how
the virtues of courage and temperance. Even in the Laches (197b) it is

recognized that "courage"

is

differ

popularly used as a

synonym

"fearlessness" (cf. Pdo. 68cd), and in this sense courage

for "boldness" or

neither the same as nor a
form of wisdom. But on the Socratic view courage is a form of wisdom (Pro. 360d,
Lch. 194de
exactly in what way Socrates considers it a form of wisdom is debatable).
is

—

In the Euthydemus passage (281c), "courageous" is clearly being used simply as an
antonym for "fearful" (i.e., in the popular sense. It is noteworthy that the original list of

"goods" in the Eud. 279a-c appears to be generated from the popular opinion of what
Dimas 2002, 2-3 agrees that Socrates is here considering not his own

are goods.

concept of courage, but that of (as Dimas
131.).

Nor does

the

Euthvdemus

differ in

calls

it)

common

Reeve 1989, 130-

sense. Cf.

any substantive way from the

Meno

in the

treatment of the "other" virtues such as courage (pace Ferejohn 1984, 118-120 and
Santas 1993, 43-44. 47 n. 27); for in the Meno courage is only said to be harmful "if

courage
(ei

is

not

wisdom

but

is

like

some

[sort of]

on eoti 9p6vrjais n avbpEia aAA’ olov

boldness

Oappos

ti}" (88b).

apparent inconsistency between these two dialogues and the others

and temperance

may be

harmful only

if

The
is

solution to the

obvious: courage

they are not treated (with Socrates) as forms of

wisdom. I essentially agree with Guthrie 1975, 260 n. 1; Flawtrey 1981, 86; Zeyl 1982,
230; Penner 1992b, 13 and 13 n. 24 (cf. Vlastos 1991, 228 n. 92). Ferejohn 1984, 16
n. 26 explicitly resists this type of interpretation.
1

14

See Reshotko 2001, 329. Brickhouse and Smith's 1994 description of what
kind of goodness Socrates thinks these things have is hampered by their unwillingness
(104 n. 2) to use the concept of instrumental goodness instead they use the concept of
;

"dependent goodness": wealth

etc. are

supposed to be good, according

to

Brickhouse

and Smith, only in virtue of their "contribution to or employment" by some other good
(103), such as wisdom (107). I wonder how Brickhouse and Smith think that a thing
like health

who

has

may be used by

wisdom There
.

is

wisdom, unless they just mean used by someone
also the confusing talk of wealth etc. becoming evils when

a

good

like

44

they

serve vice instead of virtue" (109). I cannot make
sense of this unless
simply that for Socrates wealth etc. are obstructive when they
are

it

means

incorrectly used

But the major problem with Brickhouse and Smith's discussion
is that, even
according to the main distinction sc., between "dependent"
and "independent"

—

goodness—that

(they argue) Socrates uses to distinguish wisdom/virtue
from the other
"goods", wisdom/virtue turns out to be a "dependent good" rather
than— as they think

(107ff.)—an "independent good", since, on their account, wisdom/virtue
is good only
[.
.] it always conduces to good activity" (130) and happiness
consists in

because

good
that

.

activity (130).

wisdom

is

Brickhouse and Smith thus
from the other "goods".

fail to

explain

how

Socrates supposes

different

15

the

list

Despite his appearing to do so (216, 227-228), Vlastos 1991 cannot fairly use
of goods beginning at 279a in support of his interpretation that for Socrates all of

these things are constituents of happiness
interpretation, the primary distinction

(sc., intrinsic

among goods

goods); for on Vlastos's

in the first protreptic is a distinction

between conditional goods and unconditional goods (229-230), not between
instrumental goods and intrinsic goods. This, I presume, is why Vlastos (226, 305) uses
G. 467e as the primary text in support of his interpretation of Socrates’ view of intrinsic
goods.

By

the way,

I

think that Vlastos

the primary distinction in G.

goods. There

terms

is

common

467-468

is

is

mistaken in supposing (226, 229, 231) that
intrinsic goods and instrumental

one between

a presumption in favor of assigning a single interpretation to the basic

both the Eud. and the G. passages. In any case, whatever is meant in
categorizing health and wealth as "goods" in these passages, there is no good reason to

presume

to

that Socrates himself

is

committed

to that categorizing; the lists in both

passages appear rather to be of things popularly or conventionally accepted as "goods"
(cf. G. 45 le ff, Sy. 216de; Dodds' 1959 nn. on 451e2 and 467e4; Penner 1991, 181;

Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 111).
16

(In the

passage Socrates uses "wisdom", "phronesis", "knowledge",

and "understanding" interchangeably.) Annas 1993, 59 seems to think this
is the purpose of the passage (this comes from her mistaken supposition (57) that the
primary distinction in the passage is between instrumental goods and intrinsic goods).
"learning",

Reshotko 2001 tends toward the opposite extreme; see
17

The same

is

true in the

Meno

insofar as they "end in happiness {ei$
It is

my

n.

21 below.

passage: things are spoken of as "beneficial" just

subaipoviav teAeutcx}" (88bc).

important to see that this conclusion

is

Cf.

Cm.

174de.

based not merely on the use of the word

said in these particular passages about the relationship

"beneficial", but on what is
between the "goods" and happiness;

for, as

Zeyl 1982 points out, "Since ah goods are

by definition beneficial [for Plato], one cannot argue that virtue is an instrumental
good on the basis of its being said to be beneficial[. .]" (230 n. 21 cf. Thompson 1901,
104). Similarly, at R. 1.354a, Socrates says that being happy is "profitable", and it is
[.

.

.]

.

pretty clear that he does not here

mean

that

;

being happy results in some further good.

45

—

A

18

sc., at life

.

So the question

is

equivalent to

"How would we

be happy?" (see

280b).
19

Mo.

Cf.

78a; Sy. 202c, 204e-205a.

9Q

This claim about wealth etc. may have the appearance, in
the
conclusion based on an analogy with the crafts:
For example, a carpenter — if he were equipped with all

text,

of a

the tools and sufficient

wood, but he

didn't build,

is it

possible that he

would

benefit from the

possession?

{oiov tgktcov,
IKCXVa,

e’i

TrapEOKEuaopEvo$

TEKTQIVOITO 8e

EO0 OTl

|_ir],

Eiq

COCpE

Ta

te

oTt

opyava auavra Ka\ £uAa
C(V ano Tf|5 KTf|OEGO$)

(280cd).

But

in fact,

I

arrived at in

believe that
li

it

is

not (pace Waterfield 1987, 306) meant as a conclusion
rather, the claim about wealth etc. is an assumption,

of the analogy;

g ht

and the craft-analogy

is used only to elucidate the assumption. This assumption
may of
course mark a mistake that Socrates and Cleinias make from the get-go; but, mistake or
not, I believe it goes to the heart of Socratic axiology.

21

Reshotko 2001 argues this point well (330; cf. Penner 1991, 181). But she
argument too far when she proceeds to argue (330-331, 333-334) that the
first protreptic implies that for Socrates ”[v]irtue is not intrinsically good"
(333).
Socrates does not argue that (in Reshotko's words) "[. .] it is the fact that our
knowledge allows us to become happy that makes our knowledge (which is virtue) a
good thing" (331). It is true that the only value that Socrates attributes to virtue in the
carries the

.

first

protreptic

is

instrumental value. But this

this context, since his

happiness

main purpose

is to

is

the only kind of value that

dispel the

commonly

is

relevant in

held notion that

may be

the passage

is

achieved simply by accumulating the so-called goods. The focus of
therefore upon when and why the things commonly accepted as goods

have value; the passage cannot

wisdom may have

fairly

be read as a survey of the various ways

in

which

value.

Socrates and Cleinias do indeed agree that even

if

one possessed "wealth and

all

good things [on their list]" one would not be happy without using these possessions
(280d). So they seem to be agreeing that, aside from happiness itself, no possession
contributes to happiness if it is not used. But there are good reasons
not even wisdom
the
point is meant to apply primarily (if not exclusively) to goods on
supposing
that
for
the list other than wisdom: For one thing, wisdom has already, in the argument of
279c5-280b3, been separated off as unique among the other "goods". But more
the

—

importantly, the craft-analogy, which

is

used (280cd) to elucidate the conclusion of

280d, focuses on the craftsman's possession of materials and tools, not on the
craftsman's possession of craft-knowledge. Indeed we would likely not be mistaken in

concluding that Socrates also believes that the possession of garden variety craftknowledge never benefits without being used. But the fact that Socrates and Cleinias
are agreeing in 280d on a point that applies generally to the goods on their original list,
including garden variety craft-knowledge, does not

46

mean

that Socrates

is

inclined to say

same thing of that one good on

the

bad) that

the

list (i.e.,

as

we

shall see,

uniquely good.

is

Or

their opposites.

I

281el refers to the things "we
Elvai}" (281 d3-4) and "their

take

it

that "neither of

knowledge of good and

them (ouBsTEpa auTcbv}"

were good {a to TipcbTov ecpapEV
contraries {tcov evcivticov}" (d6-7).
first said

at

aya0a

23

Reshotko 2001, 327.) Essentially the same point about wealth
is made
it is worth, we find it also in
Cephalus' mouth at R.
1.33 lab) and about health at Lch. 195b ff, Cm. 164bc,
173b-174d, G. 51 lc ff. (cf.
(Cf.

Ap. 30b

(cf.

513e-514a):
actual

ah

in

23a; for whatever

if

we know how to bring about health, that is not by itself sufficient for
if all we know is that someone is healthy, we
still have no idea at

improvement;

how

well off he

and bad]

worth

is

(Cf.

is.

eotiv kcu ouBevos}

;

Ap. 23a: "human wisdom

actually, nothing {q

little

[sc., without knowledge of good
cxv0pcoTnvq oocpicx oAiyou tivo$ cx^ia

Socrates of course puts

(e.g., at

G. 452a) doctors in the class of

who do not know, but think they know "the greatest things" (Ap. 22d).)
When in Re public Book I, Socrates talks (e.g., 332d, 346a, 346d) as though medicine
brings about a "benefit"—viz., health for the body—he is not implying that this
"craftsmen"

"benefit"

necessarily in fact beneficial for the person except insofar as it brings about
which in the end may or may not be beneficial for the

is

the desired goal of health,

The only "advantage" that the doctor qua doctor looks to is the
supposed advantage of being healthy; the doctor is never said to consider whether or not
health is really advantageous for the person. "What is advantageous" for a thing is
person's living well.

simply (for the sake of argument) identified

(1 .341

e-352a;

"virtue" the thing needs in order not to be "base/faulty",

producing
for the

its

peculiar "work"

body (34 le)

(sc.,

352e-353c). So health

(cf.

cf.

i.e.

is

10.608e-609a) with the

bad

at

performing/

said to be "advantageous"

advantageous for achieving those goals that a body is used to
may not be advantageous for a person trying to live a good

achieve), even though health
life.

24

Brickhouse and Smith 1997

thing that

Socrates

is

[.

.

good
.]

in itself: virtue

say, "Socrates is

(281d2-el)" (101).

convinced that there

And Penner

is

1991 says,

only one

"[.

.

.]

denies that such things as health and wealth really are good in themselves

Euthydemus 280D7-281E5 [. .])" (181). Cf. Benson 2000, 150 n. 31 and Dimas 2002,
7. These are examples of a common but misleading way of expressing Socrates'
conclusion. In modern philosophy "good in itself' usually means intrinsically good
(

.

.

have explained (and as the scholars cited themselves appear to acknowledge
of their misleading language), Socrates is not in this passage concerned with

But, as
spite

I

intrinsic

goodness.

25

passage

Though Brickhouse and

is

Smith's 1994, 106ff. account of the Euthydemus

admirable in other respects,

Socrates considers

wisdom

it

fails to

a "good". See

my

47

explain clearly in what

n. 14.

way

exactly

in

Th e same
phronesis

is

is

true

of what seems

to be Socrates' conclusion at Meno
89a:
be properly called "beneficial" or "good"—
Socrates

may

the only thing that

wants to reserve these terms for things that are inherently
helpful and never injurious
(see Vlastas 1991, 230-231 n. 100; cf. "virtue is
itself good {ayaQov ccuto
eivcx.
tt]v apETriv}" (87d) and "it's necessary that [virtue]
is beneficial
.

.

.

to [the soul]

{avayKaiov auTcp

cbcpsAipcp Elvai}" (88c)). Cf.

(provisionally at least, but see

some

part

—

is

phronesis

my n.

51)

{Opovqoiv

.

.

.

Cm. 174de. (It is concluded
that "virtue — either, of course, altogether or
apETqv eTvcu, f|Toi oupuaaav f| pepog

ti}" (Mo. 89a). And it was agreed earlier that this would
be a correct conclusion
pr ovided that there are no good things other than knowledge
(87d).)

^

So Ferejohn 1984

(1

12

should not necessarily be read as

n.
"

20) says that in the

Meno

.

Plato's use of "beneficial"

actually produces benefit."

28

use the qualifier satisfactory" here because in the case of certain goals
is one ol them) a thing can have positive instrumental
value even
does not cause one to achieve the goal completely
I

(perhaps happiness
it

if

.

am

I

(I

not convinced by Reeve's argument that since

think, correctly) supposes (133),

politics"

—

will guide all

promote happiness,

"[.

.

supposed

wisdom

—which,

as

Reeve

be the "superordinate craft of
the other craft-knowledges and use their products correctly

.]

we can

is

see that for

to

it

unpredictable or unavoidable catastrophes, that

to

there will be no paper shortages, no

will be [. .] luck-independent " (1989,
142 and 143). The most that such a superordinate craft can guarantee is that
what products it has will be correctly used. But that means only that it can maximize

136;

it

.

cf.

one's chances for happiness given one's circumstances, not that

one

to

it can prevent or allow
avoid those unlucky circumstances that make happiness impossible for one.

How does the

craft

of politics ensure

that draught will not cause forest fires to

the paper-producing trees, or that a hurricane will not destroy both the

and the products of most other subordinate
disasters often

need outside

aide:

crafts? (This

is

why

burn

all

raw materials

survivors of such

sometimes no amount of correct use of what remains

will guarantee their happiness.)

Ferejohn 1984 too thinks that

we must

appreciate this point in order to

understand Socrates' conclusion (see particularly Ferejohn 1984,
Santas 1993, 44 and his

n.

1982 appears (231 and his

20, and Brickhouse and Smith 1994,
n.

22) to miss this important point

1

1

15 n. 25). See also

19-120

when he

n. 31.

Zeyl

says that the

wisdom are "guaranteed" by its possession and that "the possession of
wisdom [. .] constitutes happiness." Kahn 1996, 226 n. 23 correctly observes that
wisdom is not sufficient for correct use (and hence happiness) because "there must also
be some (potentially) good resources for knowledge to use"; but Kahn considers this a
criticism of Socrates for he thinks (226) that Socrates wants to conclude that wisdom is
benefits of

.

,

sufficient for happiness.

48

30

Because of the specific examples Socrates uses, he must be thinking only of
those goals that require a complex set of activities to achieve. See p. 34 below and my
n. 50.

31

Though eutuchia certainly was thought of that way sometimes by ancient
Greek speakers: Cf. Aristotle Rhetoric 1361 b39ff.
32

seems to have gradually become
(Robertson and Dietrich 1996b, 1566).
as

33

"In popular belief each person has a separate tyche,

and appears
that

wake of Macedonian conquest

in the

it

in all the particulars of his life

Tyche was one of the Moirai

[.

.

.]"

("Fates"), the

which

is

born with him,

(Robertson 1970b, 1101). Pindar said

most powerful of them (Robertson

1970a, 431; Robertson and Dietrich 1996b, 1566). The power of the Moirai was

thought to be exerted especially

at

an individual's birth (Robertson 1970a, 431;

Robertson and Dietrich 1996a, 589; 1996b, 1566).
34

Irwin 1995, 33 appears to use Aristotle to help us understand the meaning of

"eutuchia" generally as well as specifically in the Euthydemus

Eudemian Ethics

.

1246b37-1247al (cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1099a31-b8) appears to be a critical
comment on Eud. 279c5-280b3; so maybe Aristotle thought that Socrates there meant
eutuchia as a supply or supplier of goods; this is after all the main way that Aristotle
seems to use "eutuchia", for instance, at Rhetoric 1361b38ff. But Eudemain Ethics
1247a21-27 discusses a different conception of eutuchia in fact just the one I say
Socrates has in mind at Eud. 279c5-280b3. So Aristotle is no help in deciding which

—

conception Socrates really had

in

mind.

35

Robertson and Dietrich 1996b, 1566. In Liddell and Scott 1889, the "tuche"
.]."
entry begins: "the good which man obtains (TuyxavEi) by the favour of the gods[.
.

36

The idea

that each person in

some way

controlled his

advocated by Heraclitus and Epicharmus (Robertson 1970, 43

1

own
;

'fate'

was already

Robertson and Dietrich

1996a, 589).

Robertson makes a concession in his next sentence: "Most often, however,
Aristotle
merely 'luck', divorced from human effortf. .]." Cf. Mo. 99a3-4 and

37

tyche

is

.

Rhetoric 1361b39ff.
38

Some commentators have

suggested that Socrates plays last and loose with

the term (e.g., Waterfield 1987, 306;
39

We could of course

so that he does even better in
possibility

is

cf.

Chance 1992, 238

n. 17).

imagine the gods somehow assisting the wise person
C than he would without such assistance, but this

ruled out in (1), which Cleinias has assented

49

to.

in

C

40

So at Pro. 344d it is acknowledged (though
supposedly in the words of
Simonides) that a great storm might make an expert
pilot helpless, and a harsh season
might leave an expert farmer without resource, even
though there too (345ab) "doing
well" at an activity is identified with having the
relevant knowledge.
41

T

•

rwin 1995, 55-56 rejects this natural way of interpreting
Socrates' point
280a only because Irwin has already made a decision about
what

at

Socrates' ultimate

conclusion

besides wisdom we need no good fortune— understood
(Irwin
1995, 33) as a supply or supplier of the other goods. The fact that
Irwin's interpretation
of Socrates conclusion leads to rejecting such a natural way
is,

viz. that

of interpreting Socrates'
premise should have made him reconsider his presumptions about
what the
argument is supposed to show.

mam

This kind of eutuchia

because,

poTpa}

I

)

suspect,
at the

is

it

is

not discussed in the corresponding

dealt with (under the

end of the dialogue

title

(e.g., 99a).

When

passage
{

0e (oc

Socrates there suggests that one

can do well with divine dispensation as well as with virtue, there
he is not serious (see my n. 51).
44

Meno

"divine fate/dispensation

is

good reason

to think

This was perhaps the view of those

happiness consisted

in

who are said to have thought that
having eutuchia (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1099b7-8,

Physics 197b4, Eudemian Ethics 1214a21-25).
44

So of course technically it is not true that given any set of circumstances it
would be preferable to share fates with the wise than with the unwise. This should not
make us think that Cleinias was mistaken in the answers he gives at 279e6-280a4; for
he is obviously thinking of what is true for the most part not what is true universally.
,

45

2 8 9d9-10 and 290b 1-2 are far less troublesome, since these have a fairly weak

possible reading:

"[.

.

be happy {TEXvq, qv
46

the art

They have been so

55-58; Kraut 1984, 38

226; Annas
47

.]

1

999, 4 1

;

which

[is

av KTqoapevos

n.

21;

such

tis

interpreted by

that],

having acquired

Eubaiqcov

many

it,

one might/may

e’iti}."

scholars, including Irwin 1986; 1995,

Reeve 1989, 134-136; Penner 1992b,

13 n. 24;

Kahn

1996,

and Dimas 2002, 11-13.

—

Which
makes us happy? is really just: Which of the
knowledges is owed the credit for making one happy when one is made happy ? It is the
same question asked at Cm. 174a 10-1 1. In Appendix B, I consider some other passages
that are in danger of being misinterpreted in the same way as the Eud. passages just

The

question, therefore, that occupies the second protreptic passage

of the knowledges

is

—

the one that

considered.
4X

Reshotko 2001 puts

it

well:

50

What is guaranteed is that the virtuous person
will never fail to use those
resources available to her to get herself
into the situation which is the
best one
avatlab e to her, g,ven her available
resources and the position from which
she
starts. (jJj)
Certainly even a wise quadriplegic, e.g.,
unfortunately cannot make use of many
of the
resources around her without the help of
others. But she is guaranteed to use
as well as
possible those resources that she can make
use of, including the help of others.
49

Strictly speaking, then, 'in the abstract'
we are in a better position to determine
the value of wisdom (than that of other
useful things) only inasmuch as we can
tell that
wisdom will either have positive instrumental value or
none at all: i.e., we

determine that

it

can
alone of the other useful things will never
have negative instrumental

value.

The examples Socrates discusses

are: aulos-playing, writing, piloting a
ship

soldiering, doctoring,
actions. If

woodworking. Each of these involves a series of complex
here also concerned with goals that could be achieved
by very

we were

simple actions, there would turn out to be plenty of goals that could easily
be achieved
without knowledge/skill, e.g., just by being 'lucky' (an
example might be: trying to spit
on the ground) or by passively undergoing virtually involuntary
actions (an example

would

be: trying to breathe).

This is represented by Plato as genuine Socratic doctrine, familiar
to followers
of Socrates likeNicias (Lch. 194d; cf. HMi. 366d ff„ Ly. 210, G. 466e,
506d, 513e514a, R. 1.349e, also
cf.

cf.

Pro. j»45a, though Socrates puts

it

into Simonides'

mouth

(but

356d-357d)).

Although Socrates arrives at the same conclusion at Mo. 88c, he later (97a,
98bc) appears to withdraw this conclusion because having true opinion without
knowledge seems to lead to success as well. (Vlastos thinks (1991, 228 n. 91) this
indicates a shift

Meno

is

from genuine Socratic doctrine

"a hybrid, firmly elenctic

down

to

to Platonic.

be,

Cf. his contention that the

80E, firmly non-elenctic after that"

(1

15

n.

See also Kraut 1984, 301-304.) But I think that at Mo. 97a ff. we are supposed to
see that Socrates is merely baiting Meno with the idea that true opinion by itself could
41).

lead to success;

I

think

we

are supposed to understand that Socrates himself

is

not

Our first hint of this is Meno's own reluctance (97c) to embrace
the suggestion that mere true opinion is no less beneficial than knowledge. That
Socrates himself thinks we should reject the suggestion is made clear by his explanation
tempted by that

idea.

of the difference between knowledge and mere true opinion (97e-98a). He says
explicitly that true opinions are not "worth much" until tied down with reasoning
until

they

become knowledge

(98a); that

{Ti|iicoTEpov}" than mere true opinion

is

why knowledge

(ibid.).

—

i.e.,

"more valuable

So when Socrates immediately

Meno whether it is correct to say that true opinion is no worse a
Meno is the one who is at fault when he responds by asserting
Meno has missed the point of the distinction Socrates just made at

thereafter asks (98b)

guide than knowledge,
that that is correct.

is

97e-98a. (See Penner 1987, 310-320; 1992a, 165

51

n.

63.)

may

t

at

be that Socrates

achieving a goal

it

one had

is really

all

willing to concede that one would be
successful
the relevant true opinions but no
knowledge
(97c).

But because of the sheer complexity of actions
involved in living a successful life I
think Socrates would maintain that we would
be foolish not to attempt to get
knowledge: For one thing, to have ah the true opinions
relevant for achieving happiness
without knowledge would be extremely unlikely and
could come only with the help of
gods (99cd). (Consider, e.g., how miraculous it would
be for a person to build a house
relying upon true belief alone; however extensive
the person's resource of true opinion,
it would not likely be sufficient
for adequately dealing with the unpredictable
situations

that inevitably arise in

such an endeavor (see Penner 1987, 316-320; 1991.
163, 164 n.
1 8).
No how-to book can invariably guide one successfully through a complex’
endeavor unless it anticipates every possible turn of events; no
knowledgeable human is
always an adequate guide unless he or she is there every step
of the way.) To rely on
only true opinion is to rely on divine dispensation. Furthermore,
without divine
dispensation, mere true opinion is in danger of being easily swayed
in the midst of
action by temptation or persuasion, whereas knowledge is strong
(see Pro. 356d). So
true opinion shares much in common with knowledge; but
by itself it can be relied upon
far less than knowledge, and that is what makes the acquisition
of knowledge "so much
more valuable" (97d) and so critical to living well.

Though

at the end of the Meno it may seem as if Socrates entertains
the
suggestion that true opinion without understanding could qualify as virtue, his final
conclusion evidently is that it may only be a "shade {oKid}" compared with real virtue

(100a). (As Kraut 1984, 302 n. 82 says, one thing that Plato likes about the metaphor at
100a is surely the contrast between "steadfast" and "flittering". Kraut correctly points

out that the diviner Teiresias
shades.

Still,

was not

in

Hades a flesh-and-blood man among mindless

Plato in using the metaphor obviously also has in

mind

the contrast

between authenticity and false appearance of authenticity. The word "true" (100a6) is
not as ambiguous as Kraut thinks (301 n. 82). I think it is a stretch to maintain, as Kraut

means complete rather than genuine It is more natural to
compare the present passage with Pdo. 69b-d, where Socrates quite explicitly contrasts
suggests, that "true" here

,

.

a genuine kind of virtue with a facade of virtue, using "true" to describe the former and

"shaded painting {oKiaypacpia}" for the

Kraut 1984, 301

n.

82 says that

is

necessary for virtue,

position that

knowledge

what Plato

trying to accomplish from

is

if

R. 2.365c).)

latter (cf.

Socrates in the
"[.

.

.]

96d 1-1 00c2[.

.]."

exposition of a philosophical view from those passages,

be disappointed. But that does not mean there

would agree

—

is

suggest— and

I

raise real philosophical trouble for the

is to

for virtue.

think Kraut

But where

I

differ

from Kraut

is

I

view

to understand

true that if

will (on

my

we

that

expect

interpretation)

to those passages.

one of Plato's intentions

that

and other early dialogues) the careful reader

It is

we

no point

passages

that

not abandoning the

would be hard

it
.

Meno were

I

in those

knowledge

think Plato gives (in the

is

necessary

Meno

itself

fairly plain clues to the Socratic solution to

that trouble.

on Ap. 41c3-4 Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 129-130
Socrates thought that "good activity is sufficient for happiness" and that

Based almost
conclude that

entirely

52

virtue itself

as a condition of the soul

—

is unnecessary for happiness; in
fact for
happiness consists in right activity [. .]"
(In
(130).
my estimation
their comments (113-1 14) on R. 1.353d2-354a2
and G. 507b5-c5 do not make their
position any more plausible.) Brickhouse and Smith
recognize (130) that their
interpretation of Socratic happiness seems to conflict
with the Euthvdemus passage, so
they attempt to explain how it is actually consistent
with it:

Socrates,

"[.

.

.]

.

When

Socrates says that there can be no goods without wisdom,
he does not
mean that nothing could ever be used rightly on any occasion unless
the user
actually possesses wisdom, for that is patently false.
Rather, he

means

nothing will always be good without wisdom, since false
belief about
live can turn any of those items into great evils.
(131)

But

main

this is not all that Socrates

that

how

to

means in the Euthvdemus and it is not even his
what he is most anxious to show is that
achieving goals (that require a number of complex activities)
including
happiness— is impossible without wisdom (282al-6, 282e4-5, 289c7-8). And

point.

What he

.

clearly says there and

—

success at
success at

this is a thesis that

pervades the early dialogues (see n. 51 above). Brickhouse and
Smith conclude that Socrates could not have really held it because they think Socrates
thought himself happy and was honest when he claimed not to be wise. Their 2000
attempt (148-149;

cf.

152) to explain

53

And

how

Socrates allegedly thinks he has "luckily"
flies in the face of everything he says about the topic.

avoided the need for wisdom
not knowledge

"

in general ", as Waterfield 1987,

307 assumes.

Waterfield's assumption leads

him to question (344 n. 2) the legitimacy of Socrates'
question (at 288e) about which kind of knowledge is the knowledge he and Cleinias
have been discussing. I will presently show why Socrates' question is perfectly in line
with the conclusions of the

first protreptic.

as Santas 1993, 51 n. 31 points out.
55

56

Cf.

Cf.

HMi. 365e

HMi. 366e

ff.

ff.,

See also Mx. 246e-247a.

373c

ff.;

Ly. 209e-210a; R. 1.332de, 333e-334a.

cn
~

In both passages

(505b and

5

1

8e-5 19a), the

word Socrates uses

for

wisdom

is

"phronesis".
58

knowledge is such that, when we act in accordance with it,
which
it is true to say that we "act correctly" and do well (see
there is
Cm. 1 71 d- 172a and Eud. 279e). But this is "correct action" and "doing well" relative to
the goal specific to that particular knowledge (Cm. 7 1 d-1 72a), so that that goal will be
It is

true that each

a certain sense in

1

reached with the help of that knowledge. But
correctly or do

will not necessarily thereby act

happy

.

For the most

part, the "correct

Euthvdemus is correct use relative to happiness (see particularly Eud.
while, in the Charmides "correctness" is correctness relative to the ends of

use" of the

291 cl 0);

we

well relative to the goal of being

,

particular crafts.

53

I

believe the distinction

present in the Apology though it requires
a careful
Socrates endorses the view that "human wisdom
is worth
is

,

reading to see

it.

something

little— actually, nothing" (23a); interestingly, he
characterizes knowledge about human
virtue (I think he has in mind at least knowledge
about good and bad) as a kind of
wisdom "greater than human" (20e). Craft-knowledge, he says,
is not about "the
greatest things" (22d), though it would presumably
include the knowledge that gives us
health, strength, beauty, and wealth (see G. 452a-c);
so Socrates would rather be aware
that he was ignorant of "the greatest things" and have
no craft-knowledge at all, than

he knew about "the greatest things" and have even ah
other— i.e.,
aft-knowledge (22e). (I agree with Benson 2000, 187 that Socrates
would not have
decided (or at least would not have reported that he had decided)
that he is better off
than the craftsmen, had any of them admitted to knowing none
of the greatest things,
spite of their craft-knowledge. But I would quickly add that
Socrates neither would
have decided that such a craftsman was any better off than he, in spite of
falsely believe that

ci

in

that

craftsman’s mastery of something "admirable"

mastery

of, for

(22d)— a craft—that

Socrates has no

craft-knowledge without knowledge of good and bad

is

useless or in fact

harmful.)

The distinction appears in the Laches as well: courage is not just any soil of
wisdom/knowledge (e.g., expertise in diving, knowledge of horsemanship) (192e-193c,
194e;
it

is

Cm. 173de and

cf.

174b, G. 51 lb-5 14a, R. 4.428b-d).

Protagoras not Socrates

who makes

Though

in Pro.

350a-351a

(albeit not very clearly) the observation,

Socrates I believe is supposed to be well aware of it (see 356d-357d and 360d).
(Protagoras objects, in effect, to Socrates' apparent (though not explicit) assumption that
anyone who is both bold and knowledgeable (e.g., the expert diver, the expert

horseman, the expert

which Socrates needs

peltast) is also courageous,

in order to

conclude that knowledge implies courage.) (Vlastos 1994, 109-117 evidently does not
think that Socrates

is

made

to recognize this distinction "until" the

Vlastos thinks was written later than the Protagoras and
dialogues. Vlastos's misunderstanding on this point

is, I

Laches which
,

many of the
think,

due

other early

to his failure (in his

109-1 17) to consider 350a-351a in connection with Socrates' later (360d) claims about
the nature of courage. Cf. Irwin 1977, 292, 295 n. 10.)
60
It is

this

(So Socrates says

observation

—

at

HMa. 297b4-5

is

art:

art, i.e.

is

"the good".)

—

1 7 1 d73e that dispels Burnet's
According to Burnet,
1

you describe any form of
a capacity of producing some particular epyov, there

always represented as arguing

goodness as an

ergon of phronesis

Cm.

so clearly presented in

1924 worry about identifying virtue with an
Socrates

that the

no room for it. There are already arts
required, and the apexf) is uselessf.

in
.].

.

that, if

existence which will do
(57;

cf.

all

is

that is

Allen 1996, 148-149)

Socrates only appears sometimes to argue thus because few interlocutors (Critias and
Nicias are perhaps exceptions) are able to see that none of the other arts really has

human goodness

or welfare as

its

end. According to Burnet, virtue for Socrates

is

not

do not understand why Burnet seems to think that
and a condition
a capacity to produce
Socrates could not consider virtue both an art

an

art

but a condition of the soul.

I

—

of the soul.

54

—

1

Dimas 2002 takes seriously the suggestion that
the peculiar product of the
wisdom must be (at least in part) the wisdom itself
(13). Dimas

uniquely beneficial

evidently tailed to recognize that Socrates
ultimately rejects (291 be. 292e-293a) this
suggestion on the grounds that it prevents the
original puzzle from being solved.

Socrates insistence here on finding a product
the kingly art that

is

distinct

from

that art itself

is

—

or at least a subject matter

—of

based on his belief in the principle

every art/knowledge has either a product or a subject
matter distinct from
537c ff.; Cm. 1 65d- 1 66b; Pro. 312de; G. 449d, 451a-c).
63

has

that

itself (Ion

That Socrates recognizes

this is suggested not only by the fact
that he
expresses the point in just those words at 291b6-7, but also
by the fact that in the
G orgias (464c, 502e, 503a, 5 1 3de) and Euthyphro (2d-3a) Socrates says that the
peculiar product and aim of the art of politics is the good
condition of the soul
exactly
the sort of thing one would expect it be, based on the
preliminary considerations of the
Euthydemus. (The way wealth, freedom, and lack of faction are
introduced and
characterized (292b4-7) suggests that Socrates cannot really
have considered these the

—

works of the

true art of politics.) This

comparison actually suggests an alternate way of
answering the question ot the Euthydemus In what (way) does the kingly
art make men
good?: Since the ultimate aim/product of the art is the good condition of
souls, the art
,

makes them
course

their souls

Thus

goods).

be intrinsically good, not good

achieves this ultimate aim by

it

Penner 1992a,

a
1

way

first

out of the labyrinth

is

at

some

making them good

at

further activity (of

using the instrumental

found by rejecting the assumption

j 5 thinks that Socrates accepts, viz. that a person's

that

being good

is always
something. This should make us reconsider Penner's conclusion that
Socrates really accepts the assumption.

being good

64

at

In order for the suggestion (that the kingly art produces correct use of goods)

be a viable answer to the original question of the second protreptic, Socrates and
Cleinias need not even have spelled out exactly what correct use consists in. Santas
1993 evidently would disagree: He suggests (49-50) that knowledge of the good and the
bad is not offered as an account of wisdom in the Euthydemus because it would be
to

"circular" in the context of that dialogue. This

is

not a plausible explanation for

Plato chose to avoid discussing knowledge of the
definition of wisdom as
certainly

why

good in the Euthydemus The
knowledge of the good would not have been circular It would
.

.

have been not altogether informative, since we are not

(at least in the

protreptic passages themselves) explicitly offered in addition any definition of

happiness other than '(what results from) correct use of health

etc.'

But

danger exists in the Charmides (for no detailed account of happiness
either; Socrates (in the

of what use of health

is

Charmides) understands knowledge of the good

etc. will result in (or constitute) happiness.);

Plato from having Socrates in that dialogue discuss

this

same

explicit there
to

be knowledge

but nothing prevented

knowledge of the good

in the

same

breath with happiness.
In a

way

explains that

seems similar to Santas' account of the problem, Irwin 1995, 88
Socrates and his interlocutors want to give an account of the science
that

55

whose possession would be sufficient for happiness"—
"the science of happiness"rW m S
that they haVG trouble ex lainin
the nature of its
P

but

subject matter
g
is that they lack a ,ff’
determinate and specific account of happiness"
(cf. Irwin 1977, 76).
Again, I do not deny that at some point the concept
of happiness needs filling out-' but
this does not appear to me to be the
problem that Socrates and his interlocutors face
in
our passage At the end of the second protreptic
passage, the interlocutors fail even to
recall that the subject matter of the science
they seek is happiness in fact they
misidentify its subject matter as that of producing
wisdom (where 'wisdom' is
understood as that instrumental^ good wisdom discussed
in the first protreptic)— "the
only good", evidently forgetting that happiness is that
for the sake of which wisdom is
pursued. Again, if the 'indeterminate-ness' of the concept
of happiness is such a
problem, why is nothing made of this 'problem' in the Charmides
?
,

:

65

Reshotko 2001, 331-332 disambiguates Socrates' claim that
knowledge
only good; she does not comment on whether or not Plato
was aware of the

is

the

ambiguity.

Annas 1993,

60, 63 correctly attributes the problem in the second protreptic
passage to
between the thesis that virtue is a skill (and so good for what

the apparent conflict

it can
produce) and the thesis that virtue is the "only good" (interpreted, evidently,
as the only
intrinsic good), but she fails to identify the solution to the problem,
because she appears
simply to assume that Socrates' intention in the first protreptic passage was
to conclude
that virtue is the only intrinsic good.
Waterfield 1987, 308 offers the same diagnosis of the mistake as I have. But I

do not agree with Waterfield's suggestion
interlocutors fail

(Ferejohn 1984,

is

requirement,

this

that the superordinate craft

10

1

that part
is

of the reason Socrates and his

required not only to use but to produce

17 seems to account for the error in the same manner). Even by
could happiness not be the peculiar product of the kingly art?

n.

why

(Though Annas 1993, 60-61 seems to respond adequately to the type of objection
suggested raised by Waterfield and Ferejohn, she later (64; cf. 65 n. 28) says, "The
assumption most in need of questioning" is the one that a skill requires a product "over
and above the exercise of the skill itself.") Waterfield is also mistaken in thinking that
"[.
.] there is no reason to suppose that Plato was aware that different senses of 'good'
were operative in the two parts of the argument." His main reasons for this seem to be:
the Euthydemus is an early dialogue and the required distinction between two senses of
.

'good' "is after all a rather subtle point." But in other early dialogues (ones supposedly

even

earlier than the

Euthydemus )

Plato

distinction (notably in Pro. 351c-e).

puzzle introduced here
it

is

I

shows us

some

(e.g.,

does understand the

do, however, think Plato recognized that the

an important one needing a solution, as he raises a version of

again in the Republic (6.505bc) and the

not think, as

that he

Laws

(963); see also

Guthrie 1975, 281, Chance 1992, 127,

HMa. 296d-297d. (I do
Kahn 1996) do, that

Plato expected us to find in the Republic a special solution to the puzzle.)
66

67

the

See

my

We are

argument

at

n. 63.

supposed

R.

1

to navigate our

.341-342 and

1

.346.

way around

It is

56

a potential misunderstanding of

true that Socrates says there that each art

1

looks to

what is advantageous" or "beneficial" for that
over which
not inconsistent with the view that only the
knowledge of good and

it

is set-

but this

is

bad looks to what
of medicine must be

is

advantageous for people trying to live a good life.
The art
distinguished from the knowledge of what is
good and bad for patients In R 1 341-342
and 1.346 Socrates does not fail to distinguish these;
for strictly speaking the art of
medicine considers not what is advantageous for the
patient, but what is advantageous
for the patient's body. It is only the "art" (R.
1.332d) of justice (i.e„ virtue) whose goal
is the advantageous of people trying to
live a good life.
or sh ° uld we think that what Socrates says in
these passages or what he says
.335c implies that Socrates really thinks that the arts
cannot be used as means for
bad ends (see 333e). The one who has knowledge of music
does

^

_

R.

1

make men unmusical

(sc., less

falsehoods about music, and

Making men unmusical
at R.

have the power to
knowledgeable about music) by (e.g.) teaching them
is knowledge of music that gives
them this power

certainly

music: ignorance of music!

argument

it

at

(We

is not the ergon of what is contrary
to knowledge
& of
should be suspicious of the seriousness of the

.335 in any case; for Socrates there suggests that

1

it is the work of the
unvirtuous (335d); but this view is not
Socratic.) Socrates does not here express his real reason for
thinking that virtue
as

unjust

man

to injure

people— sc., make them

knowledge of good and bad
68

This also should

is

69
"[.

—

(viz., that

everyone desires the good)

come

as no surprise given that in the Euthvdemus the
of politics was the one they sought and in the Gorgias the
or involves knowledge of good and bad (500b; cf. 464cd).

impression was that the

of politics

—cannot be misused

.

.]

for

art

whom

alone

it is

appropriate (cb ye povcp 7TpoafjKEi}[.

.

art

.]"

(199d8).
70

Lch. 199de thus indicates that Socrates really did think (see Mo. 78c3-4) that
the right track in suggesting that virtue is the power to provide the good

Meno was on

things (Mo. 78bc).
7

that the

There

power

a related worry that at Cto. 44d Socrates is committed to the view
produce bad things goes hand in hand with the power to produce good

is

to

things.
72
‘

See Penner 1992a, 132-133 for a good discussion of the

interpretation of the dialogue's conclusion.
is

an example of an intelligent dissenter

Aristotle

As Penner

common

points out. Kraut 1984, 311-316

to this interpretation.

The earliest extant criticism of this view (independent of Plato)
Nicomachean Ethics 145b22-28.

is

of course

1

74

See Santas 1979, 189-190; Reeve 1989, 144-145; Penner 1992a, 133-134;
Irwin 1995, 69-70; cf. Allen 1996, 147-148.
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7?

Pro.
76

356c

Ju st as

ff.;

Lch. 195c9-12, 196a2, 198d3-5, 199d6.

Lch. 198e he appears to recognize that
warcraft needs the input of
is knowledge of (some of the)
events that are going to
occur (195e-196a)) in order to achieve its product—
victory— most effectively by
discerning which courses of action in battle will
(best) achieve victory. Without the
help of knowledge about the future, the expert
general would obviously be much less
effective in achieving his or her end.
the divining art

at

(whose product
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CHAPTER III
VIRTUE AS THE ULTIMATE END

IN

THE APOLOGY AND CRITO

Introduction

Although Socrates
virtue in the

same way

helpfulness), in the

in

in the

Apology sometimes speaks of the value of wisdom and

which he speaks of it

Apology he

clearly attributes to virtue

value that he does not attribute to

dialogues only very rarely.

other dialogues,

make

value but actually

away.

I

it

I

Euthydemus

in the

will

it

in the

will argue that

and wisdom another kind of

Euthydemus and does so

now show that

the

Apology and

clear that for Socrates virtue not only has

the sole bearer of such value and

is

no other

interpretation can

justice to Socrates' bold claims in those

(viz., as inherent

is

in other early

the Crito unlike
,

supreme

intrinsic

not something that can be taken

make adequate

sense of or do

full

two dialogues about the invulnerability of the

virtuous.

Why

Attend to Virtue?

There are certainly a number of passages
condition of soul

is

—

(30ab;*

of exhorting everyone

or as vehemently

cf.

Apology

characterized as the greatest good. Socrates

his constant practice

before

in the

"to attend to neither

as— [you attend to]

29d9-e2, 36c, 39d).

He

word

His

29e5, 30b3).

bodies nor

it

.
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good

a great deal of

money

will be the best"

.

.

which he

final exhortation in the

ocopaToov ettipeAeToScu qf|T£ xpnnaTcov TrpoTEpov
t rjg yuxns oncog cog apioTq eotqi.

|if)T£

ocpoSpa cbg

makes

the

"virtue" to describe that

1

cf.

which

the soul in order that

also uses the

exhorts everyone to attend to (31b, 41e;

in

ht]8e

outgo

Apology (41e;

cf.

36c) makes

it

clear that Socrates thinks there

is

nothing that one must

attend to before attending to virtue.

But

it

could be argued" that

in all these

passages Socrates

is

exhorting people to

pursue, before anything else, knowledge of good and bad, and that this
calling "virtue".

According

to this interpretation,

the greatest good, he has in

is

that nothing

must be attended

mind

its

when

is

what he

is

Socrates talks as though virtue

unique instrumental value, and when he asserts

to before

it,

the "before"

temporal rather than

is

axiological.

The exhortation

30b

at

there he characterizes virtue in

protreptic passages of the

rather,

from

virtue,

philosophizing

virtue

—

the

to support this interpretation; for

same way

all

the other things

Similarly,

when

good

(38a),

it

[come

to be]

others and himself and

is

be from money;

good

for

humans both

in

Socrates'

making speeches about

that philosophizing, being the

might be argued

knowledge of good and bad,

to

characterized in the

Socrates characterizes his practice of

own

to this interpretation, philosophizing is necessary for

is

wisdom was

as

:

— including examining

as the greatest

pursuit of

4

much

seems

Euthydemus "Virtue does not come

money and

private and in public."*

in particular

attention to virtue. According

knowledge of good and bad; so

it

only instrumentally the "greatest good". Finally, this interpretation offers an

470bc,
explanation of the uncompromising imperative (Ap. 28b, 28d, 32d, Cto. 48cd, G.

527c) to act virtuously: this

of good and bad: action

is

is,

for Socrates, simply to act in accordance with

an instrument used by the knower ot good and bad

knowledge
to achieve

happiness.

*Ouk

£K

aAAa aya0a

xpnnaTcov apETq yiyvETai, aAA’

e E,

apETqs xP HP aTa Kai

toTs av6pcbTTOis aTTavTa Kai i5ia Kai 5npooia.
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1

T(^

Consolation for the Virtuous: Their Invulnerability

Most scholars who
passages in the

prefer that kind of interpretation recognize
that there are

A pology that at

least

appear to conflict with their idea that Socrates only

considers virtue to be instrumentally good in the

passages of this

injuring

him

in

cannot in any
for a

end[.

sort. In the first,

injure

one who

good man nothing bad
5

evidently on the grounds that in general a person

is

better (30cd).

neither

when

6

himself a good man; and

this,

first

he's living

we may assume,

evidently thinks he has attended to his

good. In the

second passage, he

own

is

own

seems reasonable

him

to

would go well beyond

if

we

are good;

conclude

that,

the instrumental

knowledge of good and bad gives

if all

.

come

that

its

is

to an

condition

its

8

harm him.

(among other

7

he

is

is

In the

things) will

though those who voted

for

failed.

they possess

is

goodness/virtue. That

power of knowledge of good and bad,

As

I

this

as

have already shown, although

possessor the power to

of the things usable in her or his circumstances,

.

.Tjhere

according to Socrates, some have a

Socrates himself seems elsewhere to acknowledge:

avTi.

he's

have (inevitably)

injury (41d8), they

happiness that cannot be taken away even

.

it

behalf, since (he says) they cannot

trying to assure his listeners that dying

his death are trying to cause

.

when

.

implies that he thinks he has virtue:

soul and has seen to

not cause anything bad for him or any of us

*.

nor even

"[.

passage, he appears to be trying to get his judges to think that he

defending himself not on his

It

In the other, he says,

In both passages, Socrates pretty clearly implies that he considers

(4 Id).*

.]"

.

—

suggested. There are two main

Socrates claims that his accusers are incapable of

any way {ouSev}

way

way

make

the best possible use

power cannot by

itself

provide the

ouk eotiv avSpi aya0cp kokov ou5ev oute ^govti oute teAeutpo-

.
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materials for the correct use of materials that
results in a good

completely safeguard

its

nor can

life,

it

by

itself

possessor against misfortunes that either take
away the

materials necessary for correct use or

somehow

the process of using them.

foil

Socrates' claim about the invulnerability of the
virtuous cannot

come from

So

his thinking

of the instrumental value of the knowledge of good and
bad.

The Virtuous Risk and Do Not Risk
Given the assertions

in the

two passages just mentioned,

surprising to find Socrates elsewhere in the

receiving bad things from base
(25dl).

for

9

him

More

He even seems
if

men

to provide

(25e)

specifically as

still,

—

that he

one of those things

this

it

that his accusers

as a "great" injury; he did not count

that his accusers are incapable

it

of injuring him

that he does risk

exile,

that

he would consider bad

being silenced (37b-38b).

might do

And

it

is

any way.

all,

because

at

SNI: Socrates does not risk being injured

in

any way by his

:

inferiors.

be willing to assent to

Socrates does not risk receiving anything bad from his inferiors.

But given 37b-38b
or to

30c8 he said

10

be willing to assent to

SNB

30d

him, but that Socrates

to

to

at

not simply that he did not

as an injury at

in

to

So based on 30cd, Socrates would appear

Based on 4 Id, he would appear similarly

SNI

somewhat

list—exile—was mentioned

did not in that passage even count as an injury.

count

is

can even be injured by them

some examples of things

one of the items on

it

Apology acknowledging

he were subjected to them: imprisonment,

surprising

"Injuries”

(cf.

SNB. The

25de),

it

appears that Socrates would not be prepared to assent to

principle of charity obliges us at least to attempt to interpret these

passages so that they do not conflict with 30cd and 4 Id.
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In order tor

passages,

it

an interpretation to provide a satisfactory
account of all the relevant

must not simply make them

consistent, but also

make

sense of his attempt

(particularly at 4 Id) to provide the virtuous
with meaningful consolation; also,

not require that he assign to the knowledge of
good and bad a greater
really thinks

would
to

it

has.

The

best interpretation not only

'mean what he

says’; for otherwise, his boasts

must

power than he

would achieve those

also preserve the literalness of Socrates' words:
ideally,

it

we would

results, but

like Socrates

and promises are misleading or (worse)

empty.

Do

the Virtuous Risk Living Unlivable Lives?

Brickhouse and Smith

words

at

they say,

for a

settle for a less

than

30cd and 41d (1994, 121-3; 2000, 145;

means not

that for a

good person

good person nothing bad can happen
Since

we

maintain that he

soul, Socrates

is

must concede

there

literal

cf.

is

interpretation of Socrates'

1989, 162-163, 262ff.): Socrates,

absolutely nothing bad, but only that

to his soul

.

They

say.

claiming that no absolute harm comes to the good
that although neither Meletus nor anyone else could

ever harm his soul, unjust treatment could, nevertheless, harm him relatively,
indeed, to such a degree as to make his life no longer worth living. (1994, 122;
11
cf. 135-136 and 2000, 145-146)

So on

their interpretation, Socrates

realizes that his accusers can injure

does not really mean what he says

him

in

many ways and

the virtuous person not only are there bad things

that virtue is not

even

sufficient for a

good

life.

virtue does not provide protection against a bad

cannot be taken away!
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many and

injure

him

at all; for

he

greatly and for
;

great, but they are so great

His boasts and promises are empty:

life, it is

no consolation

to say that

it

if

May the

Virtuou s Be

Made Unhappy

Penner interprets Socrates' claim

at

Ap. 30cd

to

"hv Accident"?

mean

that those

worse than

Socrates cannot artfully injure him because they
lack knowledge of good and bad
(1997.
153-155). "Of course what they do might by accident

worse person[.

.]"

.

damage Socrates— make him

(154, his emphasis). Penner does not explain

might happen even by accident. But

if his interpretation

were

how

correct,

a

such a thing

it

would be

strange that Socrates does not appear to acknowledge the
possibility that Penner

mentions.

Of course,

Socrates thinks that the

many

lack knowledge of good and bad

and, for that reason alone, could not achieve even what they
suppose
viz. injuring

is

good

for them,

people they think are enemies. But that does not seem to be the only or

even the primary point of Ap. 30c8-dl, and certainly not the primary point of 4 Id.
I

he main problem with Penner's interpretation

that the virtuous are ever

harmed

accidentally, then

is

that if Socrates

what looked

were

like boasts

to

allow

and

consolations would be significantly deflated once they are understood. 'Meletus can't
injure

is

me

at all'

would become 'Meletus

nothing bad' would become 'There

is

me

can't injure

at all,

unless he's lucky.' 'There

nothing bad, except bad luck.'

How are the

virtuous, including Socrates himself, supposed to be so confident if there

that their virtue

may

Do

be taken away even

if

it

is

the Virtuous Risk Losing

just

from

Minor

is

a possibility

their adversaries' 'good luck'?

Intrinsic

Goods?

Vlastos has suggested a somewhat more appealing nonliteral interpretation of
Socrates' words: he suggests that

"nothing bad"

(at

non-trivial injury

4 Id), he

is

when

Socrates speaks of "no injury" (at 30cd) and

speaking hyperbolically: what Socrates really means

and no great

12

evil (1991, 219, 221).
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On

is

no

this interpretation, Socrates'

5

words

should provide the virtuous with some consolation:
virtue, according

if true

Vlastos's interpretation,

a very great intrinsic good, being the

is

sole—component of happiness. The
is

(evidently) mainly in

the other

components of happiness

knower

of

hard to see

is,

are so minute and in fact dispensable.

Socrates' boasts and promises appear to be false.

good and bad

on Vlastos's

why

and

in

some cases

interpretation, limited to

actually undone.

14
If,

on the other

knowledge of good and bad,

could be that Socrates

32d).

that

knowledge; but

it

is

Ap. 28b

not clear that Socrates believes that knowledge can ever be

statements. If we look just

making a bold claim about

the value and

thought he was making any sacrifices
not interpret Socrates' words

hyperbolically.

Maybe we

at Socrates'

is

in his pursuit

literally.

if

excessive watering

power of virtue: he does not
of virtue.

16

a person
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talk as if he

But Vlastos suggests

Vlastos says that Socrates

maybe simply because he

We can understand that,

in its

words, he appears to be

are supposed to think that Socrates

for dramatic or rhetoric effect, or

his views.

at

1

down of Socrates'

we

is

so concerned simply because he wants to retain

is

But the main disadvantage of Vlastos's interpretation

that

it

Socrates would be concerned about performing virtuous actions once

(cf.

taken away.

The

—just as of anyone—can easily be greatly

he attained this knowledge, as he seems to imply by the unqualified principle
It

since

13

restricted or restrained altogether,

hand, virtue

itself,

Vlastos's interpretation seems to be that if virtue either

consists in or requires action,

actions of the

not

instrumental value of virtue, on this interpretation,

self-maintenance— i.e., the maintenance of virtue

its

One problem with

major— though

to

is

is

is

is

speaking

overstating his view

overcome with

zeal for

expressing views very dear to him,

and especially

in a situation

inclined to express

that

them

where he

in a hyperbolic or

what such a person says

views.

My aim, however,

that they

every

17

come

feels obliged to

is

is to

inaccurate

be

is

is

does not faithfully represent his actual

it

an interpretation of Socrates' claims such

out to be consistent and accurately representative of his views. If

time a person expresses the basic principles of his view

that he is just

may

exaggerated form. But the consequence

—

see if there

defend those views, he

speaking hyperbolically,

we might

we

are inclined to say

begin to question whether

we

really

understand his view.
Vlastos attempts not only to

make them sound more amenable
most of us find

it

make

to

Socrates' statements consistent, but also to

common

is

no difference

camp and

is

no doubt

in

that, if

it

makes no difference

goodness between one's being an inmate

one's being an 'inmate' of a college

campus

in a

to one's virtue,

concentration

(see Vlastos 1991, 215-216).

Vlastos insists that for Socrates there would be a difference (but only very
'nonmoral' goods

make only

no difference

would say

slight, since

a relatively very small contribution to happiness). But

Socrates never actually says anything like that; given what he does say,

think Socrates

that

incredible that Socrates (or anyone, practically no matter what their

understanding of virtue) would really think
there

sense intuitions. There

—however untrue

to one's virtue, there

is

it

may

appear to us

no difference

in

—

that if

it is

it

plausible to

really

makes

goodness between these

alternatives.

If

Only Instrumentally Good,

Virtue Sufficient for Happiness?

is

Irwin (1986, 206; 1995, 74-75) proposes a clever
reconciling Socrates' apparently conflicting claims.
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He

way around

the problem of

thinks that Socrates held that

virtue,

though a purely instrumental means

bad (1986,

210)— is

a

means

happiness-being knowledge of good and

sufficient for happiness because

of the virtuous person's desires. That
interpretation; for

to

last qualification is

he suggests that Socrates' view

it

ensures the satisfaction

all-important for Irwin's

that only a virtuous person has the

is

ability to limit his desires to the objects that are
possible to have, given his

circumstances, no matter what those circumstances

are.

So, in spite of subjection to the

gravest injustices from others or the direst adversities of bad
luck, the virtuous person

can have satisfied desires and consequently be happy. Irwin acknowledges
(1995, 7475) that in the extreme case the virtuous person will be forced to limit his desires to
just
the desire to be virtuous. But Irwin maintains that Socrates will refuse to
admit that that

amounts

to a failure

case, all

of the virtuous person's desires (which are just one

on the

Irwin does not

satisfied.

part of virtue to ensure happiness; for

comment on

Socrates to

[.

.

its

.

in that

in that

extreme

extreme case) are

the possibility of successfully limiting one’s

desire to desire simply for virtue in a case

anything else;

even

where

virtue offers

no hope of providing

but Irwin evidently thinks Socrates' view of moral psychology commits
possibility:

H]e believes

that everyone's desires are all concentrated

happiness and the means to
our happiness

we

The problem with

it;

as soon as

will lose the desire to

Irwin's

we

do

it.

proposed solution

is

that

adequately for Socrates' claims

Apology 30cd and 4 Id,

that Socrates appears to be envisioning there.

it

own

does not deal well with the

must deal with

this is the case

at

his

(1986, 206)

extreme case just mentioned; and

it

on

see that an action does not promote

for

it

is

if

it

is

to

account

just the sort of case

Irwin makes a great deal of the point that

Socrates regards virtue as a purely instrumental good; Irwin thinks that Socrates allots
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it

no

intrinsic value.

But

in the

extreme case, he imagines that Socrates would
desire

nothing more than virtue. The inevitable
consequence of this, on Irwin's interpretation,
that Socrates will in that case be satisfied
with possessing just this purely instrumental

is

good and with possessing no

means

will

become

intrinsic goods: in the

the sole ultimate end. Irwin

desire-satisfactionist conception of happiness.

Socrates

we need

to set certain limits

charitable to Socrates,

all

possibility of eliminating

for

really

it

ones

mere means, or the idea

are satisfied

when

there

is

may

seems

be right that Socrates holds some

He may even be

on our desires

if

we must

that

we

right that according to

are to be happy. But to be at

say that he rejects either the

desires for ends and of limiting oneself to simply desires

that

one may be happy

if

no satisfaction of desires

We can certainly hope

accept both of these.

extreme case, a purely instrumental

for a

only one's desires for mere means

for ends.

But Irwin has Socrates

more appealing

solution to our

difficulty.

The Virtuous Risk Losing
Before

in

I

offer

possessed, or

X obstructs P
P's ability to

one

is

=df.

=df.

rid

Intrinsic

let

me

Goods

distinguish

two ways

injurious might be brought about for someone:

X

causes P to lose some intrinsic good that P already

X causes P to gain some

be

Not

solution to the problematic texts,

which something bad or

X damages P

If

my

Extrinsic but

X decreases

intrinsic

P's ability to

bad

that

P did not already have

gain intrinsic good (or decreases

of intrinsic bad).

not yet happy, obstruction either slows or (in the case of total obstruction)

stops progress toward happiness; and if one already has
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some measure of happiness,

it

19
.

slows or stops the accumulation of more.

Damage

is

either an actual reduction in

happiness or otherwise a regression away from
happiness
It

would obviously not be very impressive

complete immunity against obstructive
susceptible to

damaging

injuries.

susceptible to great damage. But

some kinds

ot

interpretation

that

damage

injuries,

Nor can
it

20
.

to claim that the virtuous

have

while fully allowing that they are

Socrates be allowing that the virtuous are

cannot be that he

is

ruling out only the possibility of

(say, the small ones); for then nothing but
Vlastos's hyperbole-

would account

for Socrates' claim that there

he cannot be injured aLaU; the idea that he here

has already been dismissed. But

some

is

is

no bad for the virtuous and

focusing on obstructive injury

options, besides the hyperbole-interpretation,

remain. Socrates seems to be ruling out the possibility of any damage.

suggesting that the virtuous are guaranteed happiness;

if so,

He seems

to

be

he cannot be thinking

simply of the inherent helpfulness of the knowledge of good and bad; for that does not
guarantee happiness. The only alternative
helpfulness of virtue, but of

its

left is that

he

is

thinking not of the

he believes that the virtuous eo ipso

intrinsic value:

possess an amount of intrinsic good sufficient for happiness and that that happiness
9

1

cannot be taken away.

It is

possible,

goods other than

on

virtue.

from the virtuous; for
intrinsic

to

good

if

this interpretation, that Socrates thinks that there are intrinsic

But they would have

to be

such that they cannot be taken away

a virtuous person were to possess, in addition to virtue,

that could be taken away, then

it

would be possible

some

for a virtuous person

be damaged. Let us set aside the question of whether Socrates thinks there are

69

intrinsic

goods other than

SNI and

injury:

The

SNB

and return

virtue,

to his beliefs

(see p. 62 above).

injury and the bad in these propositions
appear to be only of the

kind: Socrates thinks he cannot be damaged.
that

may

he

about his invulnerability to

On the

other hand,

damaging

when he does allow

suffer injury (Ap. 25dl) or something bad
(25e, 37b-38b), he

must

(if

he

is

not guilty ot contradiction) be thinking only of
the obstructive kind of injury. This
interpretation fits very well with

being silenced

is

what Socrates says

at

37b-38b; for the badness of

clearly an obstructive badness: Being silenced
takes

away

his ability to

discuss and examine (37e-38a), and the value of discussion
and examination
instrumental, so Socrates

would

sutfer

no actual damage even

middle of a philosophical conversation.

Now

it

is

iieedom

to

philosophize

in his usual

way”

(i.e.,

with

it

therefore,

good

will help

it

seems

him continue

that he

in a helpful sense;

about. There

is

is

it is

no reason

to

viz.,

examine people (36d).

is

would

wants, especially

supposed

In the

in the

they would take away

whomever he

those reputed to be wise). So too being fed in the Prytaneion

because

he were silenced

plausible to think that Socrates

explain the badness of imprisonment and exile in same way;
his

if

is

to

be "good"

whole passage,

discussing things that are bad in an obstructive sense and

only these that the Athenians have the power to bring

to think that at

25de Socrates has

in

mind any

other kind of

23

injury.

Indeed, whenever Socrates calls something bad in the Apology he seems always
,

to

do so with reference

to

goodness of soul as an ultimate end.

(30c) that the Athenians will injure themselves

adversely affect the condition of their

own

if

they

kill

souls in both a

70

When

Socrates claims

him, he means that they will

damaging sense and an

obstructive sense: by acting unjustly (30d) 24
and by getting rid of a person

much good

them

in getting

to attend to their soul's condition
(30e-31a, 36c).

end of the Apology, when he

seem

to

have

to

who

tries to

explain

why

death

does so

And

at

the

not a bad thing, his reasons

is

do with the soul exclusively: He does not even
consider the

loss of

family and friends or the lost opportunities to perform
just and courageous actions. In
the case ot death as the cessation of sensation, he
emphasizes the fact that sensations

have come

to

less pain alter

an end, and so he appears
death than in

life

(40de).

to consider only the fact there is

And

in the case

he focuses primarily on the supposed opportunity

What kind of protection does

to

no pain, and so

of death as a migration of soul,

philosophize (41bc).

2>

virtue, then, really provide according

my

interpretation? Intrinsically neutral things like imprisonment are bad
inasmuch as they

can prevent one

who

has not acquired anything intrinsically good from acquiring any,

and inasmuch as they can prevent one who has already got some from acquiring more. 26
So, according to Socrates, though (since

some reason
goodness,

to

we want

avoid such things whether or not

we have no

the

most happiness possible) we have

we have

a positive quantity of intrinsic

reason to fear that they will ruin what happiness

have: they cannot cause one to lose what intrinsic goodness

So

it

is

supposed

to provide

some degree (bona
and

is

bona

fide consolation to those

prevent one from becoming better there
,

27
is,

who

is

and being as good as possible

is that,

are already virtuous to

though there are things

nothing that can

is all

71

already

already possess.

fide consolation, provided they agree with Socrates about

not intrinsically good). Socrates' view

already

we may

we may

make one worse

that ultimately matters.

what

that

is

can

than one

— e Virtuous Do Not Fear the Many At

All

-

V irtue Cannot Be

Taken A way

Certain passages from the Crito not only
corroborate the interpretation
offered of

A pology 30cd and 4 Id, but also provide some (additional) 28

30cd. Socrates' friend Crito

makes
is

Athenian people have

that the

make

themselves,

it

to cause

but almost the greatest, if anyone

convinced that he ought
Indeed,

it

to give

him

great harm:

many can produce
is

is

not taking seriously the power

"[.

.

,T]he things

now

present, of

not the smallest of the bad things

aspersed before them" (44d).* But Socrates

any consideration

d be a benefit, Crito,

greatest bad things, so that

is.

a claim that sounds similar to the claim
at Apology

concerned that Socrates

clear that the

have

reason for

thinking that Socrates considered virtue to
be the only intrinsic good there
In the Crito Socrates

I

if

only

to

not

what the many think or do:

were possible

it

is

that the

many produce

the

would also be possible that they produce the
greatest goods, and things would stand admirably then. But as
it now is, it's not
possible that they produce either. For they are capable neither of making
one
phronimos nor of making one aphron[. .]. (44d) f
it

.

Not only does he
things the

many

mere bogeys

24

were a threat

characterize being aphron as the greatest bad, but he likens the

are capable of producing

— imprisonment,

death, seizure of assets

that scare only children (46c). If Socrates really thought that the

to

even the smallest of the

intrinsic

goods

in his possession,

it

—

to

many

would be

strange of him to characterize the threat with this particular metaphor. Bogeys are not
just little or
,

otherwise insignificant, sources of fear; they are imaginary sources of fear.

*auxa

8e SfjAa

xa Trapovxa

vuv'i

oxi oloi

x’ eio'iv oi

ttoAAoi ou

Kpoxaxa xcov Kaiccbv E^epya^Eobai aAAa xa psyiaxa gxe8ov, sav
auxoTs 8ia(3E(3Ar||aEvo5 rj.
f

Ei

yap

yd£so0ai,
oi/SEXEpa oloi

xa

opi-

xi$ ev

x’ slvai oi ttoAAo'i xa psyioxa kokcx spaya0a xa psyioxa, Kai KaAcbs av eIxev. vOv 5e
ouxe yap cppovipov ouxe a9pova Suvaxoi Troifioat.

cbcpsAov,

c

b Kpixcov, olot

'iva oloi x’ rjoav Kai

xe-

.
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.

.

Children fear them as though they were real
beings, but they should not.

bogeys merit only a small degree of fear;
fear.

Similarly,

I

suggest that with this metaphor Socrates

kind, not in degree; for Socrates there

sense to say that imprisonment

goods one already

obstructive: they

same point he

is

may

has).

is

worthy of any degree of

marking a difference

a sense of "bad" according to

is

etc. are

intrinsically bad, but they are not

intrinsic

rather, they are not

not really

damaging
(But they

(sc.,

bad— i.e.,

which

in the

Apology

;

in

makes

it

not only are they not

they never cause one to lose those

may be

"bad" or "fearsome" in the sense of

prevent one from accumulating more intrinsic good).

making

not that

It is

the difference

the

44d not only does

that at Crito

is

It is

Socrates express the view that having a good condition of the soul provides
some kind

of protection against

evil,

condition protects:

seems

it

is

that the reason he considers

it

why

this

the "greatest" of goods

is

that

the only intrinsic good.

One might
and

it

but he seems to indicate in more explicit terms

think that phronesis here refers simply to knowledge of good and bad

that Socrates here is thinking of

would

its

instrumental value. But that interpretation

ruin Socrates' attempt to console Crito; for what he says at

be true (even on his

own

account of knowledge of good and bad) and. on that

interpretation, should not console Crito at

all.

At 44d Socrates

has no need to fear the actions of the many, because

aphron

—

(iii)

(ii)

the

not suggesting that phronesis

on which

(ii)

is

(i),

good

10

But

and

then there

and the reason for

73

implying that

is.

in its instrumental capacity

the sole intrinsic

would support

is

(i)

he

many cannot make him

lack of phronesis being the worst bad thing there

were just knowledge of good and bad

"fear"

44d would simply not

this

is

if

if

phronesis here

Socrates were

no clear sense of

would simply be

that there

is

no clear sense of "bad” on which

assuming
it

is

that Socrates

take

still

Though

it

is

true; for

on

this interpretation (sc.,

I

is

intrinsically

many—without taking away knowledge of good

away happiness by

true that (as

would be

not taking any particular stance on what

is

easy to imagine that the

could

(iii)

taking

explained in

away

all

my discussion

other thing

without the necessary materials

(as Socrates

powerless to produce the correct use of materials that
least this sense,

it

is

and

if

Socrates

is

that the

correct use

be feared?

at

no

for the correct use that

making a claim about

the

of other goods. Since

it

is

all

he

easy to imagine

are capable of depriving one of ah those other materials necessary for

32
(i.e.,

besides the knowledge of good and bad),

If one's

bodily well-being, and

family and friends are taken away,

how

all

great

how

is

44d Socrates

is

that capacity not to

of one's wealth and possessions, and

is

the consolation in the fact that one's

knowledge of good and bad cannot be taken away or diminished?
at Cto.

is

value of knowledge of good and bad, then being deprived of it could, for

many

31

necessary for happiness. In

not supposed to be

says, actually be better than being deprived

no

that

himself recognizes)

worse than being deprived of all those other materials necessary

intrinsic

way

appears that being deprived of the knowledge of good and bad

results in happiness;

it.

of the protreptic passages of the

Socrates thinks of knowledge of good and bad as
useful in a
it is

bad—

and

the other necessary conditions for

E uthydemus )
is,

good)

It is

not plausible that

considering only or primarily the instrumental value of phronesis

and aphrosune; for on such an interpretation there would be something worse than
aphrosune, viz. whatever

it is

for

which phronesis

useful in avoiding.
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is

supposed

to

be instrumentally

Goodness
If phronesis in

have described,
to Socrates

44d were not supposed

we would

supposed

of Soul as the Sole Ultimate

to

End

be the sole intrinsic good

in the

way

I

be unable to account for Socrates'
reaction to Crito's appeals

sell-

and other-regarding

interests.

Socrates clearly thinks that he

should consider these things only inasmuch
33
as they affect the condition of his
soul.

To make

decisions about these matters (such as family
and friends) with a view to

anything other than the ultimate effects on the soul

many do

(48c2-6).

34

Evidently, the reason that the

is,

he says, to make decisions as the

many make

decisions about these

matters with a view to things other than the condition of
their soul
experts about the good (see 47cd). Socrates thinks that

when one

is that

acts,

according to the opinion of the expert about the good (47cd). This
say (at 48cd)

'

when one

that

acts there

is

the

is that, if

good and does unjust

soul

37

will

makes an

— one
—then one

one does not

become bad

acts

same

as

act

what makes him

that

he gives for

why one must

acts contrary to the opinion of the expert about

if

will thereby suffer

or worse (47d, 47e6-48a7).

act unjust is the

one should

nothing that must be considered other than

whether one does just or unjust things. The sole reason
so act'

is

they are not

what makes an

38

bad consequences: one’s

Evidently, for Socrates what

act bad: viz.,

performing

soul worse. (Presumably, Socrates holds that just as the healthy act

is

what

it

makes

the

is

instrumentally good for the body and so opined as best by the knower of the body's

good

(47a-c), so the just act

best by the

claiming,

knower of the

"Nowhere

[.

.

.]

is

what

is

instrumentally good for the soul and so opined as

soul's good.)

in the

Apology

So Brickhouse and Smith are mistaken

in

or in any other early dialogue does [Socrates]

say precisely what he thinks makes something unjust or unholy" (1994, 131).

75

The

texts, therefore, indicate that

ot a condition of the soul (distinct

is

when one

proposing a mere rule of thumb

maximized only because

The

happiness.

it

is

valuable for the sake

from the knowledge of the good). 40 Given

rationale for considering justice alone

Socrates

knowledge of the good

acts,

we

cannot suppose that

that ensures one's

this

at

48cd

happiness will be

focuses our attention on the major component
of

fact is that the only

end

that Socrates speaks

of soul, giving us every reason to presume

that

he considers

it

of here

the well-being

is

not only an ultimate end.

but the sole ultimate end. If there were intrinsic goods
other than the good condition of
soul,

it

would be odd

should also look
there

were

for

him

(e.g.) to the

to

speak only of this single thing and not mention that one

welfare of friends and family. And, more significantly,

goods other than wellness of soul, then

intrinsic

every act of injustice— sc., every act that
soul

itself,

as Socrates says

it

Can Bodily

Kofi SiE

will

make even

says that.

life

is

often taken

43

the virtuous person's

44

In fact,

bad

Make

how

not at

agent— would

Santas 1993, 44).

to

is

all

clear that

actually

harm

the

42

the Virtuous

Unhappy?

not worth living (Cto. 47de;

imply that

life

if

bodily affliction

cf.

is

G. 505a,

severe enough,

not worth living. Socrates, however, never

such an interpretation would conflict with Ap. 30cd and 41d;

what kind of consolation does Socrates think he
passages, and

for the

is

with a "degenerate/wretched and deteriorated

90 ap|iEVOu}" body

512a). This statement

it

(cf.

Deterioration

Socrates does say that

{pox0r|poO

would

is

it

if

is

can he himself be so confident,

for

offering the virtuous in those

if

a virtuous person

unhappy by someone's simply causing enough corporeal

76

4r>

may

be made

deterioration (by beating or

some

other torture) either to remove psychic virtue
or to keep

it

from producing

happiness?

Even taken by
interpretation

itself,

accept as

I

the claim at Cto. 47de

some assume

it is;

for the

unclear. For one thing, in this and the one or

introduced,

claim about psychic health; so there
without himself endorsing
value

not as threatening to the sort of

meaning of that claim

is

ultimately

two other cases where the point

is

always done so as a way of introducing or elucidating an
analogous

is

it

is

the possibility that Socrates

is

—what he assumes

makes use of

are conventional beliefs about health's

simply tor the purpose of an analogy that will help his interlocutors recognize

the importance of psychic health, which they agree (Cto. 48a, G. 477de,
479b)

more

valuable.

Socrates no

In fact, the doctor's

more than

(see G. 51 2d),

the

is

(if there is

to

when he

much

save one from physical injury impresses

one) of saving one from suffering injustice

which Socrates does not value highly

the distinct possibility that

be happy, he

power

power

"

is

at all (see

my

n. 9).

There

is

also

says that the person with a deteriorated body cannot

talking only of happiness "concerning the body".

48

But, ultimately, the meaning of the statement at Cto. 47de turns upon what

is

meant by a "deteriorated" and "wretched" body. Until we know exactly what he
means,

we

cannot be sure that the statement implies that a virtuous person's happiness

can be jeopardized by bodily
his

afflictions.

My guess

is

that the statement

sweeping claims about the invulnerability of the virtuous

he probably would say (as the Socrates

at R.

at

Ap. 30cd and 4 Id;

10.610ab actually seems to suggest)

no bodily sickness can take virtue away from those who already have

may

prevent someone from getting

it

does not ruin

in the first place or

77

it,

for

that

even though

from getting more of it once

it

one already had some. Though

would say

that not

may appear
I

to,

this is just

more

speculation:

I

assume

that Socrates

even brain damage can make the soul bad or worse (even though

by preventing someone from responding

to questioning etc .).

conclude, then, that for Socrates virtue has a value over and above

application. Virtue

In fact, as

I

makes

the soul

have shown, there

is

good not just

at

alone that Socrates values virtuous activity

It is

50

its

practical

something, but intrinsically good.

according to Socrates a certain condition of one's soul

that is the only thing intrinsically valuable for one.

of good and bad.

it

—

It is

for the sake of this

sc., activity in

this

accordance with knowledge

only on this understanding of virtue that

we

can make adequate

sense of Socrates' bold claims about the invulnerability of the virtuous.
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and

Notes

The re are even a cou P le of '"stances where
he appears to be urging other
upon his listeners besides simply attention to
the best condition of their souls'
he
seems to urge them to attend to "truth" (29e) and
"phronesis" (29e, 36c), almost as
though they were additional things that required
attention.
...

,

things

'

thinking that

But there is some reason
and "phronesis" either are simply other
names for the best

truth"

condition of soul or are

names

for things that necessarily

accompany

it

for

(as conditions

consequences, or supervening objects or properties);
for in the other cases where he is
exhorting as usual or describing his usual practice
of exhortation (30b 31b 39d 41e)
he does not use the words "truth" and "phronesis",
but does not seem to think he has left
unmentioned any object worthy of exhortation either.

My guess is that "truth" at 29e refers to genuine-as opposed to apparentgoodness of soul (cf. real vs. apparent wisdom at 21c, and
real vs. apparent happiness at
36d9-el ). It is just this contrast that is made so much of
in the Gorgias (459e, 464a ff.,
527b; cf. Pro. 356de), which I think explains the similar,
seemingly cryptic references
to truth (G. 525a3, 526c2, 526d6) in that dialogue.
(Dodds' (1959, n. on 526d6) reading
"truth" in these Gorgias passages as truthfulness
or sincerity is liable to make one
interpret Socrates reference too narrowly, as though
Socrates here had in mind merely
’

telling the truth.)

politics) is to live

There

is

To

live the life of

philosophy (as opposed, e.g., to conventional
according to the truth rather than to be satisfied with appearances.

also the possibility that "truth" in these contexts refers to
the acquisiton

of pure philosophical knowledge.
the importance of attention

It is

to soul,

noteworthy that in the Phaedo Socrates, stressing

makes a

and as phronimos as possible" (107d), and

similar exhortation to

in that

become

"as

good

dialogue having phronesis and having

philosophical truth or knowledge are considered one and the same (79d, 65a-66d).
2

As Penner

1992a, 134-135 does very clearly and succinctly. Cf. Brickhouse

and Smith 1994, 108.
2

Socrates cannot be exhorting people simply to acquire the "human" wisdom of
being aware of the extent and limits of their wisdom, unless he thought that wisdom
greater than the

"human" brand

is

unattainable.

the "best" (30b, 36c) condition of soul

(Benson 2000, 181-182 would
4

And I assume

that

he did not think that

simply one's awareness of one's ignorance

is

agree).

have translated

this passage with a view to the reading Burnet 1924 gives it.
218-220 and his n. 73. An alternative reading would be "from virtue,
money and all the other good things [come to be] for humans"; see, e.g., Brickhouse and
Smith 1994, 20 and 20 n. 33.
1

Cf. Vlastos 1991,

5

Cf. G.

6
1

7

527d

defend

1

-2 with c5-6.

G. 522c4-d2 should be read in the same way.

this interpretation later.

This assumption

is

important;

I

It is

relatively unimportant here.

defend

79

it

later.

g

Later (pp.

1

18ff.)

1

will argue that the surrounding
context

reason (as Bnckhouse and Smith
interpretation

««( 469bC

o

,

d

of the assertion

1

-

989, 263 think

it

of 41dl gives us no

does) to assign a weak

there.

do not 10wever follow Kraut 1984, 38
'

'
n. 20 or Brickhouse
thinking that Socrates takes very
seriously the question
to avoid suffering injustice; the
obvious sarcasm in these
.

94 12

th

1

34

tr 480e,
48 n' 5<;in
\ off h'
(O.
Oa-e)
how

passages (see Dodds' 1959 nn. on 480al-481b5
and 480e5-481a2) taints what we might
otherwise have taken seriously There is some
reason for concluding that although
socrates considers suffering injustice a bad thing,
he considers it the "least" of bad
things (469b 1 1 ). Such a reading will agree
nicely with the interpretation I presently
otter ot what Socrates means by "bad" in such
contexts. See my n. 26.
take "ouSev" at 30c8 to be functioning adverbially
on "(3AayEiEv"; so: "[. .]
no way[. .]." Vlastos 1991, 218-221 (and, following
him, Reeve 1989,
150-151) argues that the following sentence (30d 1 -5) with
the mention of "great evils"
shows that "ouSev" in this context should be treated as a "[.
.] special use of negation,
available in all natural languages, Greek no less than
English, whose purpose is not to
deny the applicability of the predicate, but to de-intensify its
application." I do not deny
that negations may be used that way even in ancient
Greek. But saying that death etc.
are not greatly bad is not inconsistent with saying that they
are not bad to any degree.
In fact the latter entails the former. Socrates' mention of
"great evils" on 30d does not
necessarily indicate that he wants simply to de-intensify the many's
view that death etc.
are great evils, it rather simply indicates acknowledgement of the
many's
I

may

injure in

.

.

’

position.

would say

the

same of the use of the comparatives

at

denying that the worse can injure the better in any way, and
the many's view that death is a great evil is true.

30dl-5 he

is

is

denying that

to suggest that Vlastos's is an impossible reading; but I do not
plausible in light of Socrates' aim in the passage (and especially not in light of
and what appears to be his real view that death is actually a positive good): his

think

boast
it

at

do not mean

I

41d

(I

30al-2.) At 30c8-dl Socrates

it

is

is

evidently supposed to be very grand, and Vlastos's reading would simply water
it far less remarkable. I will speak more of Vlastos's interpretation

down, making

presently.
11

1

In spite of his cursory and rather confusing

(cf.

Brickhouse and Smith 1994,

16 nn. 23, 25) treatment of the issue, Kraut 1984 appears to accept a similar

interpretation: According to Socrates, "[. .] the soul is not corrupted if one is the victim
of injustice" (38, my emphasis; this evidently is the sense in which, according to Kraut,
Socrates "[. .] cannot be harmed" (274); cf. 26 n. 2); but subjection to certain injustices
.

.

might prevent a virtuous person from "being virtuous"
virtuous life" (38

n.

—

understanding of virtue, and consequently one will not
situations (23

only

is

1

sc.

(apparently), "leading a

21); e.g., if one cannot philosophize then one cannot refine one's

with 38

n. 21).

know how

to act virtuously in all

Kraut apparently thinks that according to Socrates, not

virtuous activity necessary for being happy, virtuous activity contributes

intrinsic value to a life just as

having a virtuous soul does (though he strangely seems

80

to

.

think virtuous action and goodness
of soul are "identical") (21 1-212
n 41
S a
Uld ’ aCCOrding t0 KraUt S interpre,ation

^'

271 n 43^

'

-

haL7d

be
12

be

way

in

which Socrates

Reeve 1989, 150-153 follows

this interpretation of the
passages, though
(disagreeing with Vlastos) he does hold that
for Socrates virtue is the only
intrinsic
good (see Reeve 1 32 with 137). Reeve argues
that the worst that can happen to
1
virtuous person is that he be made "nonculpably
vicious", which evidently comes to
being prevented against his will from living
the examined life. But on Reeve's
interpretation, living the examined life—
ideally through philosophically
discussions
with a variety of people—appears (see
143, 150, 179) to be essential for a human's
good
hfe (for Reeve does not think (149-150) that being
truly virtuous is given
so I do not see how being prevented from this
turns out not to be a great harm on
Reeve's interpretation.

t^WnsV

Weiss 1998 also accepts the sort of interpretation of Ap.
30cd defended by
Vlastos, saying (in spite of Ap. 41cd) evils
but not great evils
can be done to a good
man (3 n. 59). On Weiss' interpretation, great evils are psychic
injuries, while not-sogreat evils are bodily injuries (cf. her distinction
(35) between "moral" and "material
goods").

—

—

1

Though he rarely makes this clear, Vlastos thinks that "virtue itself would
be
impossible" without "the exercise of [moral] knowledge"
(1991, 216 n. 64); so he must
be thinking either that virtue just is a certain kind of acting or at
least that virtue cannot
exist in the absence of such acting.
It is
it

very hard to evaluate Vlastos

clear precisely

what

virtue

is

condition of the soul (like the

227-231, and

cf.

s

interpretation adequately; for he never

sometimes he appears

for Socrates:

wisdom of the

to treat

it

makes

as a

protreptic passages of the Eud.; see 1991

"knowledge E " on 1994, 61 and "moral knowledge"

but sometimes he appears to treat

it

in 1994, 109-126),
as a kind of behavior (see his talk of "alternatives"

on 1991, 210-213, of "ways of life" on 214, of "choices" on 8 and 215, and especially of
"the exercise of knowledge" in 216 n. 64; cf. the paragraph straddling 1994, 111-112).
(Vlastos 1991 actually seems (as far as I can gather from his 232 n. 103) to think that
neither Socrates nor any ancient Greek before Aristotle had the linguistic means to
distinguish between the two (cf. 1981, 231 n. 25, 436). I confess that I am not sure

what

make of this

it apparently would explain why Vlastos is not
At any rate, regardless of whether Plato ever made
Socrates use the Aristotelian words for "condition" and "activity", we may safely
assume that Socrates was supposed to have grasped the distinction between states of
soul on the one hand and actions on the other. Not only did he grasp the conceptual
difference between them, but he also had quite firm and pretty clear views on the
axiological relationship between these entities, as Cto. 47-48, for example, shows.)

quite

to

point; but

careful about the distinction.

14

A possible response to this objection could be that having already performed a

number of virtuous

actions constitutes

accordingly a virtuous person

may be

some

satisfactory degree of happiness; perhaps

sufficiently satisfied with past behavior, so that

81

—

1

the opportunity for

more such behavior would be

not necessary for happiness. In any case,
if this
interpretation,
15

it

a

is

welcome

addition to happiness ’ but
are to understand the

how we

clearly needs explication that Vlastos
never supplies.

Maybe on

Vlastos's 1991 interpretation, virtue for
Socrates

is— as

it

at least

seems to have been on Vlastos's 1971b, 5-7
interpretation— a condition of soul
produced by, but distinct from, virtuous action and
knowledge of good and bad (That
[o]ur sou is the only thing in us worth saving
.]" (1971b, 7, my emphasis)
[.
appears
h 8 m WhlCh hiS f° rmer VkW Cleady differed
from his later ^ew (cf. Vlastos
am To
!
1991,
12-13).) But Vlastos never indicates what this
condition
.

T

might

16

Irwin 1995 expresses this point well:

telling [the jury] that

he

is

making no

Cto.

48b and G. 470e

.

0]n

the contrary, he

any reason

literal

seems

to be

to regret" (60

my

probably making several mini-sacrifices.

is

Apology passages, Vlastos admits

nonliterally as well.

Socrates never states in

.

sacrifice that he has

emphases). Whereas, on Vlastos's view, he
In addition to the

"[.

be.

We

should find

it

a

that he
little

must

interpret

strange that

terms the view that Vlastos thinks he holds.

But see his comments on 1986, 213: Irwin says that, though he believes
that
Socrates is ultimately committed to the view that a virtuous person's ability
to control
his desires

makes

his happiness invulnerable, Socrates' claims about bodily health
at

Cto. 47de and G. 505a provide
consistently" to that view.

(I

some evidence

for thinking that Socrates did not "stick

deal with these passages on pp. 76

f.

below.)

19

Casey Perin helped me spot an
formulation of this definition.
20
I

2

am

infelicitous

ambiguity

in

my

original

of course assuming a eudaemonist conception of intrinsic goodness.

Corresponding

between damage and obstruction, Socrates
call "improvement" and "help". There are
passages in which Socrates is quite explicit about which sense of the terms he is using.
For example, at Eup. 13bc and G. 477a he is quite explicitly using "good" and "benefit"
to the distinction

observes a distinction between what

in the sense

of improvement

we may

to refer to betterment (of soul);

whereas

at R.

1

,335c he

uses "injury" in the sense of damage to refer to worsening of the soul. Cf. also Mo. 78a

where people are said to be "miserable [sc. unhappy] inasmuch as they are injured"
clearly, the damaging sense of "injury" must be in use here, since Socrates does not
acknowledge that all obstructive injuries make one unhappy.
22

Cf. Kraut 1984, 38-39 n. 21; Brickhouse and

1989, 143. Weiss' 1998 objection (34

n.

points out that Socrates on the contrary
spite

of exile.

that he

It

may

be that he

is

supposes he will) be able

Smith 1989, 116-117; Reeve
is unconvincing. She

69) to this suggestion

shows

that he is

determined

so determined; but that does not

to philosophize to the extent that

82

to philosophize in

mean

that he will (or

he wishes. In

fact,

the talk of "being driven out of one city after
another" suggests that he believes that his
efforts to philosophize freely will be continually
frustrated and cut short (as they would
in prison too, where even if he were allowed
visitors, the Eleven could limit the number
and length of his discussions).
23

He does speak of the

inevitability of being "ruined {anoAcbAri}" by
practicing politics publicly (3 Id); but he clearly only means
that he would have been
killed or exiled (cf. ruined" at 32a) with the result that
he would no longer be able to
benefit their souls (or continue to increase his own virtue) by
his practice of

examination and exhortation, he does not mean that the many would have
ruined or
deteriorated his soul's goodness.
Similarly, Socrates suggests at 25b that it is not one man who
"deteriorates"
young men while the many improve them, but the other way around. Although the
passage offers no clue to what he may mean by this, there is good reason (because of

Cto. 44d) to think that he does not think that the

many can

making their souls bad or worse; maybe he just means
becoming better (cf. R. 6.492a-e).
I

think that

suggestion at R.
injure people

—

1

we

are supposed to see that Socrates cannot ultimately endorse the

.335d that

sc.,

it

is

make them

dismissing the argument

work of those who

young men by
can prevent them from

deteriorate

that they

at

the

work

the unjust (rather than the just) person to

unvirtuous. There are independent grounds for

335, since

it

implies that making people unmusical

is

the

are ignorant about music rather than those knowledgeable about

We know from the

Hippias Minor that Socrates believes that
knowledgeable about a particular subject who is most able to

it is

the person

tell

a

lie

it!

about that

subject.
“4

a point elaborated on in the Crito and

my

further discussion of

it

below

(p.

The badness of doing injustice (and of disobeying a "superior", sc. one more
knowledgeable about good and bad) (29b) will in every case be based on this same
75).

self-

interested consideration.
2?

26

Later

This

I

is

more

will discuss in

why

If the relevant

I

detail Socrates'

views on death.

cannot agree with Brickhouse and Smith 1994:

condition of one's soul were

or misfortunes of the sorts Socrates has in

—

all that

mind

were

at stake,

no punishment

—not imprisonment,

not exile,

would be evil or harmful, for none
good condition of Socrates' soul. (117)
It is true that none of them is a threat to his being good (i.e., they are not bad in
damaging sense); but they can be a threat to his becoming more good (i.e., they
and not disease

of these is a threat to the
a
are bad

obstructively).

This would explain
nor suffering injustice over

why
(ii)

Socrates appears (G. 469bc) to prefer

suffering injustice,

even though (on

(i)

my

neither doing

interpretation)

neither option considered alone appears to differ from the other in the amount of
intrinsic value it contains (cf. Vlastos 1991, 226-227). Suffering injustice does not

83

threaten the intrinsic goodness Socrates already possesses,
but may threaten the
possibility of increasing that intrinsic goodness. (This
solution is similar to Reeve's
1989 reasoning on his 143.)

The claim at Ap. 30cd seems to leave open the possibility that a
person better
more virtuous) than Socrates would be capable of injuring him in the
damaging
sense—making his soul worse. And Cto. 44d seems to imply that if someone
were^
capable of making another person phronimos (sc., good in soul) then
that person would
also be capable of making a person aphron (sc., bad in soul).
It is, after all, his accusers'
baseness that allegedly makes them incapable of making his soul worse.
(When have
(sc.,

I

offered

my

interpretation of what exactly

Socrates the ultimate end,

make

it

will

is

the nature of this virtue

become more

clear

which

for

is

what power the virtuous have

to

others unvirtuous or less virtuous.)

Socrates evidently would respond to this worry by saying that a virtuous person
would never wish to harm another's soul (even though in some sense he may have the
capacity to do so). At Ap. 25c-e he seems to present a reason for this. But I think his
most serious argument for it is in the Crito harming others is unjust (49c), and one must
never do injustice (Cto. 47d, 49b) because it is never in one's own interest— because
:

doing injustice adversely affects one's own soul. He does not present this argument at
Ap. 25c-e, I think, because he does not think most people believe it (cf. Cto. 49b, d).
(At

R

1.335 he presents a different argument for

people; but
28

29

30

I

take

it

why

the just person does not injure

that he does not fully endorse that argument.

See

my

n. 23.)

Cf. p. 69 above.

Cf. G. 473cd, Pdo. 77 e.

As he does

in the

Phaedo

.

There phronesis

is

the soul's apprehending

philosophical truth (79d, 66bc), considered as the sole ultimate end (66b,

e).

And

not even philosophical truth particularly about good and bad, but in general about

is

it

all

"the things that are" (66a, 90d).
T

1

32

Above

later

on

showed both

Compare how easy

362a) to imagine
33

I

it

that this

is

is

true

and

that Socrates

for Polus (at G. 473e)

and Glaucon

(at R.

that

it is.

2.36 1 e-

this.

This of course

is

consistent with Socrates' remark at 45a4-5.

in the dialogue (53a-54a)

Socrates argues, in the

voice of the

that staying in prison is also in the best interest of his friends

consequences

acknowledges

It is

true that

Laws of Athens,

and family. But the

for his friends (if Socrates escapes) are said to be bad given the

assumption that Socrates will have thereby done injustice (see particularly the
reminders that discussions about virtue will (if Socrates does injustice by escaping)
become ridiculous-sounding). That the Laws express concern about the ill effects of

on family and friends does not mean the Laws suppose
an ultimate desire for their welfare; it probably only means

Socrates' acts

Socrates' escaping

frustrates

that the

84

Laws

suppose

would

will frustrate the ultimate desire
to avoid the
result from voluntarily harming others.
it

harm

to Socrates' soul that

In Plato's depiction

of Socrates' life, he makes us see how this
sole concern
would affect one s way of life, particularly in the
self-centered pursuit of philosophy
the Apology Socrates acknowledges how
unusual is his inattention to conventionally
personal and familial matters, which comes about
as a result

own

of his relentless care

soul (23bc, 31b, 36b;

An

alternate

cf.

for his

36c6).

way of interpreting

suggest that this inattention
consists in

In

is

this inattention to everything but
the soul is to
necessary in order to acquire that goodness
of soul that

knowledge of good and bad, which

in turn is necessary for beneficial
action
trying to show, that interpretation cannot
account for
everything else Socrates says in the Apology and Crito

in all other pursuits.

But, as

I

am

.

35

See also Ap. 28b, 28d, 32d;

G. 470bc.

cf.

36

Speaking of the same rule stated at Ap. 28b, Vlastos 1 99 8
suggests that if
1
Socrates were thinking of virtue as a purely instrumental means,
he would not have said
in just these words that one must never " give consideration
to anything but this when he
acts, whether his action is just or unjust.
." (Vlastos's trans. and
emphasis).
,

Vlastos
1991, 209-215 thinks that the imperative at Cto. 48cd is by itself an indication
of what
Socrates takes to be intrinsically good: Vlastos presumes that Socrates' reason
.

for

considering only the virtuousness of alternatives was that no gain of other things
that
are intrinsically good, taken singly or in combination, could ever compensate
us for the
loss of a moral good [sc., of virtue, the supreme intrinsic good]"
(210-211). (Cf.
Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 112-113.) But the problem with Vlastos's account of
Socrates' reason for considering only justice is that that is not what Socrates says is the
reason: Socrates says simply that the reason is care of the soul.
I agree with the instrumentalist interpretation of Socratic virtue
insofar as it

considers virtuous action a mere means to happiness. Socrates clearly thinks that doing
what is just— virtuous is doing what is best that by acting virtuously one guarantees

—

—

one will achieve as much happiness as circumstances allow; so the rule as stated
Cto. 48cd) does not by itself commit Socrates to any view about what is intrinsically

that

good (Irwin 1995, 74 presents a similar defense against Vlastos's argument). The

(at

rule

is

for that reason rather unremarkable. Vlastos's failure to see that the imperative at Cto.

48cd
I

is

not by itself an indication of what Socrates takes to be intrinsically good comes,

suppose, from his refusal (1991, 232

n. 103; cf.

1981, 231 n. 25, 436) to distinguish

carefully (on Socrates' behalf) between virtue as action and virtue as a condition of soul.
37
1

take "the just" and "the unjust" at 47d4-5 and 47e7 to refer to actions

4.444c-e and Irwin 1977, 296
It is

"soul" to

(cf.

R.

n. 24).

strange that in the Crito Socrates seems to take pains to avoid using the term

name

"that

which becomes

better

by the just and

is

ruined by the unjust (6 tco

pev SiKodcp [3eAtiov EyiyveTo tco 5e abiKcp aucbAAuTo}" (47d;
48a); in fact, he does not use the term at

all in

85

the

cf.

whole dialogue. But

I

47e6-7, 47e8-

assume, with

for different,
38
I

though

think

(cf.

I

believe quite mistaken, interpretation.)

Irwin 1977, 58-61) that Penner 1992a. 167 n s?

ic

be based in the immediately proceeding discussion
(in 47-48) of the necessity of
following the opinion of the expert about the good:
First, harming others is supposed
to
be an instance of injustice (49c), and so it is absolutely
prohibited just as every other
unjust act is (49a). Second, the prohibition against
injustice is not raised here for the
first time: it is a mere reminder of the
foregoing agreement that we must consider onlv
whether or not we do justice or injustice— i.e., whether or
not we will be following
expert opinion concerning the just. And finally, it
was agreed that it is necessary to
follow expert opinion, because if one does not then one
suffers bad effects (47cl-48a7;
cf. 49b5. doing injustice is bad "tor the one
who does injustice {tco cxBikoOvti}").
(Penner also seems (136) to think that Ap. 25c-26a contains
Socrates' main argument
to

against harming others. In

my

27, 1 explained why I think it does not. See further
think that Penner's failure to see this is mainly due to his
failure (134135) to recognize that for Socrates goodness of soul is no mere means to some

Chapter VI.)

n.

I

further

end.
I

should also point out that the reference to 47d and 47e6-48a7

alone

is

Gomez-Lobo 1994, 69 (cf. 79); Brickhouse and Smith
and Dimas 2002, 18ff.) who think that a certain kind of activity is the sole

sufficient to refute those (like

1994, 130;
intrinsic

good according

to Socrates. (Oddly, Brickhouse and Smith 1994 seem to
recognize that for Socrates goodness of soul is a more ultimate aim than virtuous action:
they say (116) that "the improvement of people" is "the end of good action"— the end

even of "philosophical interchange", which
use

when

is

the

main instance of virtuous

In the Crito, Socrates

makes

it

perfectly clear that goodness of soul

axiologically prior to any kind ot action. Just action
effect

activity they

discussing (130) the evidence for their interpretation.)

on the condition of the

remain) virtuous. This

soul.

is

is

a concern only because of

its

We must act virtuously only in order to become (or

pretty clear in the Apology as well: At Ap. 28b Socrates says
person must consider only "whether he does just things or unjust things, and
whether he does deeds [characteristic] of a good man or a bad man {iroTEpov biKaia
is

that a

f|

aSiKa TTpaTTei, kou avSpog ayaOou Epya

concern

man

(cf.

is

about doing the deeds of a good

man

f|

kockoO}" (my emphasis). Socrates'

clearly because he

wants

to

be a good

G. 526d6-7, 527b4-6), just as Achilles (according to Socrates) "feared to

while being a bad

man

30cd acting unjustly

is

{Beioas to £fjv Kaxog gov}" (Ap. 28dl,
"bad" primarily inasmuch as

suggest, "benefit" at Ap.

28b7

implies that living correctly

{equtov napaoKEud^Eiv

it

my

is "[.

.

.]

emphasis). At Ap.

injures the agent

refers to benefit to self.) Similarly, at

live

.

(Likewise,

I

39d Socrates

preparing yourself in order that you will be the best

ottcos eotcu cos (3eAtiotos}."

86

The ultimate end

is

not the

manner of living
being as good as

a particular manner of living is
a means to the ultimate end of
possible. Cf. Burnyeat 1971 210 711
n
itself;

SsifeSUa

goods (513e-514a,

.

,

kn0Wledge 0f g00d and
tfsZTT^ some
iS

521 be), leading

cf.

bad) and

<*>™* “* of

scholars to believe that goodness
of soul is
(e g " IrWi " 1977 129-1 30
’
Brickhouse

Tl^Tu^
14 n. m
18); but, more prominently, goodness
of soul
'

andSmilh
and
Smith 1994
1994, 114

Goraas

-

'h

1

is in

the

characterized as an ultimate end. The
explanation of Socrates' initially
paradoxical statement that an act is good exactly
if it is just (470bc) is found
in his
posmng the good condition of the soul as the greatest
good (see particularly 477de,
511a, 527b) and that for the sake of the preserving
of which we (should) act virtuously
and refrain from unvirtuous action (479d, 480ab,
480d, 503cd, 510e-51 la- cf. 507de)

That what makes an act unjust is the same as what
makes an act bad is pretty
from Socrates' treating the terms "good”, "admirable ",
and "just" as
interchangeable. These are used together at Cto. 47c,
Eup. 7d, and G. 459d; because
-

clear also

Socrates bothers to use three separate terms, the reader may
be inclined to think they are
not tor Socrates co-referential. But there is good reason
to think that for Socrates they
are co-ref erential: At Cto. 48cd he uses the principle
that there is nothing that one must
consider other than whether one does justice or injustice.
This indicates
that acting

un

i

ust] y

'also'

has the same extension as acting badly because

at

47c not

'only' the unjust

but
the shameful and the bad are worthy of consideration. In
fact, starting at 47d he
,

drops

shameful/admirable and bad/good" and settles for the pair "unjust/just",
as
though these covered the same ground. (The expert "about the just and
unjust things"
(48a6-7) is the expert "about the just and unjust things, and shameful and
admirable
things, and good and bad things (47c9-47d2).) If that were not enough,
48b8 gives us

well-known statement that living well and living admirably and living justly are "the
same" (cf. 49a5-6). At 47d I think that Socrates is practically defining "unjust action"

the

words, "bad action") as action that harms the agent's soul.
See also the Apology where "unjust" (28b8-9, 29b6) = "shameful" (28c3, d929b7) = "bad" (28d7; cf. 29b7); cf. the use of "admirable", "beneficial", and

(in other

,

10; cf.

"just" at 31d-32a. Cf. HMi. 376ab, where the terms seem to be used interchangeably.
See also the Gorgias where "admirable' -"good" (463d, 474cd), "just -"admirable"
(476b, e), and "good"="just" (459e with 460b). We must keep in mind that, however
1

,

much he may mischievously
understands

203

who

it

use the ambiguity of the term "good", Socrates always

to refer to self-interest (see

Dodds 1959, 235; Vlastos 1991, 150

—

n. 76,

Penner 1992a, 128, 155 n. 23). Doing injustice is bad sc., bad for the one
does it (Cto. 49b4-5). For more on Socrates' selfishness, see pp. 195 f. below.

n. 14;

40

The condition of soul

But Socrates appears

to

end could simply be knowledge of
would be instrumentally valuable in preserving itself

that is the ultimate

the good, and if so then the latter

allow that everyone

—even

87

the virtuous

—

.

are subject at least to

obstructive injuries (Ap. 25c7-9; cf.
37b-38b), which seems to imply
that, even for a
knower of the good, there is more intrinsic
good to be achieved.

As

Vlastos 1991 interprets

Irwin 1977, 58-61

is

my n.

See

it.

36.

right in saying that Socrates'

argument

V° Pe y e val, ated w,thout knowing what he thinks psychicat Cto 47-48
health is and how
h^nkfi " f
t0
P PmeSS BUt U iS hiS Very
.

,

1

J

‘

-

I
have Ite
given Irwin
pause

tn

'

gap

'

in the ar
8

,

claiming (92-94, 303

inking that for Socrates virtue

good

n.

69) that there

is

um cnt that

no evidence

should
for

as an end in itself, especially
given the fact that
the only end mentioned in the

’

applies to Irwin's conclusions (1977,
129) about psychic health in the Gorgias
Irwins failure to see that there too psychic health
is the sole ultimate end
comes, I think
from his apparently identifying (130) psychic health
with the psychic order of G 506c
1 nese, however, are
distinct; cf. my Chapter IV n.

'

as

I

is

have emphasized, psychic health

is

same

passage

(The

1.)

—

Irwin also acknowledges (113) that if Socrates
accepted as Irwin thinks (103)
he did hedonism, then the argument at Cto. 47-48
would be undermined. This is
further reason for thinking that Irwin has simply
misinterpreted the passage.
43

Kraut 1984, 38 n. 21; Irwin 1986, 213; Vlastos
1991, 218
and Smith 1994, 111, 115.
44

Cf.
45

46

n. 69;

Brickhouse

Reeve 1989, 141-142.

Not

mention G. 522c4-d2 and 527dl-2 + c5-6.

to

Note

his interlocutors' (Cto. 47e3-5, 44dl-4 with 48al 0-b
1

;

G. 467e4-5, 473c)

outspoken valuing of bodily well-being.
47

Weiss 1998,

Cf.
48

As he

clearly does at G. 478c3; and

statement that sickness

body s

64.

virtue; cf. Cto.

is

I

take

"greatly bad" (478c 1) to

47c 1-7.

it

that

mean

we

should construe the

greatly bad with respect to the

should not be overlooked that in the Gorgias Socrates
maintains, in spite of his assertions about health at 505a and 512a, that one's " entire

happiness
[one]

is

is

in {ev

toutco

f]

It

Traoa EuSaipovia eotiv}" (470e8, my emphasis) "how

disposed with respect to [one's] education and justness {Trai&Ei'as ottcos exei

K ai 5iKaioouvr)$}" (470e6-7). Notwithstanding the roundabout, but typically Greek,

way of putting
virtuous one

it,

this

is, i.e.

simply means that one's happiness

(for Socrates)

how

Brickhouse and Smith 1994 are wrong

means depends on then
,

"entire".

entirely determined

by

how

is.

in thinking that if

by

"is in"

Socrates

the passage read literally does not imply that education and

justness are sufficient for happiness

word

is

well-"educated" one

(1

17

They fail to appreciate the force of the
however we understand "is in", the

n. 27).

Vlastos 1991 admits (222)

that,

88

reading

^
49

F

litera “ y

does '“P'y sufficiency, which

is

why

he opts for his nonliteral

exar"P le> does Socrates think paraplegia
makes a body "wretched’", Does
eSS d
H ° aboutbrain damage? Or an illness that severely
°
disables
u
rf on the brain?
the body but has
no effect
.

•

r

?,

,

1

50

W

Actua

Hy, I maintain that Socrates' claims about
the invulnerability of the
virtuous cannot be fully accounted for without
explaining his views on death I will
return to this matter in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER IV
THE NATURE OF VIRTUE PAR EXCELLENCE

Introduction

But what, then,

few

said so far,

if

is this

any think

condition of soul? Even

that Socrates gives us

dialogues ol what this condition of soul
that

I

have so

far

argued

for, the early

is.

if

some agree with what

any clear indication

—provide us with

disagree. Together with the interpretation

I

dialogues— particularly the Apology but

answer

is

the

sufficient evidence for an answer.

Philosophizing

An

have

in the early

,

others as well

I

at

All Costs

suggested by the fact that Socrates clearly expects 2 that

philosophizing will secure him greater good than the application of knowledge of good

and bad can guarantee. What

knowledge

— including but

ultimate end

he

is

whose

this suggests is that Socrates considers philosophical

not necessarily limited to knowledge of good and bad

intrinsic

goodness

is

sufficient for happiness.

It is

—an

not simply that

willing (Ap. 28b, 28e-29a, 29cd, 30bc, 38a, 38e-39a) to suffer death as a result of

continuing to philosophize; he

is

evidently willing to suffer whatever the costs of

philosophy might be: he will not stop out of fear of death "or any other thing

whatsoever

{f|

breathe and

it

aAA’ otiouv upaypa}" (29al); he

is

possible for

me

{ecoottep

av

(29d4-5); as a penalty for philosophizing, he

is

will philosophize "as long as

I

epttveco kcu oTo$ te go}" to do so

willing to suffer execution, exile,

disenfranchisement, and (evidently) anything else that his accusers are capable of
3
bringing about for him (30b-d); the good that comes from philosophizing

90

is

so great

that

not possible

"it is

(37e-38a).

4

{dSuvaTov}"

him

His willingness to suffer death

probably thinks that a

life

and

life is

that

for

no miserable

is

costs

is

comes simply from

5

the realization that

life

not worth living anyway. But his resolve to

another matter; for

is

necessarily miserable

is

preferable to death; so one might think that his
willingness

without knowledge of good and bad
all

without philosophizing

not by itself so significant; for he

without knowledge of good and bad

to sutler death as a result ot philosophizing

philosophize at

to live in silence

it is

difficult to see

why

he would be

willing to risk suffering anything in order to philosophize unless
he believed that

philosophizing would result in a good that was sufficient to
clear that he does not believe that

knowledge of good and bad

happiness, at least if he has in mind just

its

for

is

is

it

is

sufficient for

instrumental value. If we focus just on the

instrumental value of knowledge of good and bad,

be so certain that any fate

make him happy. 6 And

it

is

hard to see

why

Socrates would

preferable to not having knowledge of good and bad.

Is,

example, lifelong imprisonment or torture on the rack (as a penalty for

philosophizing) preferable to living an unperturbed, unexamined agrarian
course, one cannot use goods correctly either way; but surely,

mind a view about what

is

intrinsically good, then for all

could be more miserable than the

if

Of

life?

one did not have

one knew the former

fate

latter?

This willingness to suffer whatever the costs of philosophizing surfaces

least

two other

early dialogues.

to

some

in at

Socrates' advice at the end of the Laches tells us that

Socrates thought the virtue that comes from being taught

means

in

is

valuable not simply as a

other good:

,W]e ought [. .] all of us in common to search for a teacher as good as
and secondly for the lads,
for we need one
possible, mostly for us ourselves
[.

.

.

—

—
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8

307a3

^^^

eithCr

The context makes

it

others' souls,

is

to the soul (cf. Lch. 185e).

exchange for having a good soul no price

clear that the

(2 ° la

'

clear that the teacher sought after

good by expertly ministering
in

thm§

5)

is

’

my em P hasis

supposed
Socrates

-

even those of one's own children.) 7

If

clearly saying that

is

makes

the exchange-rate between that

way

in this

goods (even, evidently,

all intrinsic

to further ends,

rate the value ot a teacher so highly; for

everything in exchange for what

means cannot

is

it

that

would be odd

knowledge and

goods). Socrates does believe that

any good without knowledge of good and bad. But

it

of

he were here thinking primarily of

him characterize

means

-

make one become

to

good of one's own soul should be considered
more important than

as a necessary

If

Eud

cf

too high. (The passage also

knowledge of good and bad

him

’*

this belief

all

for

other

we cannot

enjoy

cannot be what makes

one should never be willing

to give

up

simply a means to an end, especially when the

actually guarantee the end.

knowledge of good and bad were 8 supposed not only

to

be instrumentally

valuable but also to have supreme intrinsic value (such that no amount of other intrinsic

goods would ever equal
point

I

am

it),

then such an exchange rate might

interested in establishing for

now

is

that Socrates

cannot

the one above be thinking of knowledge of good and bad as a

what he has

in

mind

at

Lch. 201a

is

knowledge of good and bad, whose

assume

that

he does not think

make

sense.

in

means

But the only

such passages as

to further ends

.

If

simply the acquisition of a thing, such as
intrinsic value is neutral or

that there are various degrees

unknown, then we must

of misery.

9

In order for

xoivq TravTas quag £pteTv paAioTa psv qpTv auToIg 81xPO vai
cog apioTov— SeopeOa yap~EUEiTa Kai xoTg pEipcudoig, pf)TE XPO pdrcov 9EiSopEvoug prjTE aAAou pqSsvog.
*.

.
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Socrates to believe that knowledge of
good and bad
not think that

all

who

n ecessary for happiness, he need

is

lack that knowledge are equally
miserable. If there are intrinsic

goods over and above the good" of learning
whatever
1

Lch. 201a

(let

situation in

exchange

us say

which

for the

it is

knowledge of good and

a person

would be

knowledge

financially destitute. In order to

become

us imagine) must sacrifice his children.
has,

good and

that Socrates has in

we may

up some of those

a student of a

It

is

at

intrinsic

goods

in

becomes

knower of good and

bad. he

(let

true that, given the resources he
presently

helpful.

the bad,

mind

easily imagine a

Let us say that Lysimachus

knowledge of good and bad would be

so that he could learn the

is

bad), then

foolish to give

in question.

it

But

if

he gave up

all

such resources

knowledge of good and bad would then be

useless for him.

Likewise,

in the

Euthydemus. Socrates expresses

subjected to anything in exchange for becoming good
teachers: Pretending that the sophist really has the

expresses an underlying desire that

we have no

his

(sc.,

own

wise)

power he

willingness to be

at the

hands of good

professes, Socrates

similar reason to think

is

feigned:

give myself over to this Dionysodorus, just as [if] to Medea of Colchis:
let him ruin me and, if he wishes, boil me, and if he wishes anything
whatsoever
then let him do it—just let him make me good! (285c;* cf. 307a4-5)
[•• •]!

The reasoning

that

I

considered with regard to Lch. 201a applies here too. The

willingness Socrates expresses here to undergo anything would be inexplicable or
least unjustifiable

from the sophist

(by Socrates'

at

own

lights) if Socrates

supposed

that

at

he stood to gain

most knowledge of good and bad but was himself undecided

as to

TrapaSiScopi spacrrov Aiovuoobcbpcp toutco cbanep tt] MpSEi'a Trj
KoAxcp. crrroAAuTco pE, Kai ei psv (3ouAetcii, EyETco, si 5’, oti (3ouAetc(i, touto
TTOIEITCO- POVOV XPfiOTOV CXTTOCprivdTCO.
*.

.
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the intrinsic value of that knowledge.
Indeed,
if intellectual

some

other

improvement-whether

knowledge-were

lose or suffer in order to get

it

all

it

appears that Socrates would be satisfied

that involves

coming

to

that he achieves, regardless

or as a consequence of getting

know good and bad

or

of what he would have
it,

and even

if

to

he were

incapable of doing or achieving anything else.

So such passages give the impression
secures

But

this

some good

that philosophizing, according
to Socrates,

greater than the instrumental value of
knowledge of good and bad.

impression could be dismissed

if the

passages are read as instances of

hyperbole rather than as expressions of a real
commitment to philosophize

at all costs:

These cases may, someone could argue, merely be reflections
of Socrates' very strong

commitment

to acquiring the intrinsically valueless (or

unknown good

good and bad and of Socrates belief that philosophizing
all)

all

alternatives

alternatives,

open
he

may merely want

in taking

by

is

his listeners to appreciate

(especially given

how

up philosophy and not be

novel his

easily turned

how

knowledge of
of most

far the best

to us; rather than trusting that philosophizing is

happiness philosophizing

courageous

is

of)

(if

not

always the best of

important for

call is)

and

away from

to

it

be

by the

prospect of losing social goods and even a considerable part of one's wealth and health.

The Good Socrates Thinks He Already Has
So the main piece of evidence
the ultimate end

is

not his

for

commitment

significant piece of evidence

is

my

interpretation of Socrates' conception of

to philosophy, significant

though

it is.

The most

the fact that Socrates regards himself as already

possessing knowledge of good and bad.

I

grant of course that this

is

highly

controversial, particularly given the recent trend in the literature; almost no one grants

94

that Socrates thinks

and bad

itself.

he has knowledge of wh at virtue
js-let alone knowledge of good

But once

we

grant this,

we

are well

on our way

to seeing

ot soul Socrates ultimately desires,
because the next piece of evidence
fact that Socrates

until his death,

continued obstinately

possible.

the obvious

engage people in philosophical
conservation

to

and his only worry appears

doing so; Plato makes him say even

is

what condition

that he

to

have concerned being obstructed
from

would continue philosophizing

These two pieces of evidence, assuming they

after death if

are accurate, connect in the

following way: Beyond attempting to achieve
knowledge of good and bad, the ultimate
desire for philosophical

knowledge

interest in philosophizing

only

even

itself is the

after

only explanation for Socrates' peculiar

having achieved knowledge of good and bad.
Not

that, but this ultimate desire also fairly
readily suggests

of Socrates

that

do not appear

to

be adequately defended

how to

explain other views

in the early

dialogues

(e.g..

the

prohibition against harming others; and the idea that in
decision-making one should pay

no mind

to

whether or not one

will die as the result

of a certain course of action).

Socrates Considers Himself "Good"
I

turn

now

to the

evidence for concluding that Socrates

believes he already has knowledge of good and bad. First,

Socrates clearly considers himself a good man.

(2000, 243-244) against

this,

He

is

would argue

41 d imply that he considers himself among the

bad.

But such argument

is

unnecessary, because in

95

has recently argued

some of the

show only

that Socrates'

good men

for

at least

Apology

greatly significant that

right that

(notably Ap. 30d) usually used to support the interpretation

I

is

Hugh Benson

but unconvincingly.

considers himself more good than others.

it

at least in the

whom

texts

that Socrates

remarks

there

is

at

Ap.

nothing

one important passage

\

Socrates clearly

makes a non-comparative estimation
of his goodness; Benson

apparently has overlooked this
passage, but understandably,
since the passage

much of the

neglected in

And

is

relevant literature.

what is going to catch/convict me, if
indeed it does catch [meh not
even Anytus, but the aspersion and
grudge of the many, which
actually has caught many other
good men tqp, Ll and I suppose wiU
also keep
And thCre S n ° fear ° f its sto in at me.
PP g
(Ap. 28ab, my
emphases)*
this is

ele us or

^

Many

'

scholars grant that Socrates does claim
to be good; but there

disagreement over the meaning of this claim.
least that

over which there
being good

is

what he means

much

is

identical.

assumed

to be the

same

that they

have

when

means

at

is

I

a further question

Apology

is

word

"agathos" (or sometimes "chrestos")

described as "virtue",

good condition. 17 This

that person good.

also helpful in this connection to keep in

as our

a

mind

also

comes

to

that to instill virtue in a

18

that "arete" in ancient

"virtue" does (viz., "virtuous"); the

fills this

we

someone "good", he simply

assumption made throughout the early dialogues

19

is

assumption that one's self and one's soul are

virtue, sc. a soul that is in

has no adjectival cognate

that he

well-founded (though, as

is

claiming to have virtue

Socrates calls

one and the same with making

It is

14

as the person's soul's being good. 15 This

common

sufficiently confident that

is

in

Since, then, goodness of soul in the

light in the

person

assumed

disagreement). Everywhere in the early dialogues
a person's

natural corollary to the equally

means

often

he has virtue (of some kind). This assumption

will presently discuss,

may be

It is

is

role (hence "kakia",

Greek

word

and sometimes

sje

^

i

if

(

j

tout’ eotiv 6 Eqs alpsT, EavTTEp aiprj, ou MsApTog ouSe "Avutos
Tcbv ttoAAcov 8ia(3oAri te Kai cpOovog. a 8q ttoAAous kcu aAAoug kcu
kcxl

aAA’

f)

ayaboug avSpas

ijpqKEv, olpai 8e kou aippoEi-
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ou8ev 8e Seivov pq ev Epo\ OTq.

poneria

,

is

the regular

antonym

for "arete""

0
).

So

in Socrates' native language, quite

independently of his peculiar philosophical view on the
matter, there
to say that

someone

is

virtuous than to say that he

is

himself as having

virtue par excellence.

we must

accept that

indications in the

it

Virtue

is

teaches

ii.

it

Virtue

itself"’ that

are clear

according to Socrates virtue in a person

a kind

is

:

is

to

be something that can be taught, whether anyone

practically identified with phronesis (29e; see

the examination of whether

same manner

treated earlier in the

iv.

wisdom. There

in fact

(20a-c).

exactly the

someone

is

Apology

31b with

virtuous

as the examination of whether

is

someone

36c). In the

treated in

is

wise was

.

Lack of virtue and lack of attention

wisdom

or

24

assumed

same passage,

iii.

goodness

often interpreted as something other than

some kind of knowledge

Apology

is

virtue, the

But whatever the exact nature of Socrates' professed goodness,

of knowledge or wisdom

i.

is

no simpler way

"good {agathos}". 21

Given Socrates frequent disavowals of knowledge about
that Socrates considers

is

to virtue are

each treated as a lack of

or phronesis (22a, 22de, 29e-30a).

Socrates' devotion to philosophizing (loving

(28e with 38a)

is

practically identified with his

he of course identifies as the greatest good )
Socrates Thinks

own

as the greatest

good

"attention to virtue" (which

A

He Knows What

So what kind of knowledge or wisdom,
Reeve (1989, 57-58, 149-150,

wisdom)

Virtue

Is

then, does Socrates think he has?

David

179), for example, thinks that Socrates allots to himself

97

no more than

that

ignorance. In

human wisdom

that consists in

awareness of the extent of one's own

some important passages of the Apology

it

certainly looks as though the

only worthwhile 26 knowledge that
Socrates wants his listeners

to believe

he has

is

a

consciousness (22d) or recognition (23b)
27
of the extent and limits of his
knowledge.
This would appear to support Reeve's
interpretation; but a closer look
reveals that he does not even in these
passages deny that he

par excellence

is:

He

is

of a higher order. Immediately

"many admirable
learning

art,

It

is

things", he accuses

after

knowledge

conceding

them of the same

worth noting and keeping

greatest things

are.

Maybe

in

in the other

mind

he really laments 28

that

that the

craftsmen

"error" (22d)

things— the

that Socrates

know

and "lack of

greatest things" (22d).

it;

is

already so familiar with the

but that suggestion appears to be

refuted by Socrates realization that he cannot safely assume that

is

up

At any

to (see, e.g., 20c, 23d).

he means "moral" knowledge, and often

Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 34 with 23;
specifically

knowledge about what

commentators

in thinking that

"the greatest things",

I

we

virtue

cf.

rate,

it

is

it is

.

.

known

commentators usually assume or

assumed

(e.g.,

Kraut 1992b,

Though

I

that

infer

5;

he means

do agree with such

can make a good guess as to what Socrates means by

disagree with those

who

think that he has in

to Tiju TEXvpv KaXcbs E^epya^EoOai ekootos
xa pEyioTa 00900x0x05 eTvou.
*.

popularly

Eudemian Ethics 1216b3)

is.

29 *

does not say explicitly what "the

he thinks that his audience

subject that he does not want to bother explaining

that

what virtue

(22e) that gripped the poets (22c5-6): "because of
admirably working out his

each deemed himself to be wisest

what he

at least

passages

says that he lacks the craft-knowledge
that the various "manual

artisans" admittedly (22d; cf. 23c7) have;
but the

lacking

knows

at these

5 ia

.

.

.
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mind knowledge of

fj^iou xai

TaXXa

what virtue

is,

knowledge.

I

and even with those who think
will

now consider

that

the evidence that the

Socrates presents the conclusion that
he

someone wise

he has

came

mind only moral

in

Apology
to after

actually provides.

an extensive search for

in those things (and thereby
wiser than he 30 contrary to the
oracle's
,

response to Chaerephon): All

no human

In fact,

4).

34

4);

"[•

•

•]

human wisdom, he

really

is

reall y [° nl
y] the

wise

god

is

33

for

,

reports, is worthless (23a7; 31 cf.

human wisdom

wise {tco ovti 6 6 eos

is

not really

0090 s

23b3-

wisdom (23b3-

e!vcxi}[.

.

(23a5-

.]"

35

Evidently, he

6).

came

to believe that the

god wants people

worthlessness of whatever "wisdom" they might

genuine wisdom, which

continued—even
question those

infer that the

why

is

be aware that they have no

Socrates (according at least to his account
(23b))

concluding that no one was wiser than

after

who seemed

he—to

seek out and

wise and showed them that they were not wise.

god supposedly wants

this

wisdom would

the Socratic brand ot

have—to

be aware of the

to

(We may

because the god "cares" (31a) for humans and

them

profit

(as

it

does Socrates (22e))

they had

if

it.)

It

wisdom
foi

we compare 23ab
,

we

are in a position to see

but could find in no

own

peculiar

with the passage where Socrates

—

human

knowledge

is

what bona

supposed to

"[w]isdom indeed

as

fide

be.

first

wisdom

speaks of his

—which Socrates searched

Immediately

that is probably

after characterizing his

human

IocoS avbpcoTnvr) 0091 a}" (20d), he contrasts himself with those

probably wise in some
says that he "was just

way

now

that

is

greater than by

human wisdom}.

*outoi 5e Tax’ ov

speaking of' these men; and the

.

.

.

ijei'^co

Tiva

f|
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own

men

{fjnEp eotiv

men who
.

.]"

"are

He

(20de).*

he had been speaking

kot’ dvQpcouov oo 9 iav

0090

)

eIev.

.

.

Of were those

who promise

education to the young and exact
payment for the service

hke Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias, and
Euenus (19e-20c). 36
denies (20c, 20e) that he has the
knowledge that those

knowledge

in question appears to be that
specific

gives one the

(20b)).

37

power

And

in the

to

make humans

possess

In both passages Socrates

men

claim to have. The

knowledge about human

human

virtue

(i.e.,

virtue

which

be good humans

former of the two passages just mentioned,
Socrates appears

to

express a desire for that knowledge; for he
says that he would be proud of himself
if he

had

it

(20c).

We reach the
his quest for

Socrates

wisdom

tells

same conclusion
in the

if

we

consider the odd fact that

Apology (21b-23a)

recounting

the only examinations concerning

us specifically what he asked are his examinations
of the poets

notably, the only group from

something (22b). He wants

whom

to

he explicitly says that he had hoped

—about

know

their

they said." Socrates never finds any living poet
the statements found in

poems; he concludes

poetry

admirable, the poets

itself

when

(22c5)

is

who can

explain to

.

.]

in

him

also

to learn

most troubled-over poems

that although

"[.

—

which

the

— "what

meaning of

what the poets say

—

the

no way know the things they say

{(oaoiv 5e oubev cov Asyouoilv]}" (22c). Poets, he says, "make the things they make
not with wisdom, but with something natural and by having a god in them, just as the
oracles and godly diviners do" (22bc).* This

the Ion 533d-534e,

[.

.

.

is

the

same view

that Socrates expresses in

where he claims,

TJhese admirable poems are not human and they are not even from humans,

but godly and from gods; and the poets are nothing but messengers/interpreters

*.
.

a ttoioTev, aAAa 9O0EI
XPPOpcpSof

.ou 009101 ttoioTev

TTEp Ol 0EO|idvTElS
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eaCh being P0SSeSSed by WhiCheVer
[80d ' P° ssesses him. (534e;-

poem, the possessing god

itself,

not the poet,

is

the real speaker (ton 534d).

Earlier in the Jon, Socrates tells
Ion that the job of rhapsodes

because

words {Tijv toutou bidvoiav EK|aav6dvEiv,

just his

(530bc).

is

"enviable (CpAcotov!"

involves having "to learn thoroughly
the thinking of that

it

38

Presumably,

is

it

cf.

pij

man [Homer],

povov Td Enp]

[.

not

,]"

enviable because poets, though having
no knowledge of

what the gods are saying (or thinking) "through"
them, "say many admirable things
about their [subject] matters (ttoAAcx
AiiyovTEs ecu
(534bc; Ap. 22c2-3),

"[.

.

saying things worth so

.]

d^ict)" (Ion 534d). This must be

why

uaAd nEpi tcov rrpay pd-rcov) ”

much [AfyouTES outco ttoAAou

Socrates represents himself as having been

particularly hopeful in his examination of the
poets: he evidently thinks that the

messages

in poetry are "the greatest things",

though the poets themselves have no

knowledge of them (compare Ap. 22c5-6 with 22d6-8), and
discover their meaning he would acquire the

wisdom he

that if only he could

seeks.

These passages together

suggest again that Socrates in the search he describes in the Apology

of divine knowledge.

Republic, Socrates says,

human with

seeking a kind

30

Well, what do the poets, like Homer, say that

things

is

"[.

.

.

W]e

hear from

some

is

"worth so much"? In the

that those

men know

all arts

and

all

respect to virtue and badness, and even the divine things"

ouk av0pcbTnvd eotiv xa KaAa xaOxa Troifipaxa ouSe dv0pcoTTcov,
aAAa 0 eTcx kou Oecov, oi 5 e Troiqxai ou 5 ev aAA’ q Eppqvqg e’ioiv tcov 0 ecov, koteXopevoi e^ oxou av ekqotos KQTExqxai.
.

.
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(10.598de;

cf.

Ion 53 led).

As we have

already seen,

it

cannot be subjects

like

medicine and leathercutting that Socrates
thinks Homer speaks so admirably
about
R. 10.599bc). Rather,

"[.

.

.]

the greatest and

(cf.

most admirable things of which Homer

puts his hand to speaking" are "about wars
and generalships and managings of
cities,

and about the education of a human being"
(10.599cd). t One of the most important of
the

main

subjects, then,

interested in

is

virtue (10.600e;

cf.

what the poets say concerning how one should

mainly the subject about which people look

why Homer was

listeners to believe that

to the poets for advice (cf.

What

40

particularly

—

ar »H this is

Lw. 858d), and

Socrates, then, in the

Apology apparently wants

his

he had expected that the poets would have the divine wisdom

power

viz., the

to

others good.

think, therefore, that Socrates has a clear idea of

I

Socrates, then, primarily has in

and 20e

not knowledge of what

is,

virtue itself consists in; to
42

primarily to deny that he has

to teach

it:

human

virtue

is

anxious above

.

human

43

to

This

virtue.

it.

at

Ap. 20c

human

to Socrates, is to

have

disavow genuine wisdom, he wants

is

No

be seeking.

why

doubt,

he

if

is

claiming not to be able

he did not

know what

it

tivcov cxKouopev oti outoi Traoag psv TEyvas ern'oTavTai, TiavTa 5e

avOpcbiTEia
f

but the knowledge that

is,

all

to

disavowals of knowledge

in his

because he himself does not have

*.
.

mind

what he claims

have genuine wisdom, according

Therefore, since he

virtue.

tcx

live one’s life

he (mockingly) says that the sophists "perhaps/probably" have:

make

seems

popularly considered the great "educator" of the ancient
Greek world

(R. 10.606e, cf. Pro. 325e-326a).

that

Sy. 209a, d). Socrates

xa upos apETpv

Kai Kaici'av, Kai tcc ys 0Ela.

psyioTcov te Kai KaAAioTcov

.

.

.

"Opripos, ttoAepcov te
TTEpi Kai OTpaTpyicov Kai SioiKijoscov ttoAecov, Kai TTaibEiag uspt avOpcoTTou
.

.

.

ettixeipeT Asysiv
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was, then that too would

make him unable

clearly the

most

virtue

not sufficient either tor having

is is

But having virtue oneself is

it.

significant requisite of teaching virtue; for

knowledge of what

(e.g.) a

house

is is

it

to Socrates in the

Apology?

It is

knowledge simply of what

or for being able to teach

sufficient for being able to

What, then, does virtue—this power

more

44

to teach

make

to

very tempting to

others

fill

(no more than

produce one).

good—consist

in,

according

blank with the help of

in this

explicit evidence that other early dialogues supply,

45
it

and

suppose that the kind of

to

wisdom

that Socrates has in

wisdom

is

wisdom

are considered (Ap. 23ab) worthless, 47 and the otherwise rather
cryptic

statement

explain

49

mind when he speaks

in the

Apology of virtue and genuine

knowledge of good and bad. 46 This would explain why

at

Ap. 30b2-4

that all

good things come from

Socrates' confidence in the

concerned

first

would appear

and foremost about acquiring

to

in the

Apology

bad.)

And

Apology

be starkly unwarranted,

it

assuming

(cf.

we were

if

at least believes that virtue is

this is certainly the

in

virtue.

is

right,

the

knowledge

It

that all
50

other kinds of

would

also help

humans should be
(That assumption

not supposed to think that Socrates

something

like

knowledge of good and

kind of knowledge that in other dialogues he thinks

that Socrates

disavows

at

it

is

is

plausible to infer that

Ap. 20c and 20e.

Socrates manifests pretty clear views about what virtue

that in the

48

Eud. 282a).

responsible for an educator's being able to teach virtue; so

that

all

is.

Apology he does not make any disavowal concerning

If this conjecture is

And

it

is

significant

the nature of virtue, as

he frequently does in other early dialogues.

But

is

there positive evidence for concluding that he considers these views

knowledge about virtue? There

is.

First, his

unreserved confidence that none of his
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examinees were wise about "the greatest things"
shows
himself as knowing

even

if

at least the nature

that he

must have regarded

of that knowledge that he concluded
they lacked,

he did not consider himself expert about
that knowledge's subject matter.

Thomas West
ignorance

(in

West and West 1998) expresses

not ignorance. Socrates

is

knows what he does
emphasis).

And

it is

knows

not know, namely,

that

the point thus:

"Knowledge of

he does not know, and,

'the greatest things'

we may

add, he

[Ap. 22d]" (12, West's

obvious that a clear preconception of what constitutes
"the greatest

things" governs Socrates' examinations from the
very

start; that

expresses any doubts about this preconception suggests

must have considered

it

well-founded. Socrates

knows

that,

Socrates never

however he

at least the

arrived at

it,

he

nature of what he

says he searches for in others.

Second,

we must

not

fail to

appreciate the significance of Socrates' well-defined

and categorical exhortation and personal commitment
exhorts everyone to pursue virtue, he

is

to pursue virtue.

When

Socrates

exhorting them to philosophize, 51 which on the

Traditional Interpretation involves abandoning complacency and pursuing

first

and

loremost knowledge of good and bad. According to the Traditional Interpretation, he

himself is already committed
5

1

a).

But

how

to

doing so; for he himself "attends to virtue" (Cto. 45d,

could he exhort and be committed so unconditionally and without his

usual disavowals, unless he thought he really

includes)

pursuing

acting

knowledge of good and bad but
first

and foremost? As

on orders from god; he

do something

that he holds

is

is

I

knew

that

not only that virtue

is

(or at least

knowledge of good and bad

have shown (Appendix A), Socrates

is

is

worthy of

not merely

acting in accordance with an order given by himself to

best.

First, in

order to hold that philosophizing
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is

the best

course of action, he would presumably
have
to

knowledge of good and bad and

happiness. Second,

if

that

he had thought,

be sure that philosophizing

at least to

knowledge of good and bad

know what

don't

'I

who

at

what he believes

it is,

and

life

are

is

presumably

really ignorant

at the

therefore,

I

cannot

would not have

all

to

likelihood, falsely)

He

.

that

many

gives far too

of acquiring

it is

signs of

too

of its nature. His beliefs that virtue

knowledge of good and bad

sufficient for deciding

complete confidence (without perplexity)

good and bad, even

is

his decisiveness about the necessity

knowledge of good and bad and

good

necessary for

cannot be that the Socrates of the Apology
considers

it

complete for him to think he

is

Ap. 28d certainly would not apply

himself still on a search for knowledge of what
virtue

for a

is;

ig norantly gave himself an order to do a thing that
he (in

holds to be best. Therefore,

includes)

virtue

the best course of action', then
he

is

considered the order inviolable: The rule
stated

one

believe that philosophizing leads

is

is

(or

necessary

on numerous occasions and with

to continue to

pursue virtue and knowledge of

prospect of suffering things universally considered greatly

bad or of suffering supposed unknowns

(like death).

52

Also, those beliefs are sufficient

also for advising (again without reservation or perplexity) others to decide
similarly.
"For," as Socrates himself says, "if we

virtue

happens to be,

53

Apology he

this:

how

it

actually admits that he

apexqv

know

at all

we become

what exactly

counselors to

would be most admirably acquired" (Lch.
is

190bc).*

a private counselor about virtue (31c),

advising people not only to attend to virtue (3

yap

did not even

then in what manner would/could

anyone whosoever about
In the

somehow

1

b),

but about

how

it

should be

to Trapairav oti ttote Ti/yyavEi ov,
Ttv’av xpoTiov toutou aup(3ouAoi yEvoipE0’ av OTcpouv, ottcos av auTO icaAAiotq KTqoaiTo;
Vi

ttou pqS’

e’iSeTpev
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obtained-viz., not by striving for financial,
bodily, and social and
30ab), but by

first

recognizing that one does not yet
have genuine

political

wisdom

power

(29d.

(23b) and

then by participating in philosophical
54
discussion and examination
(38a).

So one
includes)

knowledge of good and bad and

interpretation

is

further indication that Socrates
thinks he

depicted

is

at least that virtue is (or

necessary for the good

life is that this

perhaps the only one that can explain
those passages in which Socrates

as— and

at least

once

that painful therapy for the soul

55

actually characterizes himself

which

Since, then, Socrates in the

is,

is

knows

administer of

distinctive of the judge's or soul-doctor's

Apology not only never denies knowing what

but actually seems to think he does

have no problem identifying virtue

is

as—the

in

know

at least its nature,

himself if he had

elsewhere denies knowing what virtue

is

it.

art.

virtue

he would presumably

Because he so often

(even, allegedly, in the

Apology

itself),

some

scholars do not think that Socrates could really have
considered himself virtuous.
pair of scholars

have taken so seriously Socrates' disavowals of knowledge about

One
this

subject, that they struggle to interpret Socrates' claim to be
"good" so that he

is

not

claiming to possess bona fide virtue (Brickhouse and Smith 1994,
124);

I

take

the

same reason Benson

about

its

it,

is

struggles even to reinterpret clear indications that Socrates

claims to be "good". The problem
that he or

this,

is

apparently

this:

How could

Socrates be confident

anyone has virtue given such frequent and emphatic disavowals of knowledge

nature? The solution

know what

virtue

is

that Socrates is not being honest

when he claims

not to

is.

This solution does not have the consequence that Brickhouse and Smith think
does:
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it

we suppose

If

thal Socrates is willing to
be dishonest or intentionally
unclear
about whether or not he has
knowledge and wisdom, then we will
have at least
16 reaSOn ,0 be su sp.cious
about any other claim he might
make as wdl
f
Once we convict someone of being a liar
or a tiddler on one issue, we will
have
n
a

™

f

c f°

The words

I

have emphasized above indicate

that

<*

Brickhouse and Smith are aware

they are walking a thin line here; for
they themselves have supposed
(2000, 62ff.;

Benson 2000, 176-178)

that Socrates is

sometimes dishonest,

viz.,

that

cf.

when he claims

that

others are wise:

n, thl
C aim how ever, we judged Socrates to
be saying something other than
?
what he believes, because we also found texts in
which he broke from this pose
and admitted that he thought no one was wise or had
the kind of knowledge we
found him elsewhere granting to his interlocutors.
’

)

(64)

But

we have

similar reason for thinking that his professions
of

about the nature of virtue

are dishonest; for, as

which Socrates clearly breaks from
virtue

is.

passages
that he

One reason
is

that

is

least

have shown, there are passages

this pose', revealing his

in

opinion that he knows what

Brickhouse and Smith (and others) have overlooked these

that the only passages they consider as possible evidence for
Socrates' belief

knows what

virtue

is

are passages in

(1994, 35-36; 2000, 101-120;

it

I

ignorance— at

which he actually uses the word "know"

Benson 2000, 223ff). Another reason,

cf.

I

think,

not clear what his motives for dishonesty would be, particularly considering

emphatic he

is

(particularly in the

case against thinking Socrates

is

Apology ) about

truth-telling.

honest in disavowing virtue

possible explanation of his motives.
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After presenting

itself,

I

will offer a

is

that

how

my

Socrates Thinks

I

have shown

He Knows

that Socrates thinks he

the

Good and

knows what

only knowledge he attributes to himself
when he claims

the

virtue

Bad
But

is.

be good.

to

I

this is not the

evidence for concluding that Socrates
supposes that he knows also what

He

bad.

like Cto.

thinks he

is

what some modern commentators

47cd and Lch. 185a) a "moral

now

turn

is

to the

good and

call (in reference to

passages

expert".

Socrates' Self-Assessment

First,

we may

that he uses the

consider Socrates' assessment of his

term "good"

itself sufficient for

to describe

himself is not, as

mere human wisdom

estimation ol the "worth" of the
there

is

have acknowledged, by

I

mean

(a la

Reeve) that he has the mere

that consists in an accurate estimation of the
limits of his

knowledge. Other evidence, however, suggests
greatei than his

goodness. The mere fact

concluding that Socrates takes himself to be a
moral expert. The

description considered by itself could be taken to

"human wisdom"

own

:

that Socrates

must think he has wisdom

At Ap. 41 d he gives us a clue

wisdom he

possesses.

56

If

I

am

to his real

right that the claim

intended to offer bona fide consolation to the virtuous, then

we

cannot mistake

the importance of the claim with reference to Socrates' estimation of the

own
is

—

virtue.

is

awareness of his

'virtue' that

the

Earlier in the

wisdom

Apology he had

own

—

if

power of his

"wisdom"— if wisdom

ignorance of anything admirable. But

he allows himself
that

said that his only

own

if this is the

it

only

he does not even have knowledge of good and bad.

he supposedly strives for

can he be confident that his goodness
suffering bad things (Ap. 4 Id) or of

is

in his philosophical

sufficient to

—what

is
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examinations

remove completely

supposedly worse

—then how

the worry of

—doing bad

things? If

he thinks that knowledge of good and
bad

is

necessary for (consistently) avoiding

incorrect action and for (consistently)
performing correct action, then he cannot
think
that

he himself will consistently avoid incorrect
action

attained

knowledge of good and bad. He

human wisdom
further

"profits"

surely realizes

him only inasmuch

as

knowledge (Mo. 84bc), and perhaps 57

in situations requiring a

knowledge

it

(Cm.

1

7 1 d- 1 73e) that his

allows him to recognize the need for

also

inasmuch as

that he lacked.

Socrates believes that he possesses a goodness that

it

Furthermore,

is

value of the knowledge of good and bad, because, as
think that the instrumental

he did not think he had already

if

keeps him from acting
it

looks as though

greater than the instrumental

I

have shown, Socrates does not

power of knowledge of good and bad

is

great

enough

to

ensure the invulnerability he speaks of at Ap. 4 Id. Socrates' level
of virtue must, in his

own

estimation, be very high indeed.

Similarly,

he has

made

we

should not underestimate the significance of Socrates' claim that

others genuinely "happy" (Ap. 36d9-el).

It is

true that Socrates denies

having the knowledge necessary for making others virtuous (20c, 20e; Lch. 186c). He

even seems

to

deny

that he ever taught

anything from him (Ap. 33b5-8). But

cannot take

at face

anyone anything and
if

we

value his claim to have

often greatly underestimated,

58
1

that

anyone ever learned

are to take these denials at face value,

made

the Athenians happy.

The claim

think, both because Socrates' disavowals of

and teaching-abilities predispose scholars against a

literal

is

sufficient for happiness.
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is

knowledge

interpretation of the claim,

and also because scholars have misunderstood Socrates' view about what
and what

we

is

necessary

Some
that

scholars have attempted to account
for the claim at 36de by
pointing out

under Socrates' influence the Athenians
became either subject

practitioners of Socrates' brand of
examination and refutation,

resulted (sometimes) in recognition
of their

own

to or active

which supposedly

ignorance. Socrates does describe the

recognition of one's lack of wisdom as
"profitable" (Ap. 22e), and he actually
speaks of

examining, refuting, and exhorting the Athenians
as the "greatest good deed" (36c);

his

so

it

may seem

natural to infer that he

Athenians happy
refute,

all,

referring to that

he claims

when he claims

to

make

the

do "nothing other than" examine,

to

and exhort people about virtue (29e-30b).
It is

issue.

36de. After

at

is

worth considering

how one

scholar

who

offers this interpretation fudges the

After presenting the interpretation, Reeve concludes,
"That

is

why

Socrates

confers the greatest benefit' on the Athenians and makes
them really happy ( or as close
to

being really happy as possible)" (1989, 179,

because he realizes that according

Athenians

bona

fide

is

( 1

j 6).

Socrates' claim to

that

someone has

bona
that

fide

human wisdom he

to Socrates the

something he allegedly does not teach

Reeve's waffling reveals

make

how

others happy. If there

literally

made

another happy,

is

it

I

—

unsatisfying

any sense

claims to offer the

in

is

is

necessary for

his interpretation of

which Socrates

will allow

must involve causing someone

knowledge. Socrates presumably thinks

which

waffles here

not sufficient for happiness; according to Reeve, Socrates thinks that
some

knowledge

happiness

my emphasis). Reeve

that he has

say he believes he has acquired himself,

viz.,

caused others

60

knowledge of good and

,

165bc, Socrates reports having "learned" (156d) certain "admirable speeches

have

to acquire

Indeed, in the Charmides in spite of the often-cited avowal of ignorance

110

to

at

bad.

!tou 5 Aoyous

.

.

,tou s KaAou 5 }" (157a)

thought (157a, 157cd). 61 Not only
does

make

that

all this

produce the good condition of soul
or
imply that he has knowledge of
how

to

the soul better, he actually claims
to possess the "art of healing
{iotTpiitfj}" the

soul (158e2). Since he

we have

is

not speaking of improvement in

some

every reason to think that the goodness
in question

(and not simply the

"human wisdom"

Socrates

avows

he uses a standard virtue-term ("sophrosune")
to name
This interpretation
private counselor (31c)

is

who

is

in the

clearly limited sense,

goodness par excellence

Apology), especially since

it.

borne out by his characterizing himself in
the Apology as a
has never counseled badly (33d).

Many commentators

have assumed that he does so only because he
advises people to acquire knowledge of

good and bad

and foremost. 62 He

first

he goes on to explain

why

conventional politics,

it

certainly does give that sort of advice.

But when

he did not become a public counselor by practicing

becomes

clear that he believes that

had he done so he would

have advised the Athenian multitude" not only on the necessity of
knowing the good
'

and the bad. but also on the just

we

36b9-cl). Are

to

itself (31e3-4,

suppose he would have done

nonexpert about the just and simply as one
justice in spite of being ignorant about

in the Gorgias,

certain

it

is

power and

32al, 32e3-4;

this as

who was

what

is

just

one

"ettieikeotepov"

who

at

considered himself a

very determined to bring about

and unjust? As Socrates maintains

not by sheer determination that the just

art (sc.,

cf.

is

brought about;

knowledge of good and bad) (509de). 63 Surely

it is

by a

the Socrates

of the Apology and the early dialogues in general, would have agreed. In the Laches
,

he

states,

we

things

There

is

^nsiaering the

are considering. (185d)

a need, according to Socrates,
because not just anyone

but only the one

who

is

expert about the subject in
question.

the reason that he actually gives
in the

counselor

is

Apology

for not

qualified to counsel,

is

greatly significant that

I, is

having become a public

not that he was not an expert about
64
the just,
but that—due to his

inevitable attempts to bring about
justice-opposing political forces

ruined"

(sc., killed

would have

or exiled) him, thus ruining his
chances of improving anyone
(3 Id,

32a, 32e, 36bc). Socrates' mention of
daimonic opposition to political aspirations
(3 led) implies that he, at least at

one point

in time,

was confident enough about

qualifications for the job that he actually decided
to pursue
that

to

he hears the daimonion only when

do" (3

And, according

Id).

to his

it

own

turns

it; it is

his

important to recall

him away from what he

is

"going/about

account, the daimonion opposed

him not

because he was unqualified, but because he would ultimately
not have been allowed

to

put his qualifications to use. Here, then, staring Plato's
readers and Socrates' audience
in the face, is the tact that

the just. This should

disavows the

he considers himself an unerring counselor about virtue and

make

ability to

us doubt that

make

My interpretation so

we

others virtuous.

should take Socrates

good and

far implies that Socrates

bad). Alexander

Nehamas 1992

considered himself not only as

it

(by making others

raises

saying that Socrates considers himself a teacher of virtue.

AeT
tov oup(3ouAov gkotteTv
av, OU EVEKQ OKOTTOUPEVOI OKOTTOU|iEV.
.

.

.

word when he

65

qualified to teach virtue, but as actually having taught

learn the

at his

apa
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somehow

an interesting objection

Nehamas

texvikos eotiv

to

calls our attention

sis

ekeivou SspanEi-

to

something Socrates says when he claims not

those

men [who

the cause [.

.

.]"

listen to

me

(Ap. 33b)/

speak] becomes good or not,

Nehamas

they turn out vicious (457bc).

"I

I

would not justly be held

as

then reminds us of Socrates’ criticizing
Gorgias

for claiming that his students will be
virtuous (G.

sense, any sense, in

be a teacher: "And whether any of

to

think,"

460a) but disavowing responsibility

Nehamas

concludes, "that

if

there ever

was

if

a

which Socrates did think of himself as a teacher of
arete he would
,

never have disavowed this central responsibility"
(73). Nehamas' argument appears

go something

to

like this:

1
If Socrates thinks he is a teacher of virtue, then
Socrates thinks he is
responsible for his listeners' being good or bad. 66 [This is
based on the same
principle on which Socrates' bases his criticism of Gorgias.]
.

Socrates does not think he
(Ap. 33b).
2.

Therefore,

First

problem not for

should be clear that even

it

my

appears that he must think he has

there

or disavow. Nothing

is

to

*kcc\

if so,

of virtue.

is right,

have made (some of) his

made them

Nehamas

But does Socrates, on

And

a teacher

Nehamas

he has revealed a

says

my

listeners happy,

makes

I

it

virtuous, in spite of whatever else he

may

the claim at 36d9-el disappear, and

no plausible alternative interpretation of it

literalness.

raises?

if

is

interpretation, but rather for Socrates (or Plato) himself; for, as

have shown, since Socrates claims

avow

responsible tor his listeners' being uood or bad

Socrates does not think he

3.

of all,

is

that

does not deprive

interpretation, resolve the

it

problem

of its

that

Nehamas

how?

toutcov Eycb

a’m'av uttexoimi.

.

.

site tis xpfl aT os

.
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yiyvETai

e’i'te

pf|,

ouk av 5ikcugos

Tijv

I

think Socrates has no reason
to accept the

This can be seen better

if (1) is

expanded

into

first

premise of the argument above.

two separate

steps.

Consider

this

reformulation of the argument:
la. If Socrates thinks he is
a teacher of virtue, then
Socrates thinks it is
impossible that one of his listeners
turns out unvirtuous.
lb. If Socrates thinks it is
impossible that one of his listeners
turns out
unv.rtuous, then Socrates thinks he
is responsible for his
listeners' being good or

Socrates does not think he is responsible
for his listeners' being good
or bad
Therefore, 3. Socrates does not think
he is a teacher of virtue.
2.

thmk

1

this

sti11

Nehamas' thinking. 67 (lb)

faithfully represents

principle that Socrates uses to criticize
Gorgias.

is

based on that

He blames Gorgias

for worrying about

the possibility of his students turning
out vicious, in spite of his assurance that
every

one ot them will be virtuous. So

it

looks like Socrates should accept (lb).
But should

he assent to (la)?

I

in

thmk

that

Nehamas makes

a false diagnosis of what Socrates needs to disavow

order to escape the problem he imputed to Gorgias.

It is

not teaching or the ability to

teach that Socrates needs to disavow, but the guarantee of
teaching.

And

this is

precisely what Socrates takes such pains to disavow in the passage
in question. First,

note the focus of Socrates' disavowal of teaching

having the necessary qualifications for teaching
20e).

He chooses

wage

says

at

Ap. 33ab. Here he does not deny

virtue, as

he seemed

to

do

earlier (20c.

rather to focus on denying those characteristics typical of the

professional teachers of his day:

a

at

for speaking,

(iii)

(i)

promising

unwillingness to speak to just anyone,
listeners that they will learn.

33b5-8 could be taken as a denial

anyone ever learned anything from him.

that

69

68

(ii)

receiving

Indeed, what he

he ever taught anyone anything and that

But even here the emphasis

114

is

on asserting

that

he never promised learning and
that he said the same things
to everyone.™

Socrates, then, can avoid the problem
Gorgias

fell into

because Socrates' listeners have

not been promised any teaching
(33b), they do not pay for teaching

Eup. 3d), and those

i.e„

that

who

listeners will

at

36d9-el

listeners virtuous.

together with Socrates’ refusal to promise
learning to any listener,

virtuous.

it

9de, 3 1 be. 33ab

;

23c)—

Socrates does not promise

be virtuous. Based on his claim

conclude that Socrates believed he made
some of his

Socrates thought

1

follow him do so "spontaneously
lauTopciToi'" (Ap.

without any invitation or promise on
Socrates' behalf.

any ot his

(

we may
Given

we may

this,

conclude that

possible for a teacher of virtue to have
listeners that will not become

So on Socrates' behalf we may

reject the first

premise of my second

formulation of Nehamas' argument. 71

S ocrates' Confidence in the Justness/Goodness of His
Actions

But aside from his boast of being invulnerably good
(4 Id), his claims about
abilities as a counselor,

there

is

at least

more evidence

to

have actually made others happy too (36d9-el),

tor concluding that Socrates considered himself

knowledgeable

about the good and the bad. (This evidence will also further support the

explanation

is

and his claim

his

I

have already offered

his confidence that he has never

telling in

two ways:

First,

ability to distinguish in

can he have succeeded

how

for 36d9-el

done

and 4 Id.) For also

injustice (Ap. 33a, 37b; cf. 27e3-5).

can he be so sure about

this self-assessment

each case just action from unjust?
in

telling in this respect

avoiding injustice

in

73

Second,

each case without

if

he

72

This

without the

is right,

74

this ability?

how

We

certainly are not to imagine (with Brickhouse and Smith 2000, 152) that he really
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is

supposes that he or anyone could
consistently act justly simply out
of luck and without
a

knowledge of the just
Furthermore,
then

just,

(as

if

(see Chapter

II p.

34).

he did not think he had the ability

why does he seem

to

determine which actions are

(Ap. 28b, 28d, 32d) to value so highly
his revelation

that

he

everyone else too) must consider only the
just whenever he acts? Perhaps
he thinks

he should be congratulated for his good
intentions. But his listeners

good

this is if he

often—especially

in the

may wonder what

complicated cases— cannot, because of his

supposed ignorance of the nature of the just, figure
out which alternative would be just.

One reason
his

own

for repeatedly

case the method

mentioning

—not by

this

exclusive attention to the just

itself but

presumably together with an

surely that in

is

ability to

determine which alternatives are just— leads to successfully
avoiding unjust
alternatives.

There

is

good independent evidence

also the other evidence

believes he

is

knowledge,

far too

far

only this impression, but

considered in favor of concluding that Socrates

a moral expert. In the recent literature concerning the extent of
Socrates'

uses words to that

that

have so

I

to corroborate not

much
same

focus

is

upon statements

specific effect).

in

which Socrates

7
’

Scholars often

make

says,

know...."

by

77

If

far

outnumbered by statements

we were

in

which Socrates

to consider only such statements,

says,

we would

are really interested in

we must

knowing

Socrates' opinion of his

consider not only Socrates' self-reflective claims but
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own
at

"I

76

rare,

(or

and

don't

indeed find

any evidence that Socrates thought he knew something of significance

we

know"

a special point of noting

such statements, particularly having to do with "moral" knowledge, are

that they are

if

"I

little if

78

in ethics.

But

"moral" knowledge,

ah cases in which

Socrates

makes claims about

virtue

and the good and

all

the cases in

which

it is

reasonable to attribute such claims to him.

Now many scholars

have thought

that,

according to Socrates, until an agent as

has bona tide moral knowledge, there are a
great
will not be sure

of how he should

really thorny situations.

of this sort (or

at least

80

many

situations in

which he simply

79

or that he will not be sure what to do in
the

act,

Socrates even seems to

a corollary of

it).

In the

commit himself explicitly

to a

view

Laches he says of Nicias and Laches
,

in

his characteristic fashion,

They indeed seem

to

me

not ever have fearlessly

young man

if

have the power to educate a human; for they would
made declarations about pursuits good and bad for a
to

they for their part didn't trust that they were sufficiently

knowledgeable. (186cd)* 81

He

saying that, on the basis of these expert soldiers' fearless declarations

is

about the good,

we may

conclude that Nicias and Laches must consider themselves

experts about the good too.

I

suggest that

it

is

no coincidence

blanket profession of ignorance about virtue and the good

that, in spite

(e.g.,

is,

Plato

meant

believed. In the

we

find

for us to see that Socrates' profession of ignorance

few cases where we

him manifesting

own

Lch. 186de), Socrates

never expresses doubt or perplexity about the justness and goodness of his
that

of his

is

own

actions;

not to be

are given a glimpse of Socrates' decision-making

instead an extraordinarily tranquil confidence

—and

that too in

circumstances that appear to be of the most intimidating, trying, and morally complex

sort,

where

if

anywhere we should expect

that the perplexity or at least doubts

of a

self-

O')

confessed nonexpert would surface.

Sometimes Plato

quite explicitly draws our

’Sokouoi 5q pot Buvcrroi slvai TiaibEOoai dv0pcoTTOv ou yap av ttote
abECOS CXTTECpaivOVTO TTEpi ETTlTqbEUqdTGOV VECO XP r OTC^)V TE KOtl TTOvqpcbv, e!
l

pf|

auxoTs ettioteuov iKavcbs siSEvai.
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attention to Socrates' tranquil resolve. 83

suggest to

therefore

some

readers)

immune from bad

makes him

tranquility does not (as Ap. 41
d could

come from simply assuming

of expertise leads him into
that

Such

that he is divinely favored

(or really bad) consequences even

error.

where

his

supposed lack

of these situations,

it

clearly

confident, but rather his conviction that he

is

acting justly.

In all

is

and

not blind faith

He

without reservation that he acted justly in following
orders in battle (Ap. 28e),

believes

in voting

against the motion to try collectively the generals
of Athens' forces at Arginusae (32c).
in refusing to carry out the Thirty's order
to arrest

his family

and friends beg

his

Leon

judges for pity (35b-d),

(32d), in not letting himself or

in

making

his proposal

concerning the sentence he deserves (36b ff, 36e-37a), and in
not giving

in to Crito's

plea to escape prison (Cto. 49e-50a) in spite of recognizing
(Cto. 50c; Ap. 41 b3, 41 de)
the injustice of his judges' ruling. 84 His familiar professions
of ignorance and perplexity
are

nowhere

to

be seen

in these important cases.

Even by

his

own

lights, Socrates

cannot so confidently suppose that he succeeded in acting justly in them without
also

supposing that he has expert knowledge of the good and the
of ignorance
real

we suppose

knowledge

cases, or

Socrates thinks

—whether we

whether

we

characteristic of

think (with Benson) that

think (with,

controversial or hard cases

is

e.g.,

Nehamas)

—we must conclude

that

it

is

it is

just.

Whatever the extent

someone who does

not have

ignorance concerning

all

ignorance only concerning

that Socrates

does not consider himself

ignorant in the relevant way.

Socrates' Confidence in the Face of Death

Socrates' fearless declarations about the value of death are revealing too.

fearlessly maintains that death

is

not greatly bad (Ap. 30cd). In fact, he

118

is

He

so convinced

—

Of it that he does not fear death
77e).

him

It is,

at all.

It is,

he says, a mere bogey (Cto.
46c;

he must think, not intrinsically bad
and does not have the power

or any virtuous person.

Given

his boast that he cannot be

cf.

to

as

knowing these

bad or something

intrinsic

more

careful about

point.

If

that could threaten his happiness, 8

he thought he did not

saying these things as one

is

that Socrates

knew

that

it

know

would have made sure

who knows." 86 One

thing that

how

to think

was going

to

about and

be good

how to

(at least for

would have risked advising them

not only that

would not be bad, but

better than living.

And

significantly different

if

from the two

them

if

it

is

"But

I

am

we

at

this

that

it

to

is

actually

face death. If he really did not

good people), then

it is

hard to

have "much hope" concerning

it

would be positively good and even perhaps

into thinking that they

talking about.

all

he knew, something

were the only

would have

alternatives or

87

Ap. 42a cannot, then, be taken seriously.

are to imagine (as

not

all-important to keep in

alternatives he mentions, then he surely

knew what he was

His apparent disavowal
Furthermore, even

then he would surely be

to add,

he really thought that death was, for

said so, so as not to deceive

that he thought he

knew be an

these things, then here (as he often does during

believe that he

it

he

regard himself

trying to console the "friendly" jurors about death:
he

is

counseling them about
think he

'"

all

the

that he

himself and more careful about counseling others
concerning

it

abstract philosophical discussion) he

mind

He must

things; for if he thought that death
could for

damage

harmed by death and

promise for the virtuous that they too cannot
be so harmed, we must conclude
thinks these convictions about death are
pretty secure indeed.

Pdo.

some do)

that for Socrates the

88

immediately

preceding considerations (40a-41d) show him that he can (because of his sign) be
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own

certain only in his

case that death

(whereas for others there
certainty),

(4

1

we

is

is

good and

;

him) the Athenians will

argues that their

fare

life after his

it

(in their

much worse

39b, G. 469b).

cf.

be "helped" (Ap. 30c)

reiterates this

And

death will be a

than he will in being a good

in the

lot

reproachable (Ap. 4 1 de) attempt

me

worse without him; he claims

killed, that there will

killed" (39c);

{opOcbs}" (39d).

him

(40a-c),

91

So

we cannot

that they

he successfully persuades them not to convict
him.

come

I

assert,

this is all

to you, straightway after

in spite

because these

men

my death,

definite conclusion about the value of death

was

at the

a

me when

"aren't living correctly

of the alleged significance of his

be expected to believe that the

He

you men who have

vengeance much more harsh, by Zeus, than such vengeance you took
upon

me

man

subsequent passage he actually

toward the end of the dialogue as well: "For

[decided] to have

you had

life

cannot similarly discount his conviction
that by unjustly convicting

unjustly killed (30cd;

will

89

continued

only "much hope" (40c) or "good
hope" (41c) but no

b3 Cto. 50c) and unjustly killing Socrates

to injure

in fact better than

first

sign's failing to

oppose

time Socrates arrived

end of his

at

a

92
trial.

Socrates’ Confidence in His Ability to Deliberate Effectively

Also very
to

telling

determine what

is

is

the general confidence Socrates evidently has in his ability

best independently of an expert's opinion. This confidence

manifest in his resolve never to be persuaded by anything other than what by his

is

own

reasoning seems best (Cto. 46b): here he boldly proclaims that his decisions are never
subservient to anything except what reasoning {Aoyiopog} says

is best.

This assertion

cpqpi yap, cb avSpsg oi epe onTEKXovaxE, xipcopiav upTv rj^eiv eu0ug psxa
tov spov 0avaxov ttoAu xaAEircoxEpav vf| Aia f| oiav epe duEKxovaxs.
.
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.

.

would be unimpressive and
ever to divulge what

pointless if ”reaso„ing"-his

makes an

alternative the best alternative. 93

Not only does Socrates express
the correct decision

on

his

reasoning-were not supposed

this general

confidence in his ability to come to

own, but the Cr ito actually provides us with
a

instance of this reasoning process at work.
In determining whether

await his

unjust" execution or to allow his friends to
help

confidently

makes use of some

specific

best for

it is

him

to

him escape, Socrates

quite specific precepts about the just.

And

these

precepts are evidently accepted as sufficiently
informative to be helpfully applied to the
present dilemma: Socrates uses them to determine
that
unjustly

'

executed.

And

reservation, or perplexity

As
Socrates

is

I

to act

—

goodness of one's

(p. 75), the sole

soul.

that

ensure that one's soul
94

he considers

rule,

know what
would be

is

as virtuous as possible.

treats

it

as

He

open

one must

at all costs

confidently advises others

for debate.

One might

is.

But

if this

one might suggest, he does not

were

all

he were supposed to know,

as Socrates in fact does in the Crito

—

as though the rule in

question were helpful in making a correct decision about whether or not to remain
prison.

reply

of his knowledge; so he does not think he knows

condition of soul virtue

—

precept, then, that he uses in

in the Crito is that

to be an expert; for example,

foolish to act

fear,

ultimate end of action according to

The most fundamental

and he never

this the extent

enough about the good

—without

that he has arrived at the best decision.

have already shown

according to this

best to submit to being

is

he does so with complete confidence

decision-making elsewhere and specifically
strive to

it

But more importantly, Socrates

in the Crito actually

seems

to

have (or

he has) some very specific knowledge about which acts harm the soul.

121

And

in

to think

this

it

consists not simply in the

amount merely

harm

the soul,

to the

which

knowledge

knowledge
is

that unjust acts

would not

done contrary

that acts

the soul (for that

to

may

knowledge of good and bad

arguably not very informative), 9 but in
the knowledge that
'

doing harm to others harms the agent's
certainly

harm

soul.

If

he did not think he knew

treat the prohibition against

harming others

this,

he

(or bringing about

bad

things for others) as inviolable (Cto. 49cd). 96
If he thought either of these
precepts-the

one about maximizing goodness of soul or the one
against injuring others
seriously

open

for discussion,

97

then he would not at the end of the Crito (54d4-6)

his friend not to bother trying to convince

convinced of these basic points that he
is

—were

is

him otherwise: Socrates says

tell

that he is so

"not capable" of listening to alternatives! 98

It

interesting in this connection to note that the concept of
immovability bv

cou ntervailing argument
distinguish

is

precisely that

which Vlastos uses (1994, 54-55)

knowledge par excellence from the only knowledge

scholars think Socrates ever

avows

that he

to

and other

("elenctic knowledge").

Nonexpert, "Elenctic" Knowledge?

Some

will say that Socrates'

thinks he has genuine

making confident claims does not imply

knowledge about these claims. Many

so that Socrates does think he has

many

99

Many

will interpret the evidence

firm beliefs about virtue and the good, but does

not think that any of these beliefs constitute knowledge that

excellence.

is

necessary for virtue par

will say that he has confidence, rather than

understanding, about his beliefs due to his

concerning these matters.

that he

many

100

122

bona

fide

knowledge or

successful refutations of others

This suggestion runs against

much of the evidence I have

so far presented,

particularly Socrates' total lack ot reservation
in supposing his actions are
just (see p.
1 1

8 above).

It is

important to see that

makes confident

that Socrates

claims.

my

interpretation

The evidence

for

is

based not simply on the

my

interpretation has to do

primarily with Socrates' categorical confidence not
simply in
propositions, but in the ability he evidently thinks he
has to

fact

some

general moral

make use of ethical

precepts

so as to avoid error consistently and to give others
accurate and substantive counsel. But
let

us consider the "elenctic knowledge" hypothesis as

Sociates conclusions in the Critp; for

it

it

is

applied specifically to

can be shown that there

on which the hypothesis can gain a foothold, and

in Plato s text

Socrates' confidence in the Crito then there

is little

is

if

very

it

reason to accept

little

fails to

it

or nothing

account for

at all.

Irwin thinks that Socrates' frequent reference in the Crito to previous

conversations shows that his conclusions in his discussion with Crito are based on the
results

of successful past refutations ("elenchoi") (1995,

19, 122):

The

Crito claims
,

Irwin, "presents the clearest statement of the constructive role of the elenchos[.

(122). Socrates’ references to past conversations, however, do not

is

"constructive", unless

appear to)

it

is

101

we simply assume

not only that refutation

Socrates' only

is

method of attaining

(as Irwin 1995, 18

for Socrates a

truth;

show

.]"

that refutation

and others actually

method of attaining

we must assume

.

truth, but that

that the past

conversations are supposed to have been wholly refutative. Socrates does not describe
the nature of the past conversations he refers to in the Crito (he does not characterize

them,

e.g., as

"elenchoi"); he only says that he and others

certain points.

Why

should

we presume

came

that past conversations

123

to

an agreement about

must have involved

refutation exclusively, as opposed, e.g,
to positing and defense of positive
views?

say that the early dialogues contain no
such conversations, even

if

it

were

true,

To

would

hardly be persuasive, since that has been one
of the main considerations used in
distinguishing an

'early'

group from supposedly

begging the present question— simply assume

later

groups. Also,

we cannot— without

that Plato has given us a representative

sampling of the conversations that he imagines the leading
character of his
dialogues to have participated

Brickhouse and Smith

in.

cite

(1994, 24-25;

cf.

2000, 88-89) the same evidence as

Irwin does for concluding that the main argument of the Crito

chain of argument

[.

.

.]

against Crito

s

is

that the premises rest only

Crito continue to hold them,

it is

more reasonable

shown

inconsistent with those principles."

is

not "a straightforward

proposal that he should escape from prison."

The scholarly duo argue, "Given

that leaving prison

'early'

to

on the

fact that Socrates

and

conclude that Socrates has only
It is

true that after

Socrates asks Crito whether they should accept their old premises or reexamine them,
they decide to accept them.

that Socrates

rested

were

on

102

and Crito continue

in past conversations

facts.

But

It is

to

this indicates not that the

premises

"rest

on the

fact

hold them", but that they rest on whatever they

—presumably on

things that the two have always thought

also true that Socrates has "only"

shown

that escaping prison

is

inconsistent with the agreed-on premises; but such could be said of any attempt to prove

a conclusion with the use of premises. That Socrates uses premises that are not

themselves proven
them.

in the Crito

does not show that he has no 'non-elenctic' argument for

103

124

Success
of arriving

in refutation is,

at principles that

according to Brickhouse and Smith, Socrates' only

help

him

making

in

way

decisions.

Scattered throughout the early dialogues are a variety of principles which
104
Socrates plainly endorses.
Socrates' acceptance of these principles appears to
have been generated through his practice of philosophy [sc., in Brickhouse and

Smith's words, "elenctic examination"]. Thus,
variety of ways in

many

principles he has avoided

(1994, 129,

my

[.

.

he has come to recognize a

.]

which he could have acted wrongfully; by following
evils

emphasis)

Brickhouse and Smith thus explain not only Socrates' confidence
his confidence concerning other decisions, like the

arrest

the

his

he might otherwise have committed.

in the Crito but also
.

one against obeying the order

to

Leon. They concede that Socrates "realized" and "recognized" what was just

Leon case (128-129); but they think

genuine moral understanding,

105

that this

but rather

is

"knowledge" does not constitute

derived from convictions Socrates reached

through successfully refuting others; even here, they maintain, Socrates knew only
but not why,

it

was unjust

to carry out the order (129).

be derived from any of the ones they mention in their 129,
believed that arresting Leon would be unjust, and he

Leon, but the question

to

is:

How

did he

come

that,

They do not explain from which

convictions exactly the knowledge in this case was derived.

harm

in

n.

(I

cannot see

41

;

how

could

it

Socrates obviously

maybe believed

it

would

result in

even

to these beliefs?) So,

it

they

are correct in thinking that Socrates thinks the "elenchus" ever has such positive results,

I

do not see

how they

can be so confident that in

this case Socrates'

knowledge

is

so

derived.

Nor does
decisions

I

Socrates mention the elenchus as support for any of the other confident

have mentioned

(p.

1 1

8) either.

and Smith or anyone else has pointed

And

to that

there

makes

125

it

is

no other case

clear that this

that

is toi

Brickhouse

Sociates a

source-and
"elenctic

in

the only

source-of the knowledge he

knowledge" hypothesis

is

clearly supposes he has.' 06

The

a futile attempt to preserve
Socrates' alleged honesty

disavowing genuine wisdom: the
hypothesis

fails to

away

explain

the peculiar nature

of Socrates' confidence.

Disavowals of Knowledge
But can

knowledge

that

knowledge

at

we
I

so easily accept that Socrates

is

lying

when he claims

not to have the

say he believes he has? Vlastos 1994
thinks the disavowals of

Ap. 21b and 21 d are unique, because there
we find Socrates making the

disavowals to himself

"[.

.

.]

inmost privacy of self-scrutiny[.

in the

Socrates have said tojiimself

,

am

'I

aware of not being wise

.

.]"

(48):

in anything,' if

"Could

he thought

untrue?" (42, Vlastos's emphasis).

A

answer himself: Yes,

presenting in these passages a narrative that he

knows

107

if

Socrates

Many

is fiction.

is

few sentences

judges, to

whole

other scholars would share Vlastos's worry

he had promised, just a moment

truth"’ (42).

he prefers
nanative

his

whom

is fact.

promise

at

cf.

But why

20d and

at

"[.

.

Socrates

.]

earlier (20D):

Vlastos evidently thinks that that

on 48;

(e.g.,

Vlastos suggests the obvious

later,

responses to this possibility by saying that in that case

is

which

is

it

so hard to believe that Socrates

17b to

that if Socrates

in turn

is

I

lying to the

shall tell

you the

1991, 238) the assumption according to which Socrates'

tell "all

special consideration (1989, 40-46).

beliefs,

'Now

when he

an undesirable conclusion; for

damages

is

108

is

dissembling even

in

the truth"?

Brickhouse and Smith also think Socrates' disavowals

by pointing out

it

They defend

(ibid.) the

lying to his jurors, he risks

their souls,

which

126

is,

in the

Apology deserve

Vlastosian interpretation

making them have

according to Socrates,

false

1

unconscionable and, in

fact,

impossible for a just person. But
this

is

assume

to

that

(Socrates thinks) the jurors are so
naive as to trust Socrates; on the
assumption that he

one

that typically dissembles,

it

is

not likely that any of his jurors
are supposed to have

is

taken anything he said without a
grain of salt. Bes.des, Athenian
jurors were used to

defendants routinely making the promises
he makes (Burnet 1924, 66-67).
not enough, they had (as Socrates
Socrates' accusers to be

speaker

(

1

on

their

is

good enough

guard

lest

to

If that

were

remind them) just been warned by

they be misled by this cunning
{5eivo S }

7ab), and Socrates himself reminds

them of the long-standing—almost

lifelong— prejudice against him to the effect
that he makes the worse logos
appear
the better (18b).

We may assume that

would take everything he

Many have

Athenians

is

was

bright

enough

to

be aware that they

109
said with at least a grain of salt (see Ap.
37e-38a).

suggested that since Socrates in the Apology

his audience in an elenchus, he has

to the

Socrates

be

to

no clear motive for lying

to

is

not even engaging

them.

110

But his speech

surely part of his habitual exhortation to people to
attend to virtue;

during the course of the speech he makes the exhortation
again and again. Perhaps he
has found that the best

way

to exhort successfully is to

philosophy lor themselves, not setting himself up as a
a knower. Perhaps he has found that

she

is

an expert, they uncritically

discover

mere

why

“

trust

'teacher', but

to

engage

in

pretending not to be

a teacher tells potential students that he or

whatever the teacher says without bothering

to

the teacher's basic claims are true, and so the students acquire at most

true belief

belief

when

encourage others

—not knowledge—about a handful of propositions.

about Socrates' wisdom

is

1

A

1

little

false

evidently a small price to pay for being put on the

road to the acquisition of knowledge through philosophical discussion.
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1

13

(This

I

suppose

also the reason

is

especially,

shown

I

that

why he

should think, after a single refutation. See

we have

clear indication— in the

views about virtue and the good

problem ot supplying a motive
it

continues to feign ignorance even after
refutation-

—

n. 60.)'

14

But since

I

have

form of clear-cut avowals of substantive

that Socrates'

disavowals are not

for the disavowals

is

to

ultimately not

be believed, the

mine any more than

is Plato's.

I

am

willing to concede that for Socrates there

perplexity about virtue and the good."''

It

may even

is still

much

philosophical

be true that some of the

philosophical puzzles encountered in Plato's early dialogues are
supposed to perplex

Socrates himself. 1 here

may even

be some sense

in

which

it

is

correct to say that

because of such unresolved perplexities Socrates does not "know"
Perhaps sometimes

does not

know how

problems. If this

when

Socrates claims not to

to posit a definition

is all

know about

how to

virtue,

define virtue.

he just means he

of virtue that will not generate philosophical

Socratic ignorance amounts

to,

I

do not see any good reason

for

disagreeing with Gary Matthews:

[.

.

.]

Socrates thinks'

know how
know how
know how

16

he doesn't

to resolve basic

know

at all

how to

problems about

to offer a satisfactory definition
to define 'virtue' in

such a

way

what

virtue

define

is

because he doesn't

'virtue'.

He

doesn't

of 'virtue as a whole'; and he doesn't

as to

make

clear

why

temperance,

courage, wisdom, justice, piety, and munificence count as individual virtues.
1

17

(1999, 52)

But whatever Socrates may
or perplexity does not

seem

still

(at least to

be ignorant or perplexed about, such ignorance

him)

to stand in the

decisions, acting knowledgeably, and living a

to

good

life.

cause him trouble appears to be 'merely' philosophical

way of his making

correct

Whatever perplexity continues

—

it

does not cause practical

trouble in his day-to-day decision-making. (Likewise, an expert mathematician need

128

not conclude that philosophical perplexity
over numbers interferes with her ability
to

solve practical problems in mathematics or
with her ability to teach others

such problems.)
in

order to

1

18

Socrates seeks to solve these perplexities (just
as

know how

how

to solve

many of us

to act, but si mply in order to understand
the truth

do) not

and specifically

to find the solutions to philosophical puzzles.

Conclusion
I

conclude that Socrates thinks he possesses the knowledge of
good and bad

he believes

Chapter

is

III, I

necessary and sufficient for consistently making correct decisions,
in

showed

that the

goodness of his soul was Socrates' sole ultimate end.

have also shown that the condition of soul

knowledge, and that

this

in a position to see that

knowledge

at

which Socrates aims

is

knowledge of good and bad cannot

knowledge (through philosophical

I

some kind of

knowledge includes knowledge of good and bad.

that Socrates ultimately desires; for Socrates,

the pursuit of

that

constitute

all

We

are

now

of the

we know, adamantly

continues

discussion), in spite of the fact that he

thinks he has already achieved knowledge of good and bad:

He even

expresses the

desire to continue philosophizing after death if possible.

It is

natural to suppose that the

knowledge Socrates ultimately seeks

is

complete

philosophical knowledge, in addition to the philosophical knowledge of good and bad
that he believes

bad

is

he already possesses.

intrinsically valuable, then

it

is

If

Socrates thought that knowledge of good and

natural to think he

philosophical knowledge. Plato makes

him say
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in

Book

would have

V

similarly valued

of the Republic

,

"[.

.

.

all

T]he

philosopher
6.485b,

a desirer of

wisdom, not of some and not

other, but

of all" (475b;*

cf.

d).

*.
.

aAAa

is

.

tov cptAoooqxov

oocpi'ag

.

.

.

6TTi0u|_nr]Tf)v e!vcu,

Traaris;
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ou

TT\S piev,

Tps

5’

ou,

Notes
1

Indeed, some may suggest that the Gorgias hints
that it is a certain
"orderliness" in or of the soul. There are two problems
with this suggestion. First, there
is the reply that any talk in the Gorgias
of order is no evidence for the views of the
Socrates of the other early dialogues; many will say that
in the Gorgias Plato presents us
with a Socrates whose views are new and different from
those of his 'previous'
incarnations. So any evidence that comes solely from
the Gorgias is not likely to

convince such

critics. But second and more importantly, there
is good reason for
thinking that the orderliness of which Socrates speaks in the
Gorgias is just a means to a
further end, and not something that Socrates would consider
the sole intrinsic good. It
is pretty clear that order at G. 503e ff. is
something from which virtue arises; and virtue

in this

order

same passage

is far

2

answer

it

is

treated as a

from an ultimate end

means

(cf.

to

behaving

in a certain

way

(507a-c); so

Irwin 1977, 125).

Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 103ff. confront the same problem I raise here and
(106-107, 130, 133, 135) by maintaining that Socrates' confidence about the

value of philosophizing derives from divine revelation. I am quite sure that Socrates'
determination of the value of philosophizing was independent of his beliefs about what
any god orders; and his resolve to philosophize is based solely on that independent
determination. I assume this here and argue for it in Appendix A.
3

Cf. G.

508c

522c, 527cd.

ff.,

4

Socrates' attitude here

Republic VII

is

similar to that of the liberated cave-dweller of

who would "vehemently wish

whatsoever rather than

{c^oSpa (3ouAEO0ai

to [return to the
.

.

.

otiouv av

[.
.] to be subjected to anything
cave and] opine those things and live that way
.

ttettov0evo(i

qaAAov

f|

’mva

te bo^a^Eiu kcu

EKEIVCOS £fjv}" (516d).
5

(Cf.

HMa.

have already shown that Socrates thinks knowledge of
necessary for a happy life. I think that for Socrates (as, I suspect, for
304de.)

I

good and bad is
most ancient Greek speakers) there are no 'neutral' lives: one is either happy or
miserable; if one does not live well, one lives badly. Consequently, a life without
knowledge of good and bad would for Socrates be not only not happy, but miserable.
6

Socrates' resolve (Ap. 41b) to philosophize even after death (if possible) raises,

same interpretative problem for readers who think that philosophy is for
means to knowledge of good and bad. First, it is unclear in what way
knowledge of good and bad would be useful after death even if one survived it in some
I

think, the

Socrates a

sense.

After death, the time for performing just actions, courageous actions,

etc.

with a

view to acquiring good things is presumably at its end; how would the knowledge of
good and bad be applied in the hereafter? Second, and more importantly, Socrates
actually claims that philosophizing after death will be an overwhelming amount of
happiness (41c).

(I

presume he means

that

it

will result (immediately) in such

131

1

happiness, since he does not think that philosophizing

Appendix A.)

I

will

have much more

to say

is

intrinsically good.

See

of 41 be.

7

There was some indication earlier in the dialogue as well that
Lysimachus and
Melesias' interest in the wellness of their sons' souls was not
altogether altruistic
(see

185a).
8

perhaps, a

la

Vlastos 1991.

which he evidently does think (G. 473 de) and which

is

in

any case a reasonable

assumption.
10

which

is at least

instrumental and arguably intrinsic.

1

Benson's arguments against counting 41d as implying that Socrates considers
himself good are weak. For one thing, on Benson's interpretation, the point made at

41c8-d2 seems wholly unrelated

to the immediately following point at 4M3-6: first, an
exhortation to the jurors to attend to virtue so as not to fear death; then, simply a
repetition of Socrates' own reason for not fearing death. A more plausible interpretation

of 41c8-d6 would not divorce 41d3-6 from 41c8-d2:

first

Socrates

is

saying that the

gods do not neglect the troubles {TTpaypaTa} of good humans; then he
in his

own

case, (presumably)

neglected his troubles. His

is

by

'arranging' his trial

is

saying that

and execution, the gods have not

a specific case of the principle just stated at 41 dl

though

;

most of his jurors wish to injure him (41d8), they will (inevitably) fail. The passage
would not cohere in this way if Socrates were not including himself among good
humans, and the passage ought to cohere.
Benson argues that Socrates' admission that it is better for him to die suggests
that

he does not think he

suffer harm.
that the

is

good, since Socrates does not think that a good

(Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 121 reason

admission suggests that a good

man may be harmed

longer worth living, since Socrates considers himself a good
"troubles".) First

of all

man

could

in the opposite direction, saying

much that his
man harmed by

so

this ignores the very point that Socrates is

life is

no

making: Socrates

evidently wants us to think that the god or gods have so arranged things that he will die

and so not have

to suffer in a state

wherein he would be better off dead, which suggests

that Socrates is not admitting that he has

say (as he seems to suggest in 244
implies that he does think he

is

n.

been or being harmed. Maybe Benson would

80) that Socrates' mentioning of his "troubles"

currently being

harmed

(cf.

Brickhouse and Smith

ibid.).

such a way that whatever "troubles" he

now

But the passage may be easily read in
suffering are not causing a loss of intrinsic goods, but only preventing

maximizing of intrinsic goods. His
troubles {d7Tr|AAdx0ai
his talk in the

sentiment that death will give

TTpaypaTcov}"

I

cf.

T£ia}" (Pdo. 67b 10; Th. 174b)

evils {drrrr|AAdx0ai

Th. 176a) which require

in order to

his

"release from

think almost unmistakeably 'foreshadows'

Phaedo of "release from human

KaKcbv}" (Pdo. 84b3-4, 81a;

him

is

"much

tcov dvOpcoTTivcov

troubling {-rrpaypa-

overcome and thereby enable one

philosophical knowledge in spite of the body

(cf.

132

to

Pdo. 66b8 and G. 493e3-4).

pursue
(I

take

it

as obvious that Socrates at

was an old man, but

A pology 4 Id does

not specifically

mean

bodily troubles; he

was supposed to be in remarkably good condition
age (Burnet 1924, 66; Calef 1992, 289). Nor
(pace Calef 1992, 295) does he
certainly

for his

specifically mean the troubles that his prosecutors
are creating for him: he evidently
thinks (30c) that they are not able to make things
any worse for him.)
12

This is clear in the Gorgias too, where he characterizes
himself as "good" at
521b and admirable-and-good" at 51 lb. Benson admits that
G.521b does not merely
make a comparison as Ap. 30d does. The fact that at G. 521b Socrates
actually
describes himselt as a good man" does not seem to worry
Benson:
[.
.] it is clearly meant to foreshadow the Apology
and so it would not be
.

,

unreasonable to take

in the

same way

presumably, as merely making a
comparison]. This is supported by the fact that in the lines that
immediately
follow, Socrates focuses on the badness of his hypothetical
accuser and not on
his own goodness. (244-245 n. 82)
it

[i.e.,

(Benson does not mention G. 511b; but presumably he would downplay it in
just the
same way as he does 521b.) But whether 521b "foreshadows" Ap. 30d is irrelevant;
so
is

the (disputable) fact that his accuser's badness

is the "focus" of 521b. These points
do not magic away Socrates' explicit characterization of himself at G.
521b (and 51 lb) as "a good man". In fact, if G. 521b really foreshadows the Apology
we should expect that Socrates of the Apology would be as disposed to assent to the
statement "Socrates is a good man" as he is in the Gorgias And in the Apology

even

if correct

,

.

Socrates

is

certainly so disposed.

13

In this clause, the first "kco" (-'too")

is

adverbial, the second (untranslated)

loc. of Adam 1914 and Burnet 1924; cf.
984, 651-652). Socrates reports that on his search for wise men he found none.
This, together with his considering himself good, could suggest that he alone has the

conjoins "many" and "good" (see the notes ad

Smyth

1

wisdom he

said he

was searching

for.

If so,

it

would be consistent with

the belief that at

time there were other wise men. Cf. G. 52 Id: "[.
I] alone of the men
today practice the political things {irpccTTEiv tcx ttoAitikcx povos tcov vuv}[. .]."
least in past

.

.

.

(Contrast Pdo. 78a.)
14

1984, 268;
15

who make this assumption include Vlastos 1971b, 7; 1994, 4; Kraut
Nehamas 1987, 48-49; Reeve 1989, 57 with 150 and 179; Kahn 1996, 90.

Scholars

HMi. 376b; Lch. 185e- 186a with

16

E.g.,

compare "soul"

at

186c;

Cm.

154e; G. 503a7-8 with 503c8.

Ap. 29el-2 and 30b2 with

"self' at

Ap. 36c6-7 and

39d7-8; see also Pro. 313b, Lch. 186ab.
17

Though

this point is implicit in

least the following: Pro.

many

319e-320b; G. 506d,

1.335d, 1.349e.

133

5

made quite explicit in at
519cd; Mo. 73a-c, 87de, 93a5-7; R.

passages,
1

2d.

it is

8
1

1

Ap. 20b; Pro. 348e-349a and passim; Lch.
190b + 186a + 185a- Eud 273d +
274de; G. 515ab, 519c ff., and 503a + 504e.
19

best

except in the superlative "aristos", which

is

most often rendered simply
r
17

as

.

20

So

at

Ap. 39a7-b6 he says his accusers are "bad" and "base",
clearly meaning

that they lack virtue (cf. G. 51 lb, 521b, d).
2

have provided all this support for what I and many others
think is an obvious
point, because Brickhouse and Smith challenge it: they
think (1994. 124; 2000, 150)
that according to Socrates goodness and virtue are not
identical (cf. Benson 2000 243)
I

They suggest (1994,

126ff.; cf. 2000, 150) that Socrates is willing to call
someone
only the person strictly adheres to convictions justified by the
elenchus. (In
their 1994 they even seem to imply that someone could
be good independently of the
person's beliefs or their source
if only he or she acts correctiv e Whether or not
Socrates actually believed that the elenchus could justify convictions.
Brickhouse and

"good"

if

—

—

Smith's interpretation in any case runs against the Socratic principle that
goodness
some kind of bona fide knowledge or wisdom (see Ap. 23b with 29e-30a; Lch.
194d; HMi. 366d ff.; Ly. 2 1 Od; G. 459e, 506d, 5 1 3e-5 1 4a); Brickhouse and Smith

requires

acknowledge

that elenctic

Socrates in

caU certain

men

some

"good"

"knowledge"

contexts

who

not knowledge in the

is

strict

Socratic sense.

Mo.

94a, G. 526ab) certainly seems willing to
he clearly thinks are not wise (see Mo. 99b ff.); but these
(e.g.,

exceptions actually prove the rule, for in those cases the context always makes
(see Mo. 100a, G. 526a7-bl) that Socrates thinks such men are "good" only by

it

clear

colloquial standards, not in the

bona fide sense. There is sufficient reason to think that
Socrates considers himself good in more than just the colloquial sense.
Later, I will consider Brickhouse and Smith's underlying motive for their

struggle to separate "good" and "virtuous".
22

Vlastos 1991 and 1994

is

perhaps unique

among

those

who

take seriously

Socrates' disavowals of knowledge; for, according to Vlastos, Socrates does think he

has acquired virtue par excellence, since this
(1994, 61

;

but

cf.

my

Chapter

III n.

is

simply knowledge elenctically secured

13); this in fact is all

have accumulated plenty (1994, 62; 1991,

32).

See

my

he

is after,

n. 27.

and he claims

Though according

to

to

Vlastos Socrates' self-deprecating statements are genuine (since he means only to be

disavowing

certainty), Socrates nonetheless plays

listeners into seeking for

upon

their

ambiguity to goad his

themselves what he already has (1994, 64-66; 1991, 44).

In

spite of the often unsophisticated minds of Socrates' listeners, Vlastos is not so troubled
by the possibility (1991, 22, 44) of such disavowals being misinterpreted that he

considers them genuinely deceptive.
23

The evidence from

particularly

the

Apology

is

corroborated by other early dialogues,

by Lch. 194d.

134

~4

Kahn's 1996 interpretation to the contrary
puzzles meCare for the excellence of the soul [for

Socrates in the Apology includes
the
]
pursuit of practical intelligence or
understanding [.
Thus the Socratic
.]
conception of gpte certainly includes a
cognitive or
.

nothing in the Appfogy suggests that
virtue
identical with wisdom.
(90)

.

intellectual element But
simply a kind of knowledge or
B

is

For one thing Kahn understands "phronesis"
as practical intelligence or "good
sense".
This is the word in its Aristotelian
technical sense. But there is no
evidence for
mterpreting "phronesis" according to this
specialized sense, and there is every
reason
P t0
ne
USeS th£ W ° rd aS a s non
for
"sophia"
y
(see Burnet
y
1°9?4 n!
u t

m

Maybe Kahn

1924, 12).

thinks that Socratic virtue (sc., virtue in
the Apology ) involves
also some purely conative element such
as properly directed noncognitive
impulses or
something (for Kahn does not think that the Socrates
of the Apology would necessarily
deny the possibility of akrasia). But, speaking of
textual evidence, there is certainly not
much in the Apology for this type of interpretation.
25

It may be thought that Socrates
cannot think that virtue is knowledge because
he holds that virtue is unteachable. I answer this
worry in Appendix D.

26

In spite

something

of the generalization

at

Ap. 23a

human wisdom

that

is

"worth

actually, nothing," Socrates evidently thinks that
the sole

little

wisdom he

though human (20d), "profits" him (22e). In the Apology
Socrates
does not explicitly say how he is profited by this wisdom; but
we would not be far off in
supposing that his view about this is same as the one we find at Mo.
attributes to himself,

84bc

and

p.

27

of the

see

mv n.

32

109 below.

When

assessing what Socrates thinks of his

Apology ultimately

own wisdom

forbids us from taking into account (as

or lack of

some

it,

the text

do, including

Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 100; 1994, 30; Vlastos 1991, 3, 82-83, 237-239;
1994, 43,
n. 12, 58; and perhaps Benson 2000, 171,
179) what he says at 21b: "[. .] I am
conscious that I am surely wise neither greatly nor a little {sycb
8f) oute psya
43

.

.

oute apiKpov ouvoiSa EpauTcp oocpog

cov}." This

is

.

.

his first reaction to the oracle,

before he has done any searching and before the conclusion (23ab) he makes after
interrogating many (Kraut 1984, 271-272 sees this very well). Socrates' remark at

21d3-4 is more to the point: Socrates does claim to have a sort of wisdom (i.e.,
awareness of the limits ol his knowledge), but even this wisdom is apparently not of
"anything admirable-and-good {ou8ev kcxAov KayaOov}": compare "[. .] I was
.

conscious of knowing so to speak nothing (spauTcp
cos £TTos eitteiv}

[.

believed he

knew

assessment;

now

even though

.

.]"

(22cd,

that he

he

was not wise

is at least

.

.

.

my emphasis). Whereas
at all,

he

now

is

it

may

not really be

ou8ev ETnaTapEvco

before he examined anyone he

much

willing to caH his peculiar

in the final analysis

ouvrjSri

less sure

of that

knowledge "wisdom"

wisdom

(see

my

(20d),

n. 34).

(To make the apparent "blatant contradiction" between 21b and 20d consistent,
Vlastos 1991, 239 believes that we must infer that Socrates is "using 'wisdom' in two
sharply contrasting senses." Vlastos ultimately interprets Socrates' disavowal of
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knowledge as a disavowal only of certainty (1994,
64); in fact, the "human
that Socrates accords himself in the Apology
is, on Vlastos's interpretation

wisdom"
(1994, 62).

moral knowledge elenctically secured. Vlastos, however,
reads a lot into the text of the
Apology that simply is not there: according to the most natural reading
of the text,
Socrates' human wisdom is nothing more than an accurate
awareness of what
knowledge— certain or otherwise he has (Benson 2000, 170 n. 13
makes a similar
point against Vlastos). Contrary to Vlastos's interpretation
(1994, 62), Socrates in the
Apology is not prepared to claim that any knowledge has "issued from" his
examinations other than knowledge of his own lack of knowledge
about important
issues. It is odd that Vlastos chastises other commentators
for "emasculating" Socrates'
avowal of ignorance (1994, 43 n. 12), when his own interpretation of it
deprives it of
shock-value (cf. Nehamas 1992, 71, Matthews 1999, 45).)

—

In the Euthydemus Plato has Socrates admit that he himself
"certainly" has
"much" knowledge (293b) (cf. Mo. 98b4); but he immediately adds the qualification:
,

of small things

(cf. Ion 532de). (Cf. Lch. 192e-193c, where Socrates draws
a
between being phronimos in "the great things” and being phronimos in
small things" (on which see Vlastos (1994, 1 1 1-113)).) According to Ly. 218ab,

distinction

philosophers

(sc.,

lovers of wisdom) are neither wise nor unwise, but between

and ignorance {ayvoia}: they "have ignorance {exovtes

{ayvcbpovEs}" or "unlearned" as a result of it,
not knowing what they do not know (cf. Sy. 204a).

"ignorant
as

.

.

.

ayvoiav}" but

"the

wisdom
are not

since they regard themselves

28

Not only does he lament the lack of it, but also he portrays himself (not only
Apology (e.g., at 20c, 22b) but in many other early dialogues) as attempting to
achieve it. This may seem to conflict with the assertion at 23a that only the god has real
wisdom, which perhaps implies that only a god can be really wise. But not only does
Socrates evince some reservation about the assertion with the use of "kivSuveuei" at
in the

23a5, but also there

is

some reason

deplorable status quo.
1

to believe that Socrates is

Some commentators

(e.g.

speaking merely of a

Vlastos 1994, McPherran 1985, Reeve

989) argue that Socrates considered the knowledge that he and all humans lack to be
Benson 2000, 181-182 argues effectively

unattainable in whole or in part by humans.
against that interpretation.

The same reasons count

1989, 178-179) that Socrates thinks examining
that

we do
29

not think that

On the

is

against the idea (defended by Reeve

valuable simply because

we know something when we do

conceit of craftsmen,

cf.

not

know

it

ensures

it.

G. 452a-c (but contrast 51 1 d-5 1 2b). For

between cases of knowledge based on the value of the subject
matter, cf. Eud. 293b, Ap. 21d3-4. At Ap. 22d Socrates appears to be using "the
greatest things" in same way that he does sometimes in the Gorgias (e.g., 487b5,
527el), where we are more explicitly given (472cd, 487e-488a, 500c) an idea as to what
Socrates' distinguishing

its

referent
30

a

manual

is.

The reason Socrates seems
artisan's craft

to give (22d) for

why

being wiser than Socrates

does not count against the oracle's statement

each case that the craft-wisdom

is

is

that he

found

"concealed" by the craftsman's lack of wisdom
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in

in

in

1

overestimating the extent of his knowledge. But,
given Socrates' preconception (see
below) about what are "the greatest things" of
which

his interlocutors are invariably
clear that Socrates simply presumes that
garden-variety craft-wisdom is
not the sort of wisdom that the oracle had in mind.
After all, he says that all human
wisdom— including presumably the wisdom of craftsmen— is worthless;

ignorant,

it

is

and he shows
from the craftsmen and does not rejoice at finding
among them worthy teachers of the knowledge he obviously
seeks. See my n. 32.

no

interest in learning anything

3

Socrates' phrase

"oAiyou Tivog a£ia eotiv kcu ou5ev6$

misleadingly translated "worth

two

"

is

often

or nothing", as though Socrates were allowing
for
possible alternatives. But a more accurate rendering is:
"worth something little

actually,

n othing " (see

stronger word";

Adam

little

1914 ad

loc.:

Smyth 1984, 650 would

"kcu corrects

oAiyou and

introduces a

agree).

32“

But see my n. 26. Also, this conclusion may appear to conflict with his
opinion (which he even now claims not to have been "false") that the
craftsmen know

"many admirable things" (22d). Though Socrates may be willing to allow that craftknowledge by itself is in some sense "admirable" and perhaps even in some sense
worthwhile, he seems committed to the view that it is strictly speaking not good
at all

if

not conjoined with genuine wisdom. This interpretation is supported by similar
claims found in the Euthydemus (281de with 288e ff.), the Charmides 1 73de- 1 74b),
it is

(

the Laches

(1

94e- 1 96a), and the Gorgias (5 1 1 b-5 1 4a).

The idea presumably

is that no human wisdom is inherently helpful (in the sense
defined earlier), except awareness of the extent of one's knowledge. And even this
Socratic wisdom cannot, of course, guarantee optimal use of resources the way
I

knowledge of good and bad can
33

is,

some are in a sense "more wise" than others; see, e.g., 22a (cf.
where Socrates reports that the more well-accepted {euSokipouvtes}

Certainly,

"wisest" at 23b2),

one

(see p. 34 above).

the less adequate/decent {ettieiktis} one

is

likely to

be with respect

to "having a

phronimos disposition {to (ppovipcos

e'xeiv}"; whereas the more paltry {cpauAos} one
more "adequate/decent" one tends to be. But we may assume (pace Nehamas
1992, 81 n. 40) that the kind of "wisdom" in question here is of the Socratic kind: some
people are more aware of the limits of their knowledge than others: the "well-accepted"
people are less aware, the "more paltry" people are more aware.
is,

the

34

Socrates does not want his audience to think that even his

own "wisdom"

exception; see his reservations about calling his peculiar knowledge "wisdom"

and 29b4

(cf.

"wisdom"

at

at

an

38c3-4). Likewise, in spite of appearing to call craft-knowledge

22d8,

1

think

it

is

clear that he does not consider

it

real

wisdom

(cf.

my nn.

30 and 32). (This reservation is manifest even at 22d8: the use of the disparaging
demonstrative "EKEivqv" is similar to the use of "Tiva" at 20d7.)
35

is

20e7

Cf. Pdr. 278d.
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He

also had just mentioned (19b-d)

heavenly things

knowledge of "things under the

—the knowledge

agree with Vlastos

1

994, 62

n.

earth" and

professed by the natural philosophers.
But
53 that at 20de Socrates refers to the
natural

I

cannot

philosophers as well as the sophists. At 20de he
contrasts himself with "those men of
whom 1 was just now speaking {outoi
0O5 dpTi EAeyov}"; at 19bc he does not
speak of any men, except quite generally of
"someone (ti s}" who might be "wise
concerning things of that sort." Nehamas 1992, 68
too disagrees with Vlastos.
.

.

.

37

Likewise, in the Euthydemus, when Euthydemus
and Dionysodorus claim to
be able to teach, not forensics or oratory, but virtue
(Socrates assumes (273e with
274de, cf. 275a) that they mean they are able to make
people good or as good as
possible), Socrates says that they must have received
this skill from the gods, and that
they should be treated as gods (273e). It is obvious
that Socrates
tact

have

and

this skill,

it

is

thinks they do not in
just as obvious that he really believes that none
of the

sophists really has the skill (see, e.g., G. 519c and, more
generally, Ap. 23b2-4). But
what seems not to be a joke is Socrates' opinion that having such
knowledge would be
godlike. In the Euthydemus Socrates expresses the desire to
have this knowledge (as
everyone else who does not have it would too); and it would be strange

of him

express such a desire so unhesitatingly

if

he did not think he

knew what

it

to

was.

Socrates evidently thinks that poets typically speak in riddles, where their
"thought {Sictvoia}" is unclear based just on what they say (cf. R ,332bc).
1

39

In the
I

to tell to

Meletus

in court: "[.

.

.]

too in past time [always] used to

{eycoyE kcu ev
[.

Euthyphro Socrates says he wants

.

.]"

(5a).

t<£>

make much of knowing the godly things
eptipooGev ypovcp xd 0 eTcx usp'i ttoAAou ETroiouqqv

eiSevcu}

For Socrates' reverence for statements made by poets, see particularly Ly

214a.
40

Hence

the examination of the interlocutor's "life" (Ap. 38a, 39c; Lch. 188a).

41

Given Socrates' opinion at G. 501e-502d that the "art" of poetry aims only at
pleasure (and the implication that poetic statements are never really good but at most
merely pleasant),
claiming that

it

is

of course questionable whether Socrates was ever

at least the

deciphered. But for

statements poets utter are valuable

my purposes

here, this

irrelevant.

is

I

if

wish only

Apology reveals a desire
think the poets speak knowledgeably and coherently about.
Socrates' discussion of poetry in the

42

This

is

confirmed by the passage

at

really serious in

only they can be
to

to learn

conclude that

what most people

29e-30a where Socrates repeats his

show anyone who says/thinks he is wise that he is not wise (this passage
as well as 23b, 23a5, 29d6 show that Socrates would at least like his audience to think
that he was in the business of refuting his interlocutors, at least those who claimed to be
wise). The only difference is that at 29e-30a instead of saying that he reveals his
commitment

to

interlocutor's lack

of wisdom, he says

that he reveals his interlocutor's lack of virtue
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.

“
„

j

Reeve 1989 wh0 evident| *inks that
the ultimate goal of examination
y
of self
S
P t0
(< * re ' a n) the " hUman Wisd°
m " that
'

^

Socra,es sa V s is
most he has savs
says, 'h[.
i
Hi'"
HJuman wisdom
is, surely, human
virtue" (179, Reeve's
emp ases). Reeve is mistaken if he means
that "human wisdom” at Ap
20de and 23a
and human virtue at 20b refer to the
same thing. Soerates dearly admits
QOddiavL&
(some) human wisdom and clearly
denies (20c) having human
.

.

virtue.

44

Cf. Lch. 189e-190a.

my
with
^
worthwhile —nothing "admirable-and-good”
(Ap.
Th

,i

„

•

nothing

interpretation

is

consistent

Socrates’ allegation that he

knows

21d), since presumably
'

knowledge smtply of the nature of virtue is not
sufficient for virtue. I agree with
Kraut s 984 point (256) that Socrates would
think that knowing that virtue is
knowledge of good and bad is not sufficient for
(consistently) determining which
1

are virtuous (cf. Irwin 1977,
89,

acts

Nehemas

1987, 37, Brickhouse and Smith 1994.
61 );
but disagree with his contention that
Socrates thought that genuine knowledge
of what
virtue is requires such determinate knowledge
(254; cf. Irwin 1977, 42-43 293 n 2
Nehemas 1987, 37): I would say rather that knowledge of
what is good

knowledge that is required to determine (consistently)
which
284 n. 61)— sc., in accordance with knowledge of good

and bad

is

the

acts are virtuous (cf Kraut

and bad. Kraut's interpretation
from focusing on Socrates’ desire at Eup. 6e for the
identity conditions of
pious action, which in that dialogue goes hand-in-hand
with his desire for an answer to
the "What is F-ness?" question. The problem
with making so much of Eup. 6e is that,
as Penner 1973, 181 n. 17 points out (cf. Irwin
1977, 46;
arises,

I

think,

1995, 36-37), the Euthvnhro is
unique in that whenever Socrates elsewhere asks "What is
F-ness?” he seems to be
looking for a condition of s ouls rather than a property of
actions (though, as Penner also
points out, Socrates appears most hopeful ol getting a correct
answer when Euthyphro
mentions knowledge at Eup. 14b). At any rate, it would, I think,
beg the question to
assume that Socrates would not have ultimately been satisfied in the Euthyphro
with
"Piety is knowledge of good and bad" as an answer to his
main question in that dialogue
(especially given his hopeful reaction at 14c)

Kraut also asserts,

"If

Socrates he has that virtue
is

[.

.

(cf.

someone can define
.]"

Irwin 1977, 46, 295

n. 10).

a certain virtue, then according to

(264, Kraut's emphasis;

right only if "virtue" here refers to a kind of behavior.

cf.

Guthrie 1971, 137). But he

Kraut

cites G. 460ab in
support of his assertion; but that passage makes clear what Kraut's assertion does
not:
that according to Socrates if one knows "the just things {xa SiNaia}"
(sc., can identify

one

is just. Here as everywhere we must distinguish carefully between
of behavior and virtue as a state of soul. Socrates does not imply in the
passage that if one knows what state of soul justice is, then one's soul is in that state.

just actions),

virtue as a kind

46
1

think that this

is

the interpretation to

which most

Traditionalists are

committed: that Socrates believes that virtue is knowledge of good and bad.
agree
with them that knowledge of good and bad is preeminent in Socrates' thoughts when he
speaks of virtue; but I differ with the Traditionalist insofar as I think that although
1

139

virtue according to Socrates includes
all

other philosophical knowledge.

Presumably, the statement
interpreted the similar claim at Eud.

knowledge

ot

good and bad

—

is

knowledge of good and bad

virtue also includes

would be interpreted in the same way as
have
281de that everything but wisdom-understood
I

not "worth anything" (281e). See

my

as

n. 32.

48

His claim could arguably still make some
sense even
simply the human wisdom" that Socrates
says is

if virtue here were
peculiar to himself, since Socrates

evidently supposes that such "wisdom" is
"profitable" and necessary for happiness
unless Socrates has in mind something for the
sake of which human wisdom is
desirable, then those suppositions appear to
be baseless.
49

But, as

presently argue, assuming merely that he believes
virtue
knowledge of good and bad will not fully explain this confidence.

‘

But

I

is

The Euthydemus certainly gives us the impression that
Socrates' apparently
successful (282d, 288d) exhortation of Cleinias was the
man's typical way of exhorting
his youthful interlocutors (ct. Ly. 210). And if
that is an accurate impression, then we
must infer that Socrates' exhortation to virtue was an exhortation
specifically to
knowledge of good and bad (since the wisdom toward which Socrates
turns Cleinias
clearly knowledge of good and bad). Compare Pro. 31 la-3
14b, where Socrates

is

young Hippocrates to acquire knowledge of what is good and bad
noteworthy, however, that such knowledge appears to be urged upon

specifically urges
(3

1

3e3-4);

it

is

Hippocrates as means to a further kind of wisdom, viz. the "teachings
{paGripaxa}" by
is nourished (cf. Pdr. 247d, R. 6.490b)
sc., teachings in virtue of

—

which the soul
which the soul
51

^2

is in

good condition.

a

See Appendix A.
Since Socrates elsewhere accepts as axiomatic the idea that virtue is beneficial
Cm. 169b, Mo. 87d, R. 1.348c), could we not conclude that he considers

(Lch. 192d,

himself as knowing only that whatever virtue is we need it to live a good life? Could
be why he exhorts others to philosophize: because in order to become virtue,
one must first know what virtue is? But if this were all he thought he knew, then we
this not

would be unable
from money
53

?4

[.

This

.

.]"

is

In the

mere belief

to explain his confidence (e.g.) in the belief that "virtue

comes not

(Ap. 30b).

the exact wording of Mo. 71a6-7, b3.

Gorgias Socrates divides persuasion

{tti'otis}

and persuasion

supposes that he benefits
to attend to virtue first

at all

that provides

in two: persuasion that provides

knowledge (454e).

If Socrates

any of those he says (Ap. 30ab, 31b, 36c) he persuades

and foremost, he must think

140

that

he persuades by providing

—

knowledge—-and so teaches (G. 453d ff.)-that virtue
is necessary for happiness.
Otherwise, by his own lights, he is a mere rhetorician
(in
the pejorative sense).

Cm.

158e; cf. Ap. 41e and 31a3-4, G. 475d,
505c (cf. Ly. 21 lc), 52 d ff. It
no coincidence that in the Apology one distinctive
part of Socrates' practice
reproving" the Athenians (30a, 30e7, 39d, 41e),
while in the Gorgias
1

of course

of justice

is
is

the administering
"

characterized as "admonishing and rebuking"
(478e). Indeed, even in the
errors (the only errors possible according to
Socratic psychology)
are to be corrected with "teaching and admonishment"
is

Apology ^voluntary

(26a).

6

1 have already made a case for
interpreting Socrates as thinking himself good.
here simply assume that that claims about "a good man"
at 4 Id apply to Socrates; in n.
11,1 defended against Benson's arguments for thinking
otherwise.

I

57

But

this is rather less helpful than

ignorant but lacking in

power

to act

it

may

on ignorant

first

beliefs

appear:

It is

true that

one

who

is

generally better off than one

is

who is ignorant and has great power (This, I believe, is all that Socrates means
280e and 281b-d). But this should not make us think that inaction is generally

at

Eud.

better for

an ignorant person than action is (Taken out of context, the words at Eud.
281b6-cl
might appear to suggest this). After all, if inaction happens to be bad for one in a
particular situation, then the
as the

power to abstain from action is just as harmful in that case
would be in a situation in which the action would be bad.
Of course there would actually be many cases in which inaction is strictly

power

to act

speaking impossible. Acting correctly with respect to one's happiness

many

(if

bad

they are going to have this kind of correctness. Failing to

if

not

all) situations; for

many

(if

not

all)

is

required in

choices require knowledge of good and

make a choice can be
making an unknowledgeable choice. So deciding not to act in
require knowledge that one lacks does not indemnify one against lots of

just as harmful as

situations that

even

one has complete self-knowledge concerning one's abilities. If knowledge
is necessary for acting correctly, then it would seem that it is no less
necessary for deciding correctly when to abstain from action.
Characterizing (as Benson 2000, 245-246 does) Socrates' "policy" as one of
error,

if

of good and bad

"inaction", therefore, will not allow us (as

Benson thinks

it

does) to avoid the

conclusion that Socrates thinks he has knowledge of good and bad.
the

good and bad, then the various choices Socrates made

life,

If

—avoiding

he did not

know

active political

refusing to put to a vote the decree concerning the generals at Arginusae, refusing

obey the order to arrest Leon, suffering injustice rather than doing it (all of which
Benson characterizes as instances of mere inaction) could 'for all he knew' have been
just as disastrous as the more 'active' alternative in each case. (Benson believes (246247 n. 88) that all the exceptions to Socrates' "policy of inaction" involve Socrates'
to

—

daimonic voice or other divine sanction, and not knowledge.) Socrates surely
that successfully refraining

requires an

art,

from

injustice

— including

realizes

refraining from unjust inaction

not just good intentions or even just an awareness of the limits of one's

knowledge (G. 509de).
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58

So much so that even when some scholars discuss
the question of
Socrates thinks he improves people, they seem
not even to
acknowledge

passage (see,

e.g.,

Vlastos 1991, 32, 241-2;

Nehamas

how

this particular

1992, 76).

^

raut s 1
explanation of the passage is just as unsatisfying:
Socrates' great
benefit to his interlocutor consists simply in getting
him to be "bothered by difficulties
in his moral views" (225). Nehamas
1992, 76 evidently accepts the kind

of

interpretation offered

by Kraut and Reeve.
Brickhouse and Smith 1994 (roughly in accordance with
Vlastos 1991, 32, 241242) seem to go a bit further, claiming that his interlocutors can be happy
as Socrates

is

provided they partake in enough elenctic examination so as to
acquire as many
elenctically secure convictions as he has (28-29 with
129-130). But Brickhouse and
Smith gloss over 36d9-el in the same way Reeve does: They say, since
Socrates

(as all

humans) lack genuine wisdom he has only
(129;

a happiness "such as

is

possible for humans"

132-134).

cf.

60

The

actual identity of those he has thus

improved is immaterial to my point
follows simply from Socrates' claim he has made others "happy". But
who these are supposed to be is indeed a puzzling question. He surely cannot have
thought that he made all Athenians or all the jurors happy (in spite of the "you" at
Ap.
36d9) or even all those he had a chance to cross-examine during his life: He cannot
think that all those who have thus become his "enemies" and now "unjustly" wish his
here;

my point

death are the happy ones: the majority of the jurors evidently have not even learned
from him that the unexamined life is not livable (38a6); he actually says of those jurors

who

voted against him that they "aren't living correctly" (39d). In fact, it is a
commonplace in Plato's dialogues that, as far as we know, the interlocutors remain
unmoved by the encounter with Socrates; several scholars have noted this (Kraut 1984,
300; Vlastos 1994,

1
5 (in contrast to 1991,32, 241-242); Nehamas 1992, 70-71; 1985,
Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 4; 2000, 69ff.). Socrates himself reports that
the usual result of his refutations is enmity (Ap. 2 Id, e, 23a), anger (23c), aggravation

13; 1987, 48;

(23e, 31a), and grudge (28a, 37d) (cf. G. 457de, as opposed to So. 230bc), not the
admission of ignorance (Ap. 23d7-9). It is likely that Socrates did not suppose that

learning

comes about from

a single examination or refutation; he probably thought that

continual questioning (throughout

life) is

necessary for knowledge (see G.

5

1

3cd,

Mo.

85cd, Th. 150e).

Perhaps, the people he thinks he has improved are not
but

all

the ones he refuted,

some of the wealthy young men who follow him and abandon

other knowledge,

taught by craftsmen, poets, and Sophists and go on to imitate Socrates' search for a wise

man
were

(23c, 39cd, 37d).
right,

Socrates'

list

(33d-34a) of those young

would have been corrupted by Socrates

not) could well be a

list

of those

men who

men who,

if his

accusers

(but in fact, according to him, were

Socrates thinks he has

made happy

(after

mentioning seven of such followers (including Plato), he adds that he could name
"many others"; cf. 39c8). (This list is reminiscent of the list of improved students
Socrates elsewhere (Lch. 186b, G. 515a) requires from those
teachers.

Socrates

is after all

who

that

claim to be good

attempting to prove that he has corrupted none of his
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o owers.) Note that

polmcan

Eup. 2cd, Socrates makes the point
that

at

to start

it

is

best for the

with improving the youth; perhaps he
imagines that he has made
lens herself happy by improving her
youth (cf. Lch. 1 85a). At Eup. 3d he
does not
ot
P
even deny being a teacher.
It

seems

likely that the "admirable speeches",

which Socrates playfully
incantations {ETTcpbai}", are supposed
to constitute the discussing that
is
the hallmark of Socratic philosophizing
(cf. 176b).
(On "incantations", cf. Pdo. 77ea,
14d, R. 10.608a; Th. 149d, 157cd.) By
characterizing the speeches as a mere
means to temperance (in that, if one already has
temperance, the speeches are
unnecessary) (Cm. 158b, 176a) Socrates seems
to expresses the same view
expressed at
Ly. 218a, according to which those already
wise do not "philosophize".
escribes as

This perhaps

is

what also explains Nicias' report

that Socrates "reminds" us
acted or are acting "not admirably" (Lch.
188ab). It could be that
Socrates' knowledge of the admirable is
supposed to extend only as far as knowing that
it is not admirably to act
without first attempting to acquire knowledge of
good and bad.

when we have

63

Cf. R. 4.428b:
that

"[.

one counsels well {ou

,I]t is

.

.

.

.

certainly not by lack of learning but

ttou

by knowledge

apaSia ye aAA’ ETnGTrmq eu PouAeuovtcu}."

64

So Socrates' explanation for not entering conventional politics
is not, as Kraut
984 seems to maintain, that he was so satisfied with the Athenian
legal system that he
thinks he would not have been able to counsel the Athenians
better than anyone
1

else.

Kraut suggests that Socrates could not have thought of himself as a
"moral expert"
i.e.,
someone who can satisfactorily defend an answer to the sorts of questions that are
typically asked in the early dialogues" (209)— because if he had,
then he would not
have been so satisfied (as Kraut argues that he was) with the legal system of Athens
(247): he would have preferred a state ruled by moral experts like himself instead
of by

many

(247). But Kraut admits (208, 233) that Socrates preferred a state ruled by
moral experts anyway regardless of whether he considered himself one. Maybe Kraut

the

,

thinks that if Socrates had considered himself a moral expert, he would have made
greater attempts to place himself in the position of ruler instead of simply conducting

philosophical discussions in private. But, as I am presently explaining, the reason
Socrates actually states for not trying to become a ruler is not that he "thought that
neither he nor his followers could have done a significantly better job than the many"

(Kraut 232), but that he fears that the masses or other political forces would not accept
his attempts to bring about justice.

I do not deny that there were certain things about the
Athenian polity that Socrates enjoyed; but I disagree with Kraut's suggestion that, given

Socrates'

did not

view

work

that the

word when he says
is

moral experts should

rule, the

politically to put into place such a
that neither

X?' questions" (247). Plato

only

regime

way

is "[.

.

to explain

.]

he nor anyone else has satisfactory answer

in fact

makes Socrates give

143

why

Socrates

to take Socrates at his
to his

'What

a quite different explanation.

65

Th Socrates opinion in the Apology of his
own political abilities
rnn
consistent with what he is made to say in
the Gorgias
I suppose that [I] along
with a few Athenians— so as not to say
'

•

.

^

,

is

quite

:

hand

to the true political art

political things [.

.

'alone'— put

and

[that

alone of the

I]

men

my

today practice the

(52 Id)

.].

Oipai met oAiycov ’A6r|vaicov;iva
MO

eittco movos, ettixeipeiv xq
cos
aAr)6co5 ttoAitik^ TExvfj kou TTpdxxEiv xd
TToAixiKa movos tcov vuv.
In the
pology he tells Meletus that there are not many
benefactors/educators of the
young but one (25ab; cf. Cto. 47b), and he later tells
his judges that— and he alone (Ap.
JUe)
does the Athenians the greatest good and makes
them happy (36cd)- this
certainly appears to imply that Socrates takes
himself to be the only benefactor of the
young. Nor is it coincidental that the Gorgias (504de;
cf. 503ab) describes an "artful
and good rhetorician who speaks only to improve his
listeners, and at the opening of
the Apology Socrates separates himself from
typical rhetoricians like Anytus and seems
to put himself in a category of genuine rhetoricians
(17b,
.

A

.

18a).

Many commentators resist interpreting
makes too much of "ettixeipeiv", and neglects
Brickhouse and Smith 1994, who actually
Athenian attempts the real political craft'"

G. 52 Id as

I

have. Kraut 1984, 236

the next half of Socrates' claim’

state,

"Ah he

(8 n. 11,

my

says

n.

76

As do

he 'alone among the
emphasis). See also Irwin 1979,
is that

240-241 and Benson 2000, 247. Contrast Vlastos 1991, 240 n.
21.
The "Kcd" in 521d6-8 clearly separates two clauses governed by "Olpai".
"TTpdxxEiv " cannot be taken with "ettixeipeiv", as though it read: "undertake
the true
political art and [undertake] to practice. ..." (My point here is
supported by most
published English translations of the Gorgias including Irwin's 1979 translation,
which
Benson 2000, 242 uses.) Socrates is making two points: (i) he along with a few
Athenians [either past or present] try to practice true politics, and (ii) he alone does
.

succeeds in practicing

practice

—

"

If the

it.

Kod" in 512d6-8 were epexegetic, then

would TTpdxxEiv xa TToAixiKa" be a needless and unhelpful repetition of the
preceding phrase, but "movos tcov vuv" would actually contradict
"mo eittco movos".
not only

'

66

least

Let "listener" be a technical term: P
once to what S has to say about virtue.
67

Though Nehamas

endorse (la) and (lb),

I

is

one of S's

P

listeners =df.

listens at

gives us no specific reason for thinking that he would

cannot think of what else he has

in

mind

in arguing that the

denial of teaching implies, according to Socrates, the disavowal of responsibility.
68

at

Cf. Eup. 3d,

Ap. 20c and 20e

hand

to

educating

I

where

interestingly he does not

suggest that he

humans and

I

is

exact

really

even deny being a teacher. Even

denying only the conjunction

money

[for

it]

"I

put

my

{ETTixsipcb avOpcbiTOus kcu

XpriMaxa TrpaxxoMai}" (19d, my emphasis) and is denying only that he educates
humans as Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias do (1 9e). We are liable to miss that this is
the focus of 19e-20c and 20de, especially if we

purpose

in these

passages

is to

mock

fail to

recognize that Socrates' main

the sophists. Burnet
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1924 seems

to

have noticed

the sarcasm here; for he explains

20c2 thus: "Socrates means that he would assume
a
astidious and disdaintul air (and certainly not
charge so modest a fee as five minae) for
imparting the goodness of a man and a citizen."
Cf. Vlastos 1991, 241-242
Socrates sarcastically expresses admiration for
the sophists because they are able
to attract so many young admirers and
because they make money from them (19e-20a).
It is safe to assume that he
does not really envy the wages or even the admiration,
particularly since in this case both are undeserved:
His suggestion that the sophists "are
perhaps/probably wise in some way that is greater than by
human wisdom {Tax’ av
meiCco Tiva f| KQT avGpcoTrov aocpiav 00901 eTev}[. .]"
(20de) is also sarcastic;
Socrates obviously believes they have no more wisdom
than any other human he has
encountered. I suggest that Socrates' disavowal of teaching-ability
is a part of the
sarcasm of these passages rather than a reflection of his real
opinion of his ability. I
suggest that in these passages he pretends— for the sake of mockery—
to endorse the
following argument:
.

.

.

.

1
If I have the power to make a person virtuous, then I am
not modest but
assume a fastidious and disdainful air and charge my listeners a large fee.
2. I am modest and do not assume a fastidious and
disdainful air and do not
.

charge

my

Therefore,

On

listeners a large fee.

Ido not have

3.

the

power

to

make

a person virtuous.

this reading Socrates

does not seriously accept the conclusion here. (1) is
based on a principle that Socrates does not himself accept, but thinks that most sophists
do. Here he apparently sides with most Athenians who considered it shameful to
counsel about

how to

on the condition

that

be a "good man"

one

was popularly thought
freely

gave— such

is

paid a

that every

—by

wage

ruling one's household and city well

for doing so (G. 520e; cf. Pro. 3 16c-3

Athenian gentleman was capable of giving

1

—only

7b);

it

— and

counsel (Ap. 24e-25a, Mo. 92e, Pro. 327e, G. 461c). Obviously,

Socrates reasons for rejecting (1) were different from those of the average Athenian.
6)

that

The text actually allows a rendering
some may have learned from him:

that

does not even make Socrates deny

[.
.] I never promised any learning to anyone and never taught any; and if
anyone says he ever learnt or heard anything from me privately which all the
others did not I assure you he does not tell the truth. (Rouse trans., my
emphasis)
cbv pf|Tr| uTTEOxopriv prjSEv'i priBsv ttcottote paQripa pf|TE sBiSa^a5e
tis 9 r]oi Trap’ spoO ttcottote ti paGsTv r\ aKouoai iSia oti pf] «ai oi aAAoi
.

,

e’i

TravTES, eu (ote oti ouk

Tredennick translates similarly:

from

me

privately anything

70
1

".

cx ArjGfj

.

.

if

Asysi.

anyone asserts

which was not open

to

that

he has ever learned or heard

everyone

else. ..."

suggest that the main reason Socrates disavows being a "teacher"

term brings to the average Athenian's mind the non-didactic characteristics
here disavows. This

many young

is

probably also

why he

tries to

explain

away

is

the fact that he has

followers (23c, 33bc) as professional teachers do (19e), and

why he makes

a point of claiming preference for discussing with fellow citizens as opposed to
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that the

that Socrates

1

foreigners (30a) a preference not shared
by other professional teachers who were
all
foreigners in Athens. In the Meno Socrates
similarly focuses on those who profess
to
be teachers and demand a wage, as though
those are the primary candidates for
"teacher
(90c .1 -91b, cf. Lch. !86c and Mo. 96b).
Socrates is so anxious to dislcte
himself from that profession that he refuses at Ap.
33ab to describe what he does as
teaching in spite of acknowledging that some
may have learned something from him.
,

7

It may be thought that Socrates
cannot consider himself a teacher of virtue
because he holds that virtue is unteachable. I answer
this worry in Appendix D.
7

-

In spite

of obvious parallels between

his claim that he "really fights for the just
{tco

1 e ff. and 36b ff., one
could argue
ovti paxoupEvov unep tou

3

that

Sikcuov}" (31e

ff., 32e; cf. G. 521a3, 522b9-cl) is
of a different nature than his claim
never to have done injustice; the former claim could perhaps
be interpreted very weakly
to mean only that he understands on a very abstract
level that justice (whatever it is!)
must be done— without understanding (completely or in lots of
cases) what justice
demands. But see p. 1 1 1 above.

On

his claim never to

have done injustice, cf. G. 52 Id. Besides 509de (where
pointed out that avoiding unjust action requires an art), we have in
the Gorgias
independent reason for concluding that Socrates does not consider himself
lacking in

it

is

the

power (sc., the art) of refraining from injustice;
would be if he lacked such power (522cd).

for he is not

"ashamed" or

"irritated"

as he

Since Socrates thinks himself good, Eud. 296e-297a would appear to provide
additional support for saying that Socrates believes he has never done injustice
(Socrates surely would not say that a just person sometimes does injustice (cf. R.

only by being unjust that people do injustice (see, e.g., G. 520d; cf. 460b)).
Kraut 1984, 213 n. 46 points out that Socrates claims (Ap. 37a) never to have
vo luntarily done injustice; Kraut suggests that by saying this Socrates confesses that he
1.334d);

it

is

sometimes acts unjustly out of ignorance, since the qualification "voluntarily" would
(cf. Benson 2000, 242-243 and his n. 71). Presumably 37b is to
be read with reference back to 37a (as Benson and Reeve 1989, 58 n. 66). But the other
otherwise be pointless

passages cannot be so easily accommodated on Kraut's interpretation: How, e.g., is
Socrates supposed to know that he has "never yet acceded in any way to anyone against
the just {ou5evi ttcottote

knowing

oi/yxcoppoas ouSev irapa to

Bi'kcxiov}" (33a) without

the just? (Unfortunately, Ap. 33a and G. 52 Id are not even considered in this

connection by Kraut, Reeve, or Benson.) Furthermore,

if 37b is a reference back to 37a
must also refer back to Socrates' attempt at 3 le-33a to persuade his judges that
he has never done injustice (an attempt that at 37a6, after the verdict, he says was a
failure), and at 3 le-33a he does not acknowledge the possibility of involuntary injustice.
At any rate, by using the word "voluntarily" at 37a Socrates does have a point
even if he thinks he has never done injustice (cf. Penner 1992a, 162 n. 51). Consider
the context of his claim at 37a: The question there is over what kind of sentence

then

it

Socrates deserves.

He

is

reminding his judges that

stressing the point about voluntariness here, because he
if

is

he has not done injustice voluntarily then he must not

deserve a very harsh punishment (37b) whether or not he has done any injustice
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involuntarily (he had already pointed out
(26a) that according to law involuntary
wrongdoers are to be subjected to private teaching
and admonishment rather than
punishment). None of this implies that Socrates
thinks it is possible to do injustice
voluntarily; recall that he is speaking to Meletus
before an Athenian court, most of
whom are presumably convinced that it is possible.

Brickhouse and Smith 1 994 see the problem here well
enough; but
from satisfying. They think that part of the reason

_

solution

is far

consistently

"[

]

their

Socrates has

managed to steer away from evil" is that "[.
.] his elenctically produced
him with a number of fixed points for a theory of how
humans
.

convictions provide

ought to act (60). Since this "elenctic knowledge" by no
means constitutes complete
"moral knowledge", Brickhouse and Smith say that Socrates
does not have—or even
profess
perfect assurance that he has completely succeeded in
avoiding misconduct
(132). Rather, he has great confidence that he has never, "even
unwittingly, done what
he ought not because the great frequency of his daimonic alarms
gives him reason to
think that he has avoided a host of other evils"
(132); that is, apparently, Socrates is
,

confident that his daimonion has come to the rescue when his own
elenctically justified
convictions fail him either in being incomplete or in being simply erroneous.
Brickhouse and Smith 1994 think it is significant that Socrates never mentions
having
acted badly where the voice failed to oppose him.

Though Socrates does assert that since childhood his daimonion has been "very
him "even in small matters" (Ap. 40a), there is in fact no
evidence to think that Socrates is confident that his daimonion has come to the rescue
frequent" in opposing

whenever he does not know what he ought
appears to contradict the suggestion; for

it

to do.

In fact

would imply

what evidence we have

that Socrates' thinks

it

possible

do consistently well (with the help of divine favor) without having knowledge of
good and bad, which is contrary to his arguments in the Euthydemus (see Chapter II).
Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 239 have themselves argued against the idea that

to

Socrates thinks his voice would oppose
(Cf. their 1989,

245-254

for a generally

him whenever he is about to do something bad.
more sober assessment of the possibility of

making confident conclusions based on daimonic interference and
is no good reason to suppose that
Socrates would have considered the voice's failure to oppose those actions he ultimately
completes as good evidence for his thinking that he had avoided bad action.
Brickhouse and Smith 2000 concede that
[.
.] Socrates is careful not to say that [the daimonion ] always warns him away
whenever he is about to do something evil. Thus, Socrates cannot infer from the
silence of the daimonion that whatever it is that he is thinking about doing is
Socrates'

noninterference). In light of the facts, then, there

.

actually permissible. (152)

This

is

a significant concession; for they conclude that

when he reaches

the end of his

one" (my emphasis). Even

if

life

and realizes

we were

that

"[.

.

.]

Socrates has been lucky

he has managed to have harmed no

to forget the (still) incredible

degree of luck

Socrates must have thought he had in order to avoid doing injustice in spite of his
supposed ignorance of good and bad, there remains, for Brickhouse and Smith 2000, the
(original) problem of how Socrates can "realize" that he has ("luckily") done no
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injustice without

especially given

knowing how systematically
controversial were some

to identify just

how

Nehamas

“

to suggest (1987,

actions in his

and unjust acts-

life.

1992, 69, 71 sees this problem very well.
Nehamas once appeared
it was only Plato the
author of the Apology

48-50) that

who

confidently attributes virtue to Socrates, but
that Socrates himself would not
have since
eV
ha he aC ed thG knowled e pessary for
virtue; according to Nehamas
S
!
!
(49-50) pf
Plato
depicts c
Socrates as having consistently ("habitually")
acted virtuously
simply by pursuing knowledge (but without
actually attaining it). I think it is highly
implausible that the author of the early dialogues
would have put

mouth

into his protagonist's

a self-assessment (that he

contradiction to a view

espouse everywhere

virtuous but not knowledgeable) that is in
direct
(that virtue requires knowledge) that he
is consistently
is

made

else.

(It is

somewhat more

plausible (as

Nehamas 1992 seems

to

to

maintain) that the author of the middle dialogues
would later have done so, assuming
changed his mind about the necessary conditions for virtue.)

that he

Nehamas seems to back away from the
He now seems to think (1992, 71-72) that

In his 1992,

kind of interpretation he
Socrates himself was just as
puzzled by the fact that he consistently acted correctly throughout
his life in spite of
lacking the (supposedly necessary) knowledge. (I take it
that this is the upshot of
offered in 1987.

Nehamas point that [. .] ironists can be ironical toward themselves as
well.") But
why would one who took such pains to show everyone that knowledge is necessary
for
doing well make such a great deal of the fact that he was an exception
to the rule?
Would he not be running the risk that his listeners those he is exhorting to acquire
the
wisdom necessary for virtue and happiness would conclude that there is some
alternative way of reaching these ends? See Appendix D n. 2.
.

—

—
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See

e.g.

Vlastos 1994, 43ff.; Nehamas, 1987, 47; Reeve 1989,

54ff.;

Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 35-36; 2000, 101-120; Irwin 1995, 28-29; Benson 2000
223 ff.
76

Irwin 1977, 58; Nehamas, 1987, 47; Benson 2000, 236, 238; Brickhouse and

Smith 2000, 113.
77

See Kraut 1984, 246-247. The sheer frequency of such disavowals is
sometimes treated as though it were itself a good reason for taking them seriously, and
this sort of reasoning is sometimes (see Irwin 1977, 39, Kraut 1984, 247 n. 7, Nehamas
1987, 54-55 n. 37, Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 100 n. 85, Benson 2000, 178) even

supplemented with a long list of the various passages in which they are found (the most
explicit of them occur at Eup. 15e-16a, Cm. 165bc, Lch. 186de, 200e, Mo. 71b, 80d, R.
1.354c).

me

—

I

personally find disavowals like these very hard to take seriously. They strike

as they apparently did

transparent
78
It

shamming

many of Socrates'

(cf. n.

1

listeners

—

rather as instances of

12).

appears that most of the straightforward, well-known knowledge-claims

could be dispensed with

fairly easily.

of Socrates' claim that

is

it

For example, on a

bad and shameful

to

148

do

fairly plausible interpretation

injustice

and

to

disobey a superior

PP~ss
k

that 110 ° ne desires

and Ihat in usti « simply is
what ifbad
AndSocT*
r°r10WS
3 Se menCe ° f im risonment
«ile, or silencing would
P
be bad
d (Ap.
(Tn 37b
377^1
ff.) because they each
involve restrictions on
bad

i

»

‘t

,

philosophizing which is
necessary for happmess. Similarly,
one may know that for a base/defective
person it is
better not to be ahve (G. 512ab)
simply by letting "base" = "unwise"
and by Lowing
that wisdom is necessary for
avoiding a life of misery (and that
every miserable life is
not worth living). All these
propositions are fairly if not completely
unhelpful in
decis, on-making; so Socrates, it could
be said, does not think that knowing
e them is
knowing anything "admirable-and-good".
'

Kraut 1984, 209, 231, 256, 280-282; Nehamas
1987, 47- 1992 64 69
Brtckhouse and Smith 1989, 134-137; 1994,
21, 22, 36-38, 43, 46 49 54 131-132-

’

Reeve 1989, 43-45.
80

Irwin 1977, 43;

Nehamas

5

’

1987, 35; Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 54,
131;
further than these scholars. Not
ignorance are honest, but he also

2000
2,1 7. Benson 2000 would evidently go even
on y does Benson think Socrates' professions of
1 1

1

attributes to

A

fails to

him very

know what

thinks Socrates

ought to

is

feel fear

strict principles

F-ness

then

about knowledge, one of which

A

know,

fails to

for any x, that x

is
is

Benson's (PV

F

If

Benson

committed also to the view that "if A fails to know that
x
and shame in claiming x if F or in performing various

is F,

then

A

actions on the

basis of one's belief that x
this

is,

is

F" (126).

He acknowledges

the interpretative problem that

appears to create:

Such a

principle, however,

claims and actions,

at least

would appear

when

it

is

to seriously

undermine Socrates'

conjoined with (PD) [the relevant part of

which here is (P)]. Socrates ought to feel fear and shame for the things
he says
and does, given his professions of ignorance. But Socrates famously
does not

feel this

shame

way

[.

.

.],

or at least so

it

is

argued. (126)

Benson rejects the objection. He says (126) that Socrates does indeed feel
making assertions without knowledge: this, Benson explains, is why he

in

professes only to have

"human wisdom." As

Socrates does not even assert that he
feailess assertions seriously,

we

will

is

have already noted, he

I

good.

I

argue that

have good reason

to

if

we

take

later

all

argues that

of Socrates'

doubt the seriousness of

Socrates' professions of ignorance.

Socrates confidence about the goodness of his coming death is the only instance
of shameless or fearless assertion that Benson seriously considers in connection with the
objection he entertains on 126 (see my n. 92). The other confident assertions Benson

considers (223ff.) are more general and actually contain "know" or clear words to
that effect. He concludes (229-238) that each of these falls into one of three categories:
later

assertions about unimportant matters (e.g., not having to do with virtue or the good);
(ii) careless or vernacular uses of knowledge-terms; or (iii) deliberate use of knowledge(i)

terms in some less than full-blooded sense.
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(4aH^
father
er.

at hls

P resu mption

his

based on Euthyphro's action— rather
than on
uthyphro s claims about the piety— is
reaffirmed by 15d, where Socrates
explicitly
says that there is no way that Euthyphro
would have attemnted to prosecute his
father
he d,d not have the knowledge about
(

is

,

if
' f

Socrates presumption (Eup. 2c, Ap, 24d4-6)
that Meletus must have knowledge
is
based on his legal action against Socrates.)
Socrates' conclusion is not based
on any
Euthyphro actually makes to having knowledge
specific or general about piety
Euthyphro indeed goes on to make such a claim
(Eup. 4e-5a); but Socrates' reaction at
that point is simply a repeat of 4al l-b2
(see my comments immediately below).
So

9km

Brickhouse and Smith are quite mistaken

in saying.

Nothing in Socrates' challenge [at 4e4-8]
c^lbe justified onlxif Euthyphro can produce
pious actions]. The challenge simply assumes
['

•

-

requires that Euthyphro's action
general] knowledge [about
[.
.

.

that this

is

the sort of justification

Euthyphro actually claims to have. (1994, 48, their
emphases).
(They seem no longer to accept this interpretation in
their
2000, 117.)

Nor (pace Brickhouse and Smith
Euthyphro's claim to

know why this

1994, 42-43)

action

pious

—

is

Socrates' reaction based on

or even

more generally, why pious
actions are pious. Neither the "cos" at 4e2 nor the
"ottij" at 4e5 implies that Euthyphro
claims—or even that Socrates thinks he claims—that he knows
is

how

the pious are pious (or

how/why

it

is

(sc.,

why)

that

it is

gods are disposed as they are disposed).
the text
simply whether Euthyphro knows

that the

—

The question at 4e is just as it is stated in
how (sc., in what manner) the pious things are/stand (or how
Biickhouse and Smith's "how" is not the "how" that Socrates
Smith's reading

is

not even faithful to the text

is

the gods are disposed).

That Brickhouse and
manifest in their being driven (1994.
uses.

1994, 39-41 and 2000, 108-109) to gloss the word "how" in the text as "how
it is
that". Cf. Weiss 1998, 141 n. 25. (The same can be said
of their 1994 interpretation of
42;

cf.

Cm. 66d
1

(

1

994, 43) and of G. 509a (38-39;

texts Socrates

cf.

Nehamas

1

992, 69). In

all

of these

concerned (exactly as he states) not with how/why things are the way
they are, but simply with how they are. At G. 509a, e.g., Socrates is claiming
simply
that he does not know how
sc., in which way
these matters stand; he is not claiming
is

—

he knows that they stand as he thinks they do, he does not
why they stand as he thinks they do.)

that although

that

—

sc.,

—

know how

it is

82
"

Oddly Benson 2000, 236 actually uses the "very trying and intense
circumstances" of Socrates' trial as a possible excuse for what Benson suggests

may

speaking be a mistaken use of knowledge-terms in some of Socrates'
knowledge-claims in the Apology (cf. Guthrie 1975, 99 and Klosko 1987, 259-260), as
though the intensity of the circumstances might have made Socrates unintentionally
strictly

misrepresent his knowledge.
83

Cto. 43b; see also Pdo. 58e,

1

17c, Sy. 221b.
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Concerning some of these, there is some
temptation to conclude that since
18
UnlaWfU “* (e g " 32b6 32h8 - c
»’ Socrates k " ew
each case thaUh^act*
d be unjust """P'y because
"as
against
the law But it is
fmrt- f !i
unlikely
that c
Socrates would have blindly trusted
any law without making his own
n
a e me
)
h t er ° r 10t ‘ he
reqUired by law was ust 0*e Ap.
J
2^t^9 ^2^2
28b5-9,
4f!lT
s '7 cf.
32d2-3, rt
Cto. 46b, ^m
48a5-7;
Kraut 1984, 1 lff„ Weiss 1998 8ff
See
’’
)
Appendix A.
t

,

.

'

TlT

'

’

‘

T

’

The examples show that Brickhouse and
Smith 1989, 135 are mistaken in
claiming that in the early dialogues "[.
.] we find no particular claim
[about the
morality of an act-token] for the truth
of which Socrates appears prepared to
argue (to
he degree required for conviction) that cannot
be traced back to some source in
divmahon." (They attempt (135) to show (I think
unsuccessfully; see pp. 122ff. below)
that his decision in the Crito is no
counterexample; but they surprisingly do not
even
consider the cases of Leon and Arginusae as
possible counterexamples to their
interpretation. In their 1994 they argue that
the conclusions of the Crito are reached
.

elenctically (24-25).)

Given the level of abstraction characteristic of the
discussions
dialogues, it is no surprise and not significant
that we do not find

in

most of the

many of the examples

of the sort Brickhouse

and Smith mention. But

it is telling that in those
that do involve
Socrates defense of particular actions (the Apology and
the Crito ). we do find Socrates
prepared to offer the kind of defense that Brickhouse and
Smith think he avoids.

85'

He says that death for all we
does not similarly point out that for all
says that
86

it

in fact is not greatly

Reeve 1989,

know how good

1

14

is

or bad death

without knowing

bad (30cd).

aware
is,

weakness. But his response to
that Socrates really is not

it

that,

on the assumption

that Socrates really does not

Socrates' arguments concerning death has this
is

supposed

how good

know could be the greatest good (29a), but he
we know it could be the greatest bad; in fact, he

and shows that we cannot conclude
know. Reeve argues that Socrates can, even

unsatisfactory,
to

or bad death

assume that virtue must be pursued
of death, because according to Socrates the pursuit itself makes life
good and worthwhile. Even if this last (doubtful) point were granted, it is not an
adequate response to the worry concerning ignorance of death; for death may be such a
great evil that foregoing (some or all) elenctic pursuits (or virtuous activities) would be
a worthwhile exchange for avoiding death: Life may be bad without pursuing virtue; but
even

is,

safely

at the risk

without knowing

how

great a bad thing death

greater than the badness of a

life

is,

we do

not

know

that

its

badness

is

not

without the pursuit of virtue.

87

Weiss 1998 thinks that despite not knowing the value of death Socrates
characterizes it as good simply "for his 'judges" sake": "[. .] Socrates' conceptions of
death are not designed to be accurate; they are designed to lift the spirits of his unhappy
supporters" (31). But there is no reason to think Socrates has an interest in lifting the
spirits of anyone by pretending to have knowledge. In fact, there is good indication that
he would have the opposite inclination.
.
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88

Backhouse and Smith 1989, 263 actually take it
seriously enough to use
support tor their watered-down reading
of Socrates' bold claim at

it

as

41d1

89

As Backhouse and Smith 989

1
point out, this does not contradict
42a- for a
difference in value between two possible
lives for Socrates does not entail
a difference
in value between Socrates' life
and the lives of other Athenians.

90

This language may appear reticent; but it is
worth keeping in mind that
Socrates speaks of this hope in exactly
the same way in the Phaedo
I]t appears likely to me that
[.
a man who has really spent his life in
philosophy is going to be confident in being
put to death and is going to have
good hope that he will get the greatest goods there
when he has come to an end
(63e-64a; cf. 63c, 67bc, 1 14c)
poi cpodvETai e1k6tco$ avpp tco ovti ev
:

.

OappsTv psAAcov 6nTo0avElo0ai Kai
aya0a etteiSocv teAeutpgp.

cpiAoaoqna BiaTpkpag tov

eueAttis eTvoci e«eT

(3iov

psyioTa o’ioEo0ai

Now in that dialogue he

simultaneously appears absolutely assured that the
"hope" is
Socrates surely recognizes that a necessary condition
for being justly
un irritated at the prospect of death is not only believing
that he will fare well after death
(63b), but k nowing that he will that he will fare well
(cf. 95b8-e8). Nothing else would
justify the confidence with which Socrates counsels
(77e-78a) his friends to find at all
costs a way to avoid fearing death.
fully justified.

Burnet 1924, 170 says that "hope" in these contexts is a technical
term within
Orphic religion (cf. Republic 1.331a). He does not cite any sources
for this; but if it is
true, it perhaps suggests a reason for this language other
than Socrates' supposed care in
distinguishing knowledge-claims from mere belief-claims.
It may be objected that Socrates at 42a2-5
is not addressing those jurors who
voted for his execution. It is true that at 39e he begins addressing exclusively
those
who voted in his favor; but at 41e he again shifts his focus and addresses the other

—

There is no indication and in fact it is very hard to believe that, in spite of
the fact that "you" in 41e2-42al refers to the "unfriendly" jurors, at 42a2 he
suddenly
reverts to addressing exclusively the "friendly" jurors. Clearly an independently more

jurors.

plausible reading

would imply

that beginning at

42a2 he addresses the jury as a whole.
is no question that in

In connection with 30c6-8, Calef observes, "There

Socrates' mind, his
later,

when he

is the better fate (30c6-8)" (1992, 292). But only a couple pages
discusses 42a2-5, Calef seems to reverse this, explaining that Socrates

may somehow redeem themselves and "will find
eudaimonia and be better off than a permanently extinct Socrates" (294295). This seems to be somewhat of a stretch; Calef would have been better off sticking
allows the possibility that the jurors

(or sustain)

to his earlier statement.
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“

coming death is the only
Benson 2000 seriously considers in

Socrates' confidence about the goodness of his

instance of shameless or fearless assertion that

connection with the objection he entertains on his 126 (see

152

my

n. 80).

And

this

he

—

‘

explains

gnore
(see
see

away

( 1 26) with the help of Socrates’
reference to the daimonion Even
if we
of Socrates other fearless assertions
and ignore the problems with
interpreting
'
10nS taSed S ° lely ° n da
8
0niC
sition

all

At
Appendix A),

™

this particular case.

^ nonopposition

°PP°

,h
there

remams a serious problem with Benson's way
of dealing with
Even before Socrates' conclusion that the

daimonion approved of
shows the doubts or reservations
decisions (having to do with the trial)

his actions, Socrates never
expresses or otherwise

about the justness (and hence goodness)
of his
f Be " son Were correct

t rT' rr;’
Socrates

is

0n

the contrary, throughout the

Apologv
^

bold, defiant, and sarcastic.

Vlastos 1991, 283-284 cites Ap. 29a to show
that Socrates believed
independently of his daimonic sign that death
was no evil. Though I agree with
V lastos’s conclusion, I think 29a provides at most a hmt of
Socrates’ real beliefs Ap
30cd is, I think, the really inescapable piece of evidence.
For more on Socrates' view of
the informativeness of the daimonion with
respect to the value of death, see Appendix

A

20.

n.

93

Appendix

Cf.

A p.

complete treatment of this

mind

1

89,

and more generally the

rest

of Appendix A, for a more

issue.

Sometimes in the Apology, when he exhorts others to attend to
soul, he has
knowledge of good and bad as a means to acting correctly; but

specifically

I

think

have already argued, we are to infer that that is not the only
goodness of soul
Socrates thinks we need to be attentive to. Similarly, I think
that he exhorts

that, as

that

in

I

Hippocrates to look ultimately to the good condition of his soul
many such exhortations in the Gorgias

at Pro.

312b

ff.

There

are

.

95

6

my

See

Chapter

Kraut 1984, 26

as "to injure or harm".

claim arises only
against anything

75 and nn. 36 and 39.

III p.

n.

2 advises against translating "KaKoupyElv" in this passage

But the danger, which Kraut discusses, of misinterpreting this
are foolish enough to presume that the Socratic prohibition is

if we
we would

ordinarily consider an injury. But obviously Socrates has a
very specific view about what constitutes injury; so there is no danger that the careful
reader will make the misinterpretation Kraut worries about. Consequently, I see no

reason against understanding "KaKoupysTv" as synonymous with "(3AcnrTEiv" and so

means to injure especially considering that "injurious" and "working of bad"
{KaKOupyos} seem to be used synonymously elsewhere (Ap. 25cd, Lch. 192d) and that
Socrates introduces what appears to be the same prohibition at R. 1.335 and there the
,

prohibition
ttoieTv"

—
suggests
appear

is

against (3AaTTTEiv or Kaxcbs ttoieTv (note that at Cto. 49c "KaKcbs

= "KaKoupyElv"). And

in

"to

wrong"

in fact the translation

—would make

of "KaKOupysTv"

Socrates' statement

—

that

that

KaKoupyElv

Kraut
is

unjust

English to be nearly a tautology and so useless in helping one discover

whether an act

is

unjust.

I

take

it

that the statement at Cto.

153

49c7-8

is

supposed

to

be

substantive (again, in this passage "kcxkcos ttoieTv"

is

clearly

synonymous with

"KaKoupyeTv").
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Vlastos 1971b, lOff. thinks every issue for Socrates
(except, possibly, the
cf. Vlastos 1994, 30) is an open

view that all things are done for the sake of happiness;
issue— subject to re-examination (cf. Irwin 1977, 38,
1989, 51-52, 179;

Nehamas

71; Kraut 1984, 4 n. 1; Reeve
1992, 64-65). Cto. 54d4-6 (cf. G. 473b 10-11) calls into

question the seriousness of Socrates' supposed willingness
(Cto. 46c, 48de, 49e) to
listen to counterargument on these matters. It is
true enough that Socrates "is willing to
take up the argument for [his] position from the beginning,
if that is what Crito wants"
(Nehamas 1 992, 65); but why should we conclude from this alone, as Nehamas
seems
to, that [h]e seems to lack just the sort of confidence
that would allow him to present

himself as a teacher of this view to anyone else"? His willingness to take
up the
argument from the beginning may be— and given 54d4-6, probably is—just a
confident
willingness to refute Crito if he disagrees.
In attempting to get around the difficulty raised by Cto. 54d4-6,
Woodruff 1990,

98 appears to give

in inadvertently to the interpretation that

would

like to establish that

Crito )

still

he

is

trying to avoid.

He

although some of Socrates' moral beliefs have become
resistant to counterargument, even after lifelong examination of beliefs he is (in
the

open

to persuasion.

claim by adding "for a while".

But

He

in the end, [Socrates] is

in light

of Cto. 54d4-6 Woodruff fudges

attempts to explain

this last

this:

beyond

listening to counter-arguments, it is not
because the guiding beliefs of his whole long life are
singing to him so loudly at this point that he can listen to nothing else (54d).
If,

because he

is

certain, but

do not understand. If, as Woodruff maintains, Socrates more than anyone appreciates
is no expert, why would he ever allow these merely persuasion- resistant beliefs
to drown out counterargument? If he had been wrong (as he allegedly believes is
I

that he

would be ruining his chance finally to reach the truth.
Appendix C, I argue that the Laws do not introduce reasons

possible), he
In

other than those

Socrates had already introduced in propria persona, and that Socrates supports the Laws'
reasoning.
98

Cf. G. 473b, 482ab, 509a.

might suggest that the reason
counterargument

Someone

that Socrates

in the Crito is that

is

(like

Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 135)

not capable of listening to

he thinks that his views on these matters have been

confirmed by the fact that his daimonic voice has not opposed any of his actions since
his arraignment; so the "incapacity" is peculiar to the post-trial Socrates.

Not only does

Cto. 46b4-6 constitute prima facie evidence against this kind of support for Socrates'

views, but

more

makes (46bc, 48b, 49ab, 49e) a great
present stance are just the same reasons he has

specifically Socrates in the Crito

deal of the fact that his reasons for his

given in past conversations (presumably long before the

trial),

and there

is

no mention

of the daimonic voice, which would be remarkable if that were really supposed to be his
ultimate reason for facing his death-sentence. (The reference to "the god" at 54e is not a
reference to the daimonion. Socrates never refers to the latter as a "god"
that matter, as a

"daimon";

it

is

—

or even, for

an impersonal "thing" (Burnet 1924, 16). His

154

own

.

opinion that this

god

is

iqso
loon
145

the best course of action precedes
his opinion that "in this

is

leading".)

«

5

,

C£IS

,

nonex P ert knowledge"; Kraut 1984,
231, 273-274- Woodruff
and Smith 994, 3 1 36-44, 60; Nehamas
1 992, 69- cf
Penner 992a
'*

1

168-169

,

,

1

1992b,

n. 81;

23ff,), but

many

say

i,

is

constitutes virtue in a complete sense.
Contrast Vlastos
100

the

are willing to count his beliefs
as a kind of "knowledge” (e.g.
Reeve

o’
il’
nc khouse
14

way

1

not the sort’of tawkdge thal
'
99 1 (see my n. 22).

Irwin

1977, 37ff.; 1995, 19-21, 27-29, 122; Kraut
1984, 230-231 274Brtckhouse and Smith 1989, 133, 137,
160; 1994, 18-23, 27, 39-41. 81-82 127-128
Reeve 1989, 48, 52; Nehamas 1992, 69. Brickhouse
and Smith 1994, 35-36 say that lie
is certain of some particular
propositions, but that this certainty comes
only from divine

sources.

Cf. Vlastos 1994, 17 n. 51, 18, 55-56, 59

Brickhouse and Smith 1994,
Contrast Benson 2000, 3
1

1

1,

12, 29, 68;

n. 47; 199 1,46 n 3
15 n 392000, 75 with 89-90; Annas 1996
192
1

1

1

02

So, pace Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 24, something
question the premises; but they decide they do not need
to.
1

is

said about the need to

03'

Vlastos 1994, 35 actually claims that in the Crito (at 49cd)
the thesis that
retributive injury is unjust is a conclusion "reached by
the elenctic method." A careful
look at the text reveals that that thesis (49c4-6) comes directly
thesis that to bring about

(49c7-8). Neither thesis

bad things for humans
is

unjust.

ever to do

But given
it

from the more general
them) is to do injustice

the conclusion of a refutation

Socrates never explains in the Crito
is

(sc., to injure

this premise,

why

(cf. Kahn 1992, 247).
bringing about bad things for humans

he goes on to conclude that "there

because doing injustice does damage to one's

own

is

a need {5eT}" not

soul (Cto. 47d, 49b).

Here Brickhouse and Smith have a note in which they cite the following as
examples: It is bad and shameful to do injustice and to disobey a superior (Ap. 29b6-7).
It is never just to do bad things (Cto. 49d7-9). One ought
to keep agreements provided
it is just to do so (Cto. 49e6-8).
If one does injustice, it is just and best for one to be
punished (G. 479c8-480b6).
105

See

106

In

my

n. 99.

Appendix

to support the "elenctic
107

E,

I

show

that not

even in the Gorgias do

we

find clear evidence

knowledge" hypothesis.

Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 41 and Benson 2000, 179 acknowledge

possibility.

155

this

108

Cf.Calef 1992,286.
r

g

*

hand -; n ‘ hand with the

incredulous exclamation that he
anticipates
i!
M nnp
one of
U8b)
his judges making in reaction to his
account of

r9

o

that reaction there is

no hint

his peculiar "practice’" In

that the

imagined judge believes that Socrates is
on a
mission for any god; for why would Socrates
be "ashamed" in continuing a practice to
w ich a god had appointed him? That Socrates from the beginning
did not think he had
much chance of changing his judges' beliefs is established
by 18b- 19a (cf. 37ab).
"° Reeve
1989, 178; Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 101 n. 90'
1994 32-2000 osBenson 2000, 178-179. A related idea is that there is
no motive for continuing to
dissemble at the end ot a successful elenchus
(Woodruff 1990, 88, Benson 2000, 178).
In spite ot his disavowals, even Socrates'
own claims had apparently had such
an effect on his listeners, as seems to have been the case
with Nicias in the Laches and
(perhaps less obviously) with Critias in the Charmides
(cf. Penner 1992b).
112
“

matter.

It is

arguable

how much

Socrates actually risks deceiving his listeners on this

noteworthy that in spite of the professions of ignorance, Plato often
represents these as being disbelieved. Commentators often
name Callicles and
It is

Thrasymachus

connection; but even Socrates' friends and associates are
represented as disbelieving him: See Lch. 200cd, Cm. 176b, Mo. 71
be, Sy. 175d (in
spite of Socrates' typical protestations at, e.g., Ap. 23a, Lch.
200e, Cm. 165b).
(I cannot agree with Vlastos 1991, 36 ff. that in
the Symposium Alcibiades does
not accuse Socrates of intentional misrepresentation Contrary to Vlastos's
in this

.

interpretation, Alcibiades is not implying that Socrates

speaking honestly (and just
literal sense); even after Socrates turns him down,
convinced that Socrates has knowledge (217a, 21 8d, 219de, 222a) that he
is

using words in a different but

Alcibiades

is

intentionally conceals (216e; instead of being "serious" with people, he "plays" with

them) behind feigned sexual

interest (216d, 222b) and ridiculous-sounding arguments
(221e-222a); as Alcibiades reports, Socrates flatly denies (216d, 219a) that he does have
knowledge, thereby denying that he conceals it.)

'

If

what

I

have said so

far is true, Socrates has

obvious motives for improving

others at least inasmuch as they accept the need to acquire knowledge of good and bad.
If they agree with him that philosophizing is necessary, they will first of all be less
likely to

do things

to obstruct his

own

attempt to get more knowledge through

philosophizing. Moreover, if he improves others to

have better partners

in a

common

at least this extent,

effort to solve philosophical

perplex him and generally to discover more philosophical
1

he will thereby

problems

that continue to

truth.

14

It is, I suspect, mostly out of habit that Socrates maintains the pretence of
complete ignorance about virtue and the good. We have after all at least two texts that

represent Socrates as offering his usual disclaimers apparently only as an afterthought:

156

G. 509a (see Dodds 1959 ad
Matthews 1999, 74).

loc.; contrast

Vlastos 1994 33

n. 6)

and R. 1.354bc (see

115

Penner offers some provocative suggestions
as to what philosophical
problems Socrates had not resolved
(1992a, 146; 1992b, 24 n. 38) I of course
disagree
that the problem of what is
happiness is one of these.

Ma hews here has ln mind the claim of ignorance at Mo.
71b; but Matthews
£
be offering
an account of Socratic ignorance that is
supposed to explain similar
ms of ignorance. Matthews would not agree with my
characterization of Socratic
perplexity as merely" philosophical; Matthews
does not think that Socrates considers
himself a moral expert.
c

eems

*

to

Penner too offers
according to which
good.
118

I

may

( 1

992a,

1

39ff.;

1

grant that Socrates

My example here

is

992b, 23ff.) an account of "know”
is

thus "ignorant" about virtue and the

inspired by Matthews' discussion of Socratic
ignorance.

157

CHAPTER V
THE VALUE OF DEATH

have already explained

I

(p.

118)

why we must conclude

that Socrates believed

he had k nowledge about the value, not
just of his death, but of the death
of any virtuous
person.

I

have argued

that according to Socrates death

either as an intrinsically

technical sense of

bad thing or as something

"damage" defined on

right that the sole ultimate

how can

end

p. 68).

for Socrates is

that

But

is

a

mere bogey, not

can cause damage

this generates a

to be feared

(in the

problem:

If

maximizing the goodness of his

am

I

soul, then

Socrates not acknowledge the possibility that the
death could damage him?

death could obliterate the soul

goodness

(e.g.)

by removing

feared as something

(cf.

Pdo. 70a, 77b, 84b) or otherwise damage

all intellectual

greatly bad"? (The

capacity

(cf.

Pdo. 70b),

is this

If

its

not to be

Phaedo actually portrays Socrates

as

considering both worries in need of serious response.) Without
having an answer to the

worry

that death destroys the soul

that death renders

it

(presumably the most prevalent view of the time) or
1

"mindless" (the Homeric view), Socrates cannot think he

is in

a

position to offer meaningful consolation to the virtuous. But he evidently does
think so.

We

therefore cannot completely account for Socrates' claims about the invulnerability

of the virtuous unless

we

can explain

nothing for the virtuous to

So
here

we

I

want now

why he

thought the possibility of death was

fear.

to look further into

what he thought he knew about death;

for

will find not only an explanation of Socrates' fearless attitude toward death

which he counsels others

to share, but also corroboration

158

of my interpretation

that

Socrates' ultimate end
attitude

death:

is

philosophical knowledge.

toward death conies from a decided,

He does

not think, as presumably

that death involves destruction or

not "greatly bad" because

it

show

will

fairly detailed

many

damage

I

that Socrates' fearless

view about the nature of

or most of his contemporaries
thought,

to the soul;

on the contrary, death not only

leaves the soul intact and undamaged,
but

bring about the greatest good because

is

actually helps

it

holds forth the possibility of finally attaining

it

perfectly that condition of soul that Socrates
ultimately desires.

This view makes
death

may

its first

appearance

turn out "to be, for the

human,

fact,

all

Apology when Socrates suggests

the greatest of all the

TTavTcov pEyioTov ov tcov aya0cbv}"
similarly bother to point out that for

in the

(29a). This

we know

he makes a great deal ot the point that

is

it

goods {tco dv0pcb7Tcp

telling

is

that

because he does not

death could be the greatest bad;

in

not greatly bad (30cd). The popular

conception ot death as the greatest of bad things (29a8-bl, 40a8)~ cannot, Socrates
says,
be correct (40b8-cl

;

cf.

30d2-4). Later, he assures us that there

death's being a positively

good thing

(40c;

actually be "happier" than the living (41c).

better (at least,

least

everyone

But

I

whenever

who

is

it

happens

to

3

4

"much hope" of

who have

died

may

pretty clearly indicates that death

for

him but

is

for everyone (or at

"good").

want here

to suggest that Socrates' claim at

way of attaining what

never expressly claims, as he does
result in the greatest

He

come) not just

proposition about death's instrumental value:

only or best

41c8-9); those

cf.

is

is

He

is

29a

meant

to express a

suggesting that dying

ultimately valuable.

in the

is

Though

in the

may

be the

Apology he

5

Phaedo, that death will (as opposed

of human goods, the Ap. 29a passage

159

is

to:

a clue to Socrates'

may )

1

considered view even in the Apology he really
does think that getting the greatest of all
:

goods involves dying.

I

will present

however, a controversy needs

to

good

textual evidence for this interpretation.
First,

be resolved.

Socrates in the Apology, in contrast to the character of
the same

middle dialogues and even

in the

Gorgias and Meno,

view about the nature of death;

specific

There seem to be two main reasons for

seems

to

in fact,

is

in the

often thought not to have a

thought to be agnostic about

First, there are

passages in which he

disavow knowledge about the nature and value of death (29ab, 37b5-7,

two quite

[.

.

6
it.

7

this.

Second, in his discussion of the nature of death
are

he

is

name

in the

Apology he seems

42a).

to think there

different possibilities:

T]o have died

one of two things: for either it's like nothing and the one
has died doesn't have any sensation of anything either, or [. .] it happens

.

who

is

.

be for the soul some alteration and a migration {peToiKqois} 8 from

to

this place

here to another place. (40c)*

The

first

alternative

might be expressed

The second might be expressed

its

following way.

After one's body dies, one's mental faculties no longer function. 9

DN:

DM

in the

:

thus:

After one's body dies, one's soul leaves the body and goes to a place where

mental faculties are fully functional.

But the evidence,

I

believe, weighs

10

more heavily

in favor

of attributing to the

Socrates of the Apology the view about death that he more clearly espouses in

dialogues:

DM.

main concern

1

Why,

at this

'later'

then, does Socrates offer the other alternative at 40c? Socrates'

point in the Apology (40a

show

to

ff.) is

his audience that dying

Oorrepov eotiv to TE0vdvar r) yap olou pqbev slvai pqbs a’iopETa(3oAf) tis TuyxavEi
Oqoiv pqbEplav pqSEVos exeiv tov teOvegotq, r)
tou
ev0ev5e
tottou
toO
eis aAAov tottov.
tt)
ouaa Kai pETOiKpaig
yuxo
*5uoTv

.

.

.

.

160

.

.

now will
believe

be not bad but positively good for
him. Most ordinary Athenians
did not

we

survive death in any personally
meaningful way:

would have accepted
fanciful.

12

Socrates'

first

it

seems possible

was not agnostic about death, but
this

body and place

alternative

may

worry (with,

his

argument (and may even have stopped

had simply disregarded a very popular
conception of death. Once we

appreciate this,

from

(perhaps, most)

characterization of death and rejected
the other as

They would not have followed

listening) if he

many

that in the

Apology

really expected

it

,

just as in the Phaedo, Socrates

to consist in the soul's "migrating"

to another "place"; his reason for

not have been that he really considered

e.g.,

Calef 1992, 286) that on

this

it

acknowledging the other

a possibility.

13

We

need not

kind of interpretation Socrates

is

intentionally misrepresenting to his audience his views
about the nature of death, unless

we suppose

that Socrates did not expect his listeners (particularly
the potentially

virtuous ones) to figure out for themselves which alternative
he really favored.

But there are positive reasons
dialogues;

some of these come

(44b and 54bc).

First,

that he will "arrive at

for attributing

when one

to light

DM to the Socrates of the early

considers two passages in the Crito

Socrates obviously puts stock in his dream in which

loamy Phthia on

the third day"

uses in the Iliad (9.363) to

mean

three days. Evidently, this

dream convinces Socrates

(counting the present day as the

At the very

about the nature and value of death that
Socrates' faith in

it

home

14

after death,

show

(44b)—the same words

that he will (Poseidon willing) arrive

first).

rise

it is

home

foretold

Achilles

within

that he will die "on the third day"

least, this

passage reveals beliefs

above mere agnosticism. The dream and

that he believes that he (sc., his soul) will at last find his true

clear indication of an expectation that death results in something

161

positively good.

But

conclude more than

to

from the 44b passage alone would
be

this

controversial; the comparison of dying
to arriving
different interpretations.

I

am

home

is

by

itself surely

open

to

inclined to say that the comparison
indicates that he

believes that death involves the soul's
migration from this place to another
place Gust as
Achilles'

voyage home

to Phthia would),

where

it

will continue to

have conscious

experiences, in fact better experiences, as one
would naturally expect to have on

home

arriving

showing
soul

1

"

But some

we have more

Socrates views in the Crito

that,

when he has

have

to

answer

.

than just 44b on which to base an interpretation of

Later on in the dialogue Socrates reveals his expectation 16

to the rulers there

show

for his behavior here in this

that Socrates thinks his true

this

world

death that Socrates discusses in the Apology

whole,
jurors

is

i.e.,

who

case, since

for the

Apology passages

significant that

all

ano 8 ppf)op$}",

he will

17

he will encounter other individuals;

As

comparison as

of final resting place where the

died and goes "abroad to Hades {E 15 "Ai5ou

passages from the Crito

it

interpret the

allowed to sleep dreamlessly.

Luckily,

death,

may

that Socrates thinks of death rather as a
kind

finally

is

after a long journey.

in

is

the

world (54bc). The two

home

is

an afterworld where

Hades of the second view about

18
.

which he supposedly expresses ignorance of

of these passages occur within his speech

to the jury as a

outside the "pleasant discussion" (39e-41d) Socrates reserves for those

voted in his favor

I

have shown

specific nature of death

whom

he considers almost friends (40al ).

that he appears not only to be

(DM)

committed

to a

19

But

in

any

view about the

but also to consider himself knowledgeable enough about

the value of death to counsel others and to

make
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confident decision for his

own

part (see

p. 118),

we may

dismiss these disclaimers as examples
of Socrates' typical coyness

in

admitting to have knowledge. 20
Lastly,

endorsed

and perhaps most importantly, a further
reason

for thinking that Socrates

DM rather than DN—and actually thought he knew that DM was true—

he was confident that death could not damage
him. Attributing
explain this fearlessness
indecisiveness between

DM

is true,

he

is

much

DN and DM.

not (by his

think about death or

own

will survive bodily death

he believes not just that

goods" (as he suggests

at

decisions concerning

that Socrates in the

and

will continue to

it

is

Ap. 29a,

that

Hades he might well

is

it

something

counsel anyone about

like

how

to

it.

Apology believes

that

have an intellectual

my emphasis),

not horn a belie! that departing the body

arrives in

him agnosticism and

epistemically possible that death

confidence that the soul's migration will for

when he

DM to Socrates would

Without thinking he knew

lights) in a position to

how to make

Having established

that

better than attributing to

that

is

but that

it is

we

life, I

"

is

our souls

will

now show

greatest of

in fact true.

all

the

His

be a positively good thing evidently stems

good

find "all

in itself, but

from

men who have

his expectation that

died" (40e); for

if this is

"could/would there be any greater good than that (t( peT^ov dyccOov toutou eip

true,

av}[.

.]?" (40e),

.

he asks rhetorically. This

is

why

I

think that Socrates considers death

only instrumentally good; for him death will lead to the greatest of all goods.

But what exactly
merely meeting

all

those

is

the

good

who have

to

which Socrates believes death

will lead?

Is

it

died? Having the entire passage before us will be

helpful.

For

if,

having arrived

in

Hades, having been released from these

assert they are Adjudicators,

men

here

who

one will find the true Adjudicators who are also
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said to adjudicate there— Minos
and Rhadamanthys and Aeacus and
Tnptolemus and however many other of the
demigods who had been just in their
own life— would this going abroad be paltry?
Or, again, how much would any
of you give to be with Orpheus and Musaeus
and

wi

mg

to die

many

Hesiod and Homer? For

times

if

I

am

those things are true; for spending time
there would

be wonderful for me myself at least, since
I would chance on
Palamedes and
jax the son of Telamon and any other of the
men of long ago who has died
because of an unjust judgment, laying my
experiences side by side against the
ones of those men. I suppose it would not be
unpleasant. And surely
the

would be examining and questioning the men there
just as I pass
time with the men here as to who of them is wise
and who supposes that he is
but is not. And how much, men of the Judiciary,
would anyone give to examine
the man who led the great army against Troy,
or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or ten
greatest thing

—

thousand other ones one might speak of, both men and
women there,
would be an overwhelming {apf| avov 21 [amount] of
happiness

X

with and to be with and to examine?

We

should note

good

first that this

that Socrates believes

good just

passage makes

we

40 e- 41 c)*

it

absolutely clear that whatever

will experience after death,

for those already dead: First recall that he

is

it

is

trying to

;

times

if

after death

show why
is

life (cf.

the

it is

a

good

"willing to die

he will be with such illustrious people. Dying

involve an improvement over

is

not supposed to be a

thing t o die secondly, he explicitly says in the above passage that he

many

it

to discuss

}

(

whom

is

supposed

to

41 c).

ei yap tis cupiKoqEvos eis
Ai 8 ou, auaAAayEis xouxcovi tcov cpaoKovtcov 8 iKaoxcbv slvai, Eupijosi tou$ cos aAq0cbs SiKaoxas, oitrsp Kai AsyovTai
ekeT 8ikci£eiv, Mivcos te Kai 'Pa5apav0us Kai AIokos Ka'i TpiuxoAspos Kai aAAoi 6001 tcov i)|_u0£cov SiKaioi syEvovxo ev tco sauxcbv (3(cp, apa auAq av sip
9
q atroSppia; fj au ’OpcpsT ouyyEVEo0ai Ka'i Mouoaicp Ka'i 'HoioScp Kai 'Opijpcp

uoocp av

av upcbv; sycb psv yap uoAAaKis e0eAco TE0vavai si
tout’ eotiv aAp0fj. ettei Epoiys Ka'i auTcp 0aupaaTf] av eip ij 5iaTpi(3f] outo0i,
ouote evtu- xoim T7aAanTj8Ei Kai Aiavxi tco TsAapcovos Kai si tis aAAos tcov
uaAaicbv 5ia Kpiaiv aSiKov te0vpkev, avTiuapa(3aAAovTi xa EpauToO ua0q
upos xa EKEivcov— cos syco olpai, ouk av aqSss eip-Kai 8 f] xo psyiaxov, xous gk
eT E^sxa^ovxa Kai spEuvcbvxa cbauEp xous Evxau0a Biaysiv, xis auxcbv 0090 s
eotiv Kai xi's oisxai psv, eotiv 5’ ou. sui uoocp 8 av xis, c0 av 8 pss SiKaoxai, 8e
^aixo E^sxaoai xov eu'i Tpoi'av ayayovxa xqv uoAArjv oxpaxiav f\ ’OSuoosa fj I 10 U 90 V f| aAAous pupious av xis eiuoi Kai avSpas Kai yuvakas, ols gkeT
8iaAsyEO0ai Kai ouvsTvai Kai e^exoi^eiv apqxocvov av Eip suSaipovi'as;
GTri

Tig Se^oit’

’
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He seems

to think that he will

experiences with the great

men

have the opportunity

thing"— "an overwhelming [amount] of

happiness"—will be examining and questioning

who

there

are supposed to be

preoccupied with doing here. Again,
a kiut bein g dead

;

it

is

common

of legends; that will be "wonderful" and "not

unpleasant." But "surely the greatest

women

to share

the myriad of illustrious

wise— the same
this is

supposed

clear that Socrates thinks

it

is

sort

to

men and

of thing he has been

be the "greatest thing" not only

the greatest thing simpliciter for he
:

rhetorically asks his listeners,

individuals?

7).

—

Again, he

individuals.

as though having discussions with

is

It

"willing to die

becomes

with these individuals

accustomed

The

"How much would

times"

them

if after

clear that the reason he

is

is

to

incomparably good

to be

willing to die

many

times

that he believes that he will be able to practice

embracing the idea

philosophizing during

is

that philosophizing

supposed

life here.

postmortem philosophizing

is

to

is

if

he can be

on them

at 38a),

the greatest good.

be better than anything

his

better because

it

23

But

in

of course

Maybe

will involve direct soul-to-soul
24

listening.

That could be

of the reason; but Socrates actually suggests a more satisfying answer: he

and more numerous interlocutors

Hades. This

is

will

have

surely the point of mentioning

such illustrious minds of legend and history as the most influential poets of Greece

165

calls

Socrates

else, including

Socrates does not explicitly say why.

communication without the medium of bodily speaking and

better

40e6-

of questioning, examining, and discussing are what Socrates

philosophizing in Hades

part

(cf.

death he can be with these

"philosophizing" (28e5-6, 29d; see Appendix A). So here again (as

seems

be with such

22

practices.

activities

is

many

any of you give"

Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer, two
of legend's greatest military

Agamemnon and
Palamedes.

26

will increase both the

to the greatest

far better

number and

The implication must be

discussions.

means

25
Ajax, and the proverbially shrewd
Odysseus, Sisyphus, and

These are the interlocutors of Socrates' dreams;
and

So death

few.

this is

only to

name

a

quality of his philosophical

that philosophizing with the

good than philosophizing with

dead

is

better as a

the living: in death he will stand a

chance of becoming knowledgeable. That

knowledge

men

is

it

ultimately for the sake of

that Socrates intends to philosophize after death
is so clear that

it

is

unnecessary to point out that in his account of the nature and value
of death Socrates
feels

no need

knowledge).
evidently

27

mention any further worthwhile goals

Moreover, knowledge there

would

the sake of

one

to

is still

at that

some

in the

philosophizing

point be

—

the

living."

knowledge

him

there are none besides

Hades would be an ultimate end;

one might imagine doing

8

It is

is

is

improvement of the soul

that constitutes the

greatest of instrumental goods.

ultimately after, not just good conversation. Death

philosophy, which in turn

knowledge. This
that the

is

is

why he

the best

means

is

all

suggests that being dead

good things (29a)

—

where

It is

is

that

here embracing the

knowledge

the best

—

means

that Socrates

to the best

to the ultimate end, philosophical

is

dead are happier than the living (41c5-6), and

greatest of

in the case

the immediate result of postmortem

Socrates takes to be "an overwhelming happiness." So Socrates
idea that philosophizing

for there

opportunity of applying what one has learned for

little

further, greater good, as

world of the

in

(for

preferable to being alive (42a),

that death

interpreting "good" to
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mean

may

be said

to

be the

instrumentallv good

.

Notes
1

Pdo. 77b, 80d8-el.
2

Cf. Pdo. 68d5-6.

3

See Chapter IV

4

An

n. 90.

attempt to explain

why

Socrates says this

is itself

revealing.

The

immediately suggests two possible reasons; but neither of these
can be his

text

real reason.

those in Hades are not put to death for philosophizing
(41c). Second, those in
Hades are deathless (41c). But both of these seem to entail that dying
is a bad thing,
which would contradict Socrates' original assertion that is not a bad thing
(40c). We
must look elsewhere for Socrates' reason for thinking that denizens of Hades
First,

are happier

than we.
5

6

See

my

E.g.

Dodds 1959,

Chapter IV

n. 90.

20, 372; Penner 1987, 263 n.

1;

Rowe

1993,

7;

McPherran

1996.
*7

Some appear to think that the lack of discussion of death or immortality in
other early dialogues besides the Apology and Crito or that lack of argument for his
claims about death are reasons for concluding that Socrates
hardly reasons worth discussing.
8

Literally,

is

agnostic. But these are

"change of abode/residence".

4

"AloOriais" here evidently covers not only sensory but
10

The functioning of mental

faculties

is

with other individuals (41a-c). Since the soul

all

mental phenomena.

evident from the supposed interaction

presumably immaterial, Socrates

is

talk

literally; he appears only to mean that when the body dies
from its 'connection' with the body: there are no longer any causal
connections between psychic and bodily events.

of "place" need not be taken
the soul

is

'released'

1

'it is

alternative

is

important to notice that the language Socrates uses to describe

this

second

exactly that used in the Phaedo to describe death: In the Apology death

could be "a migration of the soul from this place here to another place {petoiktiois

toO tottou toO ev0ev5e

£ig

aAAov tottov}"

here to another place {dTroSriiifjoai.

Phaedo

,

it is

.

.

a "migration from here to there

(117c); he speaks of
67b). Death in the

it

cf.

it

{Tpv petoiktioiv ti)v ev0ev5e ekeToe}"

as "going abroad to that place {ekeToe aTTobripElv}" (6 1

Phaedo

soul from the body;

sis

is

the "release

e; cf.

(dTTaAAayf)}" (64c, 66e, 67a, 68a) of the

Ap. 41a, 4 Id.
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.

.

may be like "going abroad from
aAAov tottov}" (40e). In the

(40c);

evBevSe

.

12

th
1

1

Jt\

1

Ct

Tn'f™

h D,
7

1

‘,

5b

rr’f
(C 'l
the

6)

0 f'„
cmoMuoeai}

’

the testimon of both Aristotle
y
( Nicomachean F.thirs
b 80d8 ' el; in ,hese ass ^S®s> as
’ 7
P
throughout the
S ° U J S Clearly ldentifled wi
‘ b the self)
-

2W

assurance >'

'

(cf.

*e Meno

Burnet

that the soul "never is ruined/destroyed

(8 b5-6).) Most of Socrates' contemporaries
probably did believe that
was for them some form of existence after death;
but this existence was confined
to a Homeric Hades or to the tomb
itself, or both (Garland
2001, 76, 19); but in none
of these alternatives would one retain his or her
'whole self or even any particularly
valuable part of it. Homer's Hades is not the one
Socrates envisions (cf. R. 3 386bc)
No one would have considered it a good to exist in the Homeric
Hades (cf. Achilles'
famous declaration at Odyssey 1 1.488-491) (Garland and
Scheid 1996, 433). The souls
residing in Homer's Hades evidently did not retain
the full consciousness and
{

1

there

1

intellectual capacities

of their former selves (Garland 2001,
1; see eg
Iliad 23 103 f.
10.493-495 and Garland 133 n. 1 for more references).
Evidently such a
fate was accepted not only by Homer but,
more importantly for our purposes, by the
ordinary Greek" (Garland 2001, 12; see also Garland and
Scheid 1996, 433, Burnet
1911, xl viii-1, Guthrie 1955, 276-277, and my n. 17 below). Even
according to the
Homeric view, only a select few (great heroes who went to the Islands
of the

and

O dyssey

Blest)

survived death in a personally meaningful way, and they did this
only by actually
retaining their bodies (Burnet 1924, 167).
13

Interesting though it is, the fact that Socrates several times
attributes the
version of the immorality view to "the things that are said {tcx
Aeyopeva}" (40c. 40e.
41a, 41c) is by itself no reason for doubting that it is also Socrates' own view,
whatever

DM

the referent ol

the things that are said" is supposed to be. After all, he may happen
to
be sympathetic with "the things that are said" about death. (It should be clear, for the
reasons I already noted, that "the things that are said" is not a reference to popular belief

Homer. Nor, pace Brickhouse and Smith, should it be taken as a reference to "the
stories that are typically told about [death]" (1994, 203) or "the traditional stories
of the
or to

(2000, 259; cf. 1989, 259 and Rudebusch 1999, 73 ff.).) After all, in the
Gorgias Socrates' account of the hereafter is what he has "heard" (524a), but he says
that he believes {ttioteuco} it is true (524ab; cf. 526d). (Cf. Meno 81a.) Nor does he
afterlife"
,

even in the Phaedo claim authorship of the doctrines about the soul that he discusses:
they are things that he "happen[s] to have heard" (6 Id) and "remembered" (70c): "the
account

AsyopEvog

[.

.

.

.

.]

that is

spoken of in the things

.Aoyos}" (62b), what

the "account of long ago {TTaAaios.

"is said
.

.

that aren't to be said {ev

airoppf|TOi$

since long ago {TrdAai AsysTai}" (63c),

Aoyos}"

(67c, 70c).

These references

in the

who set up
the finishing rites
{oi tcxs teAetos
.outoi KaTaoxfioavTss}" who "long ago spoke riddlingly
(TidAai aiviTTEoOai}" (69c) (cf. Rowe 1993, 151). So, too, I suggest, are "the things

Phaedo seem

to

be written Orphic doctrine: "those
.

.

.

.

.

Apology (Also, it is significant that in the Phaedo just as in the
Apology Socrates seems to allow that DN is a real possibility (9 lab), though there is
the Phaedo good reason to think that the concession is not altogether serious.)
that are said" in the

,

.

,

168

in

1 W0Ul
P ° lnt 0at that il is j ust as interesting, if not significant,
,•
that the amount
nf
of discussion ^
Socrates devotes to the second alternative
(40e4-41c7) is twice that
devoted to the first (40c9-40e4). At any rate,
I agree with Burnet:
We are not to suppose that Socrates has any real doubt
on the matter, but he is
bound to look at it from the point of view of the
ordinary Athenian [his
audience], who had no clear belief in human
immortality
[.
(1924, p 166)
reactions t0 the immortality doctrine in
other dialogu^’see R.
.

l(X608d where even Glaucon— who is presumably
fairly close to Socrates— is
shocked
to hear of Socrates belief in the soul’s
immorality; and Pdo. 70ab, where Cebes is
skeptical of the view and thinks that ’’humans’’—
sc., most people— will not
believe it.

According
Guthrie (1975, 94

to

Burnet

an Orphic doctrine (Burnet 1924, 177-178)

this is

compares a fragment of Aristotle's dialogue Eudemus
(in Cicero
UeDiy. 1.25.53) where a similar dream is "interpreted to mean that,
once released from
the body, his soul had found its true home."
n. 1)

In the Iliad passage, Achilles speaks

of the possessions that he left behind in
Phthia and that he will enjoy again, together with his
new-found spoils from the war.
once he returns.

The

tact that the

passage

is

within the speech Socrates imagines the Laws of

Athens giving him should not (pace McPherran 1996, 265-266) lead us to
doubt that the
claims here about an afterlife are to be understood as expressing his
own considered
judgment. See Appendix C.
17

Cf. the judges in

Ap. 41a, also

ct.

Hades "Minos, Rhadamanthus, Aeacus, and Triptolemus" at
G. 523e-524a. The view that divine judgment after death constitutes a

good reason for acting virtuously in this life is found also in Socrates' mouth (reporting
view that he "heard" but believes is "true and admirable") at Mo. 81b and in Cephalus'

a

at

R. 1.330d-331a

(cf.

R. 10.613ab). (Cf. also Th. 177a.)

Beverslius 2000, 190

The view was not

(as

some,

19 and Blyth 1996, 2-3, appear simply to assume) popular
Greek belief at the time. The idea that souls are judged (and judged specifically by the
e.g.,

named

n.

Ap. 41a) upon their arrival into Hades for their earthly conduct
seems to be a peculiarly Orphic or Eleusinian doctrine (Burnet 1924, 168; Garland
individuals

2001, 61-62; but

seems

at

cf.

also

Dodds 1959,

373-4).

(It

may

not even be Eleusinian because

that the Eleusinian doctrine held that, regardless of one's conduct,

it

one could

escape punishment in the hereafter simply by being properly "initiated" in this life
(Garland 2001, 61-62; cf. R. 2.364e-365a, 366ab).) In Homer ( Odyssey 1 1.568-571)

Minos judges

the dead for their postmortem conduct (Garland and Scheid 1996, 433,

—

Garland 2001, 60). (Even on the Homeric view a few those who perform very great
life
are rewarded or punished for those deeds after death;
but this fate is confined to extreme cases (Garland 2001, 60-61), not something that an
deeds, either good or evil, in

—

ordinary person could expect to face.) In

conduct while alive
at

R.

1

is

fact, the belief in

judgment

after death for

apparently so contrary to generally accepted Greek opinion that

.330de the phenomenon

is

said only to occur in "stories {pu0oi}" and something

169

8

1

that is popularly

punishment

"laughed at" (cf. G. 523al-2, 527a5-6).
On the absence of postmortem
popular Greek belief see Mikalson
1983, 80-82 and Garland 2001, 17-

in

18, 52, 66.

1

The d ff re ce in his audience accounts for
f ^
Apology and the
Crito in what Socrates commits
'

a

e

,

private conversation

the (apparent) difference between

himself to: the Crito portrays a

between life-long friends, while the Apology
delivered before hundreds of Athenians.

is

a public speech

Though he seems to have no reticence with Crito in
expressing his beliefs
about the hereafter, evidently Socrates generally
kept these beliefs to himself, as Plato
seems to make clear by the portrayal of the reactions
of other close followers of
Socrates upon hearing these beliefs expressed (R.
10.608d, Pdo.
70ab).

20

After

all, even in the Phaedo, Socrates is
represented (particularly at 84c; but
4d) as reluctant to claim to know what happens after
death. His realization
that evidence is lacking pertains, it seems, to the
precise details of the hereafter (e.g.,
who we will meet), not to the fact that the soul continues to survive and to

cf.

63c,

1

1

retain

intellectual

powers

its

after bodily death.

2

Cf. Pro. 344c,

where

this

term

used to describe a calamity that renders one

is

"helpless" or "without resource".
22

Socrates used same hyperbolic language earlier

his unwillingness to give
if the

consequence
23

1

is

up his accustomed
dying many times.

The passage gives us no reason

30) that

"[.

.

.]

(see

is after

"4

face

to

30c 1)

suppose (with Brickhouse and Smith 1994.
is

enough

not, for Socrates,

for Socrates to judge his

an ultimate end;

it

is

resuits that

Indeed, in the Phaedo Socrates says that the dead are with the gods "face to

{auTOis Trpo$ auToug}" and so hear

Apology

is

(1

1

supposed

their "voices

lb7-cl). Perhaps that
to

work

is

and divinations

{q)f)pa<;

how communication between

And

in the story

te kcu

souls in

too.

Socrates in the Republic calls him "the wisest of men" (3.390a);
1.66.

(at

do so even

Appendix A).

qavTEi'as}" directly
the

is

expresses

would continue

practices: he

just engaging in this activity alone

condition happy." Philosophizing

he

to

when he

of Er (R. 10.620c), Odysseus' soul

is

be reborn into the kind of lifestyle that Socrates elsewhere

cf.

Odyssey

described as preferring to

(e.g.,

Gorgias 526c) praises

as best.

Phaedo Socrates says that after death he expects to meet up
with "good men" (63c, cf. 69e), dead humans "who are better than the ones here" (63b).
Surely by "better" he means at least wiser (Presumably in the Phaedo just as in the
Similarly, in the

,

,

.

170

.

early dialogues, Socrates thinks
of human goodness exclusively in
terms of
R ° we 19 «, 133) See 67a: "[.
being thus pure, leased from
.]
the
aphrosune of the body, we shall likely be
with others of that sort {outco

«

.

anaAAaTTOMEvoi Tns too ocbparos i9P°auvtK,

.

.

EOO|_l£0a}[.

.

Ka6aooi

cb s

to

eIkos p £T a to.outcov

.

11 1S'Unimportant to my
interpretation whether or not Socrates
really believed
could learn something important from (e.g.)
Homer (cf. Chapter IV n 41) or
senouHy believed that he would actually get a
chance to cross-examine him (or any
of
the others) m the underworld. In fact,
I take the specific
individuals Socrates mentions
in the
pology to be of no great importance to his
main point. They are chosen
probably for the benefit of his audience, as
paradigm examples of wise interlocutors
Nor is the specific activity of cross-examination,
which he also seems to anticipate,
.

.

t
that
he

A

significant to his

mam

point,

beyond making

end-goal of philosophizing. The point he
search for truth.

is

clear that he anticipates achieving
the
making is general: Death will improve his
it

significant that in the Phaedo not only does
Socrates not mention specific
he thinks he will meet after death, but he makes
a point of saying that he
"would not strongly insist on" the proposition that he will
in fact meet men (63c)
Rather, what he more strongly wants to insist on
is that he will be with a good and
wise
god or gods (63bc, 69c (but cf. 69el-2), 80d, 81a, 82b,
85a), and that the dead are with
the gods "face to face" (1 1 1 cl) and so hear their
"voices and
It is

men who

divinations" directly

lb7-cl).

Rowe

probably right when he explains that according to Socrates
in the
Phaedo the true sense of "dwelling with the gods" is "communion
with to QeTov, the
forms" (1993, 192). We can understand why Socrates in the
(1

1

is

Apology would suppress
audience—ordinary

the part about being with the gods themselves, if we
realize that his

Athenians— would generally have thought the suggestion to be impious or
at least
Though most of his listeners probably found his second account of death
fantastic, they would not likely have rejected it out of hand
as impossible

absurd.

.

27

There

is

one explicit indication in the text that Socrates hopes to learn from
Hades. ... it would be an overwhelming [amount] of happiness to

his interlocutors in

discuss with and be with and to examine ..." these

men and women (my

"To be with {ouveTvou}" was the regular expression for

to

emphasis).

be a student of (cf. Ap. 19e-

20a; Lch. 186e, Pro. 316c, 318a; G. 455d).
28

true that at R. 10.618b ff, e.g., Socrates imagines that after death souls
return to the world of the living and make a choice of what life to live there; in
It is

must

such a case, as he points out, knowledge of good and bad would come in handy. But
even on this view it is not clear that such knowledge would be valuable only or
primarily as a

means

to further ends.

Republic philosophical knowledge

is

After

all,

there

is

the sole intrinsic
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good reason to think that in
good according to Socrates.

the

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

How Does
Not only have

I

Injuring Others Injure Oneself?

explained Socrates' various uses of the term "virtue",
but

solved several traditional riddles of the early dialogues:
thinks happiness

is

committed

is,

how

I

have explained what Socrates

he thinks he and other "good" people are invulnerable,

to philosophizing at all cost,

remains one important question that

and

why

promised

I

in

that

to

it

That

is

is,

how would

unjust

bad things?

sc.,

Chapter

I

to

answer and

—

that

is

a

to understand Socratic

Socrates have defended his claim (Cto. 49cd;

bad for the agent

why he

he has no fear of death. There

major stumbling block for most Traditionalists who attempt
ethics.

have

I

cf.

R. 1.335)

to injure another or otherwise subject another

1

Irwin explains the problem thus:

[Socrates] argues that

my

it is [.

my

harm

with what

do; and so

I

to

.]

my

[doing] justice benefits

benefit and

.

just to benefit,

soul and

my

and not

to

harm, other people; but

[doing] injustice harms

it;

and the

soul do not vary with

it

is

equally just

what the other person does, but
and good for me to treat him well in all

conditions. This argument will be plausible only if Socrates explains what the

psychic benefit will be, and
else

damages

my

As Irwin himself admits

soul.

an intentional infliction of harm on someone

(113), the problem

interpretation of what for Socrates

hedonism he

how

(1977, 59-60)

is

actually exacerbated

is

intrinsically good.

attributes to Socrates appears to

on

his

own

Irwin explains that the

"undermine" the possibility of defending

the Crito 's absolute prohibitions against doing injustice and injury to others.
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Vlastos too finds "no fully satisfactory
answer to this question anywhere
Plato's Socratie dialogues"
(1991, 196). Vlastos's only recourse is to the
1

.335,

and he says

that

we

"must

settle for" the fact that

in

argument

at R.

Socrates had an "intuition"

according to which
.] true moral goodness is incapable
of doing intentional injury to others, for it
inherently beneficent, radiant in its operation,
spontaneously communicating
goodness to those who come in contact with it, always
producing benefit instead
of injury, so that the idea of a just man injuring
anyone, friend or foe is
unthinkable. (196-197)

[.

.

|

is

But even

in the Crito (as Irwin explains)

we

are told that there are prudential

consequentialist reasons against doing injustice,

it

i.e.

cannot be Socrates' intuition that the "beneficence

something "inherent"

in the possession

harming others harms the agent; so
others]" of having virtue

[sc., to

of virtue or simply comes from

is

it

"spontaneously".

For

many

Traditionalists, the question

a puzzle Plato left for the reader to solve;

it

Traditionalist interpretation. According to

not express a view about what

is

certainly does not claim to have

constitute

actually raises a real

many

problem

for the

Traditionalists, not only does Socrates

happiness, but he actually does not have a view, and he

knowledge of what

knowledge of the good).

In spite

harming others harms the agent;

sure that

must represent not just a missing piece of

is

happiness (for that would

of this, Socrates

it is

in the Crito is clearly quite

a precept he uses to solve, for example,

the perplexing question of whether he ought to remain in prison.

The argument
go

in the Crito against

harming others

is

unsatisfying.

It

appears to

like this:

1

.

2.

Doing

injustice

is

always bad for the agent (49b;

Acting badly {kqkgos ttoigIv} toward others
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is

cf.

47d).

doing injustice (49c).

Therefore,

It is

3.

Acting badly toward others

unsatisfying because

we wonder how

several references (e.g., 49a, 49b, 49e)
to

conclusions were made; this
fuller

argument

argument.

It is

may

bad for the agent.

exactly (2)

many

was

2

arrived

we

The passage has

at.

past conversations in

give us the impression that

in another Platonic dialogue.

true that

is

which similar

are supposed to find a

But no other early dialogue gives us

arguments against harming others are presented

and R. 1.335. But the argument

at

Ap. 25c-e

is

supposed

to

show

that

at

this

Ap. 25c-e

harming others

is

not good because by doing so one corrupts others
and thereby risks being harmed by

them.

3

And

to justly

the argument at R.

harm another because harm

In neither

passage are

harming others
4

soul.

is

seems

we

supposed

is

is

to

show

that

it

is

actually impossible

the peculiar product of injustice not of justness.

presented with an argument that

bad because such action has a

Does Socrates
It

.335

1

really think that such an

that he must, since there

is

is

supposed

direct harmful effect

to

show

on the

that

agent's

argument exists?

no indication

in the Crito that

he

is

not

presenting what he takes to be sufficient justification for remaining in prison. Socrates'
decision to remain in prison

against injuring others.

is

a

sham and

would appear

5

is

presented as a direct application of the prohibition

We may suppose that the justification he presents

that he has other reasons for remaining in prison.

to the best interpretation only if there

Socrates' other beliefs) against

harming

A
Here

I

And

in the Crito

he could; but that

were no plausible argument (given

others.

Sketch of a Solution

can present only a rough sketch of how

I

think Socrates would answer

our question; but an answer of this sort seems to be our best bet in attempting to
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understand what Socrates has

mind

in

at

Cto. 49cd.

begin with

I

Socrates views about the value of philosophy;
for this

remain

in prison, as

it

is

also at the root,

I

believe, of

according to Socrates, has a permanent role in the
good

good

afterlife;

it

is

not something that

wisdom about

the

Socrates, also

seems

good and bad
to

to

we can

make

the root of his decision to

is at

all

some comments on

his decisions. Philosophy,

life for

humans— and

even the

give up even if we have acquired enough

correct decisions consistently. Philosophy, for

be an inherently interactive

affair;

it

cannot be practiced or

profitably practiced in solitude; and ideally one's pool of
potential interlocutors
large as possible.

saying that

all

Socrates sometimes alludes to the

of us

in

common

communal

should search for a teacher

is

as

nature of philosophy,

who

will

make

us virtuous

(Lch. 201a), and stating (in allusion to Diomede's proverbial words at Iliad
10.224-226)
that,

in

when

we humans

together, "all

are

somehow more

resourceful {EUTTopcoTepoi }

7

every deed, speech, and thought" (Pro. 348d).* Hence the importance Socrates places

upon friendship and community: One who

is

preoccupied with attention to the body

cannot really have friends (G. 507e); 8 friendship and community are necessary for
happiness, according to Socrates (507e-508b), evidently because without friendship and

community
opposed

the search for truth

to the life

is

impossible. Thus the

of philosophy (G. 500c); for success

life

in the

few, while success in the other requires sharing equally and

But Socrates would evidently go

further:

of conventional

Not only

is

is

one

is

politics is

available only to a

available to

all.

cooperation necessary for

acquiring philosophical knowledge, but frustrating or sabotaging another's pursuit of

such knowledge never maximizes one's

*euTropcoTEpoi
Ka'i

Aoyov

.

.

.

kcu Siavoqpa.

ttcos
.

.

own power

cxuavTE$ Eopsv

.
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to acquire

oi

it.

This

is

the real

avQpcoiroi upos orrTav spyov

meaning of the undefended principle
injury for Socrates consists either in

at Cto.

damaging the soul

philosophical knowledge or adding to
inci

easing

its

49cd against injuring

its

ignorance

—

—

others.

taking

sc.,

away

or in obstructing

philosophical knowledge. So Socrates thinks that

Recall that

its

from

it

we must

be

philosophically cooperative with ah others. Running
others off the philosophical road
that leads to truth

would

pollute or drain one's potential pool of intelligent
interlocutors.

According

to Socrates,

even death

to another in one's

one may

in certain

own

circumstances justly cause physical harm or

pursuit of the good, because in certain circumstances

these do not involve real injury and

may even

benefit the recipient; but one

may

never

cause another to be permanently deceived about the good or to be prevented
from
acquiring philosophical knowledge.

Perhaps

would

ruin his

maximize
soul.

will

his

in Socrates' case,

own

own

when he has been sentenced

philosophical community by escaping prison, thereby failing to

acquisition of philosophical knowledge, thereby harming his

But what makes Socrates think

maximize

one's

One may imagine

own

that there is

no possible situation

in

which one

the following situation in

which

of "injure":

She cannot philosophize with

it

appears to be in the agent's interest

A young philosopher is being kept in an

others.

Suppose

that her only

way of

gaining the freedom necessary for maximizing her philosophical knowledge

deceive another about the good. (Let us imagine that she cannot

herself.)

Suppose she

is

own

philosophical knowledge by damaging or obstructing another?

to injure another in Socrates' sense

isolation cell.

he thinks he

to death,

allowed one

final visit

own

to

her captors or

from a non-philosopher

can deceive into trading places with her, thus losing his
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kill

is

friend,

freedom, which

is

who

she

contrary

to his

own

Suppose her captors

interests.

are also willing to

our philosopher will lose one potential interlocutor;
but

it

is

make

the exchange. True,

hard to see

how

she would

ever have the opportunity to interact with him again
anyway, whether or not the

exchange

is

made. Moreover, losing a single potential interlocutor
hardly compares

the alternative of giving

up

all

interlocutors

by remaining

to

in prison for the rest of her

life.

difficult to see

It is

how

prohibition against injury, he

friend also injures herself in

cases are so rare that he

49cd. But

I

Socrates would respond to such a case. Given his

would of course say

some way. But how? Perhaps he would

was disregarding them when he

think that he could try to defend the

following way. Living one's whole
philosophical

life

—

is

A

life in

prison

injuring others

deplete the

in the

a full-blooded

life

are minute

compared

to the opportunities to

do so

desire to injure another only for the sake of maximizing one's

life.

is

stated the prohibition at Cto.

—obstructed from

opportunity to gain philosophical knowledge in this

concern for this

say that such

form of the prohibition

strict

of her

surely not worthwhile living. But the opportunities to acquire

philosophical knowledge in this

in the hereafter.

that the philosopher's injuring

strict

Perhaps

this is

life

what Socrates has

manifests an ill-informed

in

mind when he

says that

absolutely prohibited: If one injures another soul, one will pollute or

community of knowledge-seeking

one injures another

in spite

of this, one

fails to

individuals

who

await us after death.

If

maximize one's acquisition of

philosophical knowledge and thereby injures oneself.

There
his

is little

evidence that indicates

view about injuring

others.

I

think,

how

exactly Socrates

however, that
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my

would have defended

sketch of an answer

is

supported by

all

of the following:

extreme aversion

view about the nature of the

to limitations being placed

accustomed manner, and
interlocutors.

his

on

hereafter, his

his ability to philosophize in his

his life-long efforts to increase his pool of
wisdom-loving

Of course

it

is

hard to see

how

Socrates thought he

accepting such a defense of his view about injuring others

was

if this is

justified in

indeed the kind of

defense he would have offered.

Conclusion

One mark of a
personality and

In order to

saying

is

life

great dramatist

seem

is

the ability to create characters

really to extend

beyond the pages of the story presented

as critical as looking at

words but also the

what they are actually made

we must

historical context in

arguments, and motives the author had

in

understand the philosophical dialogue,

we must

characters,

look beyond what he

is

However much

will be that

much

in the

the dialogues and about

made

to say

is

mind while

placed

and

to

Often, in order to

which they were written

So

writing.

—what views,

too, in order to

take into consideration the words of

beliefs

The complexity of Plato's

richness of the settings in which he

to say.

take into consideration not only the

and often we must also determine what the

characters are supposed to be.

beliefs.

to us.

understand such characters a consideration of what they are thinking but not

understand even purely expository writing,
author's

whose

make

it

so

its

and intentions of its

favorite protagonist and the

much

the

form an opinion about

more necessary
his intentions

to

and

Socrates' intentions and real beliefs remain a mystery to us,

real

we

dark about whether or not Plato wished us to get anything from

what he wanted us

to get
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from them

if

he did have such a wish.

This

is

what makes scholarship on Plato so

different

other philosopher in the history of philosophy

I

full

9
.

have offered an interpretation of Socrates'

justice to all of the things his author

from scholarship on almost any

real beliefs

makes him

say.

My

and intentions

that

does

interpretation offers a

new

and reasonable way of understanding some of Socrates' most famous
and most puzzling
claims about

human goodness and what

is

otters a plausible account ot passages that

hard or even impossible to explain.

good

humans.

for

would on

My hope

is

My

interpretation also

the Traditional Interpretation be

that this

new

interpretation will

improve our understanding of Plato's dialogues and the views and arguments he
presents in them.
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Notes

As I have

already explained, the prohibition against
injustice is not so
practically a tautology, given that doing
injustice is evidently by
definition bad (all things considered) for the
agent. I suppose this is why Socrates
believes that every unjust act actually worsens
the soul: Any action that fails to
maximize one s philosophical knowledge (or maximize
one's chances of acquire the
most philosophical knowledge available) is bad/unjust for
one. Performing such actions
worsen the soul because they unnecessarily prolong its
condition of having less than the
most philosophical knowledge available. The longer the soul
is ignorant
kept from
the good
the more 'damage' is done. The longer one keeps
an intrinsic bad and the
longer one is kept from possessing an intrinsic good
the worse off one is. So the idea
presumably is that the more time spent doing unjust/bad actions,
the more opportunity
to do good actions is lost.

mysterious; for

it

is

—

—

—

Maybe Socrates has further reasons for thinking that such actions worsen the
At Pdo. 83 the Socrates character appears to present a view according
to which
the performance of actions that are contrary to knowledge of
good and bad somehow
bolster false belief in the agent about what is good. So the idea
could be that unjust/bad
actions worsen the soul by supporting the beliefs that keep the soul in its
bad
condition— sc., ignorant of the good. Maybe allowing bad/ill-informed desires to be
satisfied
and thereby, unjust acts to be performed provides the ignorant soul with
what appears to it to be more evidence supporting the belief that such satisfaction is
good (especially, presumably, in those cases where one completely 'gets away with it'
soul.

—

by not immediately suffering any obviously bad consequences). Obviously (according
to Socrates), a soul that remains in lack of knowledge of good and bad is eo ipso
worsened.
2

After reading the passage in which Socrates states the principle prohibiting
injury to others, one might think this was his argument for it:
1

Acting unjustly

.

is

always bad for the agent (49b).

Acting unjustly = acting badly.
Acting badly toward others is acting badly.
Therefore, 4. Acting badly toward others is acting unjustly (from 2,3).
Therefore, 5. Acting badly toward others is always bad for the agent (from
2.
3.

It is

not a very interesting argument, and there are pretty clear objections to

do not think that Socrates
argument for (5).
But

I

—

in the Crito is presenting the

Penner 1992a, 136 thinks

that

Ap. 25c-e

is

where we can

form" Socrates' argument for saying that injuring others
(contrast Penner 1992a, 146
4

unjustly

We

—

must keep

sc., in

in

and 1992b, 24

mind

is

made

find "in

its

or any

simplest

38.

III n.

(47d) the claim that by acting

defiance of what knowledge of good and bad prescribes

agents of such action will "deteriorate and debase {SicKpOepoOpEv
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—

not in the agent's self-interest

See Chapter

n. 38).

that Socrates has

above argument

1,4).
it.

.

.

.

—we

xai

the

Aco(3riaou£0a} M our soul.

If,

deteriorate and debase" our

It is

therefore, injury to others

own

soul

whenever we

is

always unjust, then

we

injure another.

sometimes

said that Socrates believes that escaping
would be wrong
because he would be violating an agreement
or other debt (Kraut 1984 51-53
10-1 14
136-137), or that he believes that escaping would
be wrong because he thereby would
be attempting to rum the city or its laws—
or would be contributing to its
ruination
whether or not he actually does any ruining (Allen 1984). But,potential
as I have
1

argued, Socrates

'

a consequentialist through and through:
what makes a correct action
is the goodness of its consequences.
And this is borne out in the particular case
ot Socrates decision to remain in prison:
Escaping would involve acting "badly toward
some—and those to whom there is a need to do so least {kcikcos Tiva
s ttoiouuev K at
TccOTa 0O5 ntaoTcr 8eT}" (Cto. 49e-50a; cf. 54c: "[.
.] producing bad things for ’those
is

coirect

.

for

whom

e5si}[.

.

there is a need to
).

.]

for others

6

irara EpyaaapEvous toutous 0O5 pKioTa

is

wh Y

is

the injury to others

Socrates despises a

whomever he

things

where he is restricted in his freedom to
likes (Ap. 37cl-2, 37c4-e2, 37e3-38a6; Cto.

life

why

he considers the opportunity to discuss with
"overwhelming happiness" (Ap. 40e with 41 be).
7

—producing bad

at 49c.

discuss whenever and with
53e4), and

least

"Acting badly" toward others

—prohibited

This

do so

all

who have

died an

Presumably, philosophical partnership puts us in a better position with respect
{aTiopia} that philosophical examination creates. Sy. 209bc, which

to the perplexity

describes the community/union {koivcovicx} of two naturally gifted souls, states
that

one will suddenly become "well-equipped {euTropel} concerning speeches about
virtue[.

.

g

In the

Phaedo the

sole cause of enmity

is

too

much

attention to the

body

(66cd).
}

Things might have been so different
writings by Plato to which
his

name

we

if

we had any

expository philosophical

could turn without controversy (the

are not universally or even widely accepted as genuine).

certain that Plato's

have such

main character

is

supposed

"letters"

Even

if

published

we

in

could be

to represent a real historical Socrates,

we

information (independent of Plato's dialogues) about the latter that our
understanding of the former would not thereby be significantly improved.
little
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APPENDIX A

OBEDIENCE AND SOCRATES' REASON FOR PHILOSOPHIZING
T]his actually happens to be the greatest
good for a human— to make
accounts/speeches each day about virtue and about
the other things concerning
which you hear me discussing and examining myself
and others and I
1 the
unexamined life is not livable for a human[.
(Ap. 38a)*
[.

.

.

—

.

It is

fairly uncontroversial to

assume

that

.

what Socrates

in this

passage calls

making speeches and discussing and examining" he elsewhere
simply

calls

"philosophizing"(28e5-6, 29d). Socrates uses "philosophizing"
to refer to the primary

involved in the attempt to acquire virtue. So in the Euthvdemus
Socrates asks

activities

make

the brothers to

this is

meant

Cleinias "turn toward {upoTpecpaiTE}" philosophy
(275a), where

as a plea to get Cleinias to care about virtue,

good man and

to learn

what he must

learn to be so.

1

(As

i.e.

have shown, Socrates got

I

Cleinias to turn toward philosophy (282d, 288d) by getting

necessary for happiness.) Socrates' statement

PJhilosophy

[the process of] acquiring

is

ETTiOTrinqs}."

assume

that he

general that

good",

it

*.
.

.

does not mean that

when an

meant

is

him

may

Eud. 288d8

knowledge

{

H

.

.

to desire

.

wisdom

be translated:

"[.

as

.

.

ys cpiAooocpia KTqois

2

So when Socrates characterizes
to

at

about his becoming a

to

this process as the "greatest

it is

an ultimate end. Nor can

good",

it

is

we assume

also safe

in

ancient Greek speaker characterizes something as the "greatest

be an ultimate end.

Kai TuyxavEi psyioTov

We may assume

that Socrates here

means

aya0ov ov avOpcoTrcp touto, EKaoTqs

apETqs Toug Aoyous TroisToSai Kai tgov aAAcov TrEpi gov upsTs Epou
cxkouete SiaAsyopEvou Kai spairrov Kai aAAoug e^etci^ovtos, 6 8e avE^ETaaxos
(3ios ou (3 icoto$ av0pcbTicp.
qpspas

TTspi

.

.

.
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only that philosophizing

with 90d6-7).

1

is

an indispensable means to an ultimate
end

(cf.

Pdo. 89d2-3

4

Indeed, since Socrates actually says
elsewhere (Ly. 218a; 5

76a) that those already fully wise no longer
philosophize,

think there

I

is

cf.

Cm.

158b,

good reason

to think that Socrates did not regard
philosophical activity itself as intrinsically
good.
It is

important to appreciate that Socrates believes
not only that philosophizing

a necessary condition for the

one must
This

is

(if

one

is

good

unwise) devote

life (at least for

all

those

who

of one’s energies to

it

is

are not yet wise), but that

(at least until

one

is

wise).

so even on the Traditional Interpretation according
to which Socrates values

philosophizing for the sake of acquiring knowledge of good
and bad. Even on that
interpretation, Socrates does not value philosophy simply as

one pursuit among many

other equally valuable pursuits. Brickhouse and Smith, for
example, are mistaken in

suggesting that, according to Socrates, one might lead an examined
"dedicated largely to other activities (farming, for example)[.

purpose of philosophizing

is at

the very least to acquire

.

.]"

life

while being

(1994, 208-209). The

knowledge of good and bad;

if

only for this reason, dedication to any other activity would, according to Socrates, be
worst) harmful or

knowledge

is

(at best)

attained.

Now in

only accidentally beneficial, and so unadvisable

(at

until that

6

some passages of the Apology

Socrates gives his audience the

impression not only that he philosophizes because of a divine order, but also that his
philosophizing with the Athenians

is

a service that greatly benefits

them (30ab, 36c,

36de) while having no perceptible benefit for himself (23bc, 31b, 36b):

"[.

.

.]

I

am

far

He even

says,

from speaking a defense on behalf of myself, as someone might suppose;
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rather,

I

do so on behalf of you,

voting against

me"

lest

you somehow

err regarding the god's gift to

you by

(30de).*

But neither impression represents the

truth.

To begin

with,

I

will dismiss these

impressions from some general considerations about the conditions
according to which
Socrates

makes

Then

decisions.

his resolve to philosophize,

I

will explain

why

Socrates, in the particular case of

would not have done so without

figuring out what

makes

philosophizing his best option.

First,

we have good

he thought

act unless

it

reason to think that Socrates would never countenance an

was

in his

own

He

interest.

stresses again

and again

his

determination to consider in the decision-making process nothing other than whether his
alternatives are just or unjust (Ap. 28b, 28d, 32d; Cto. 48cd). This concern for "justice"

might lead some
concern for

to

conclude that Socrates countenances acting without any particular

self-interest.

But

in fact, as

I

have shown, his only reason for being

concerned about avoiding injuring others and about avoiding unjust action
a self-interested reason:

own

7
I

have shown

that his ultimate

end

is

in general is

the best condition of his

soul.

Second, one reason against supposing that an order
behind Socrates' philosophizing

is

his insistence

is

the ultimate motivation

on producing an argument

for acting
o

whenever he

At Cto. 46b he

acts.

says,

"[.

.

.

I]

am

the sort of

man

such as to obey

9

none of my things other than the rationale/argument/rule {Aoyos}

that, after

having

ttoAAoO Sego sycb unEp Epaufou anoAoyEToOai, cos ti$ dv o’ioito,
aAAa uirsp upcbv, pf) ti Ef,apapTr|TE TTEpi Tijv toO 0eoO Sooiv upTv spou Kara*.

.

.

yriqnaapEvoi.
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reasoned {Aoy.CopEvcp}, appears to

me

Now

best."*

it

may be thought

that this rule

is

consistent with a willingness to uncritically
obey a god's orders, particularly if
Socrates

assumes

that the

god would always value Socrates'

interests as highly as he himself

does. Let us define acting "on orders" thus:

S performs an action

A

A on orders from R =df. When R orders

whether or not S has reasons

to

A that are independent of R's order.

do

Socrates could thus philosophize on orders from
a god and
favor of the decision (as he insists

46b

at Cto.

case the argument were to go something like

1

The god orders me

.

If (1

2.

),

then

Therefore,

We can

3.

best for

It is

best for

is

that he

still

produce an argument

always does), provided

in

that in this

this:

to philosophize.

it is

imagine that (2)

S to do A, S does

me to philosophize.
me to philosophize.

based on some principles about the

infallibility

and

benevolence of the god.

But

if the rule stated at

showing

that the act ordered

Socrates

makes such a

stating the rule

is

to

is

Cto.

46b allows the above

deliberation, as the latter

actually

It

is

it

is

hard to see

true that

why

one reason

for

Crito see that he will not simply obey Crito's pleas without

demands;

10

after all, Crito is surely

But Socrates means that the rule applies not just
"[.

.

.]

no expert about the just.

to cases like the

— not now
always {ou vuv irpcbTov aAAa kcu ae(} — am
of Socrates' decision-making:

to all cases

count as an argument

in Socrates' best interest, then

great deal of the point at 46b.

make

to

I

one then present, but

for the first time, but

the sort of man such as to obey

none of my things other than the argument

that, after

having reasoned, appears

ToiouTog oTog tcov spcov pribevi aAAcp
eycb
Aoycp os av poi Aoyi^opEvcp (3eAtiotos cpaivr|Tai.
*.

.

.

.

.

.
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TTEi0EO0ai

rj

to

me

tco

best"

(my emphasis).

I

suspect that ordinarily

when one

does not bother to produce any argument showing
that

one just does

rule

were so

inclined to act on orders, one

is

best to do what

it

is

ordered;

Socrates, however, insists on producing an
argument in every case,

it.

someone—even

whether or not

is

trivial as to

a recognized, infallible

expert—has ordered him.

If this

allow the above to pass as an argument, Socrates
cannot claim

be a reason-seeking person any more than even some
of the most servile,

to

unquestioning agents can. But Socrates really appears to be trying
to distinguish

himself from

those

all

who

act

on orders. So although Socrates' words

be logically consistent with an inclination to act on orders sometimes,
not voicing a

is

habitually acts

be a

commitment

on orders

man who obeys

to a principle so bland as to

to voice the

is

best, like the

it

is

is

god Socrates discusses

surely

it

is

allow the person

to

who

is

is

best for

That Socrates

is

him

to

is

term "ruler",

a need to abide by

this

claim

may

it

makes

that,

independently of the action's

it.

never willing to act on orders

makes elsewhere about obedience.
then there

do

only orders what

saying that he does not obey orders

from anyone without producing an argument showing
is

claiming to

technically a bit of reasoning, acting

philosophizing the best course of action. Socrates

it

is

connection with the Delphic oracle. Though

in

consistent with acting in absence of an examination of what

being ordered,

who

be inconsistent with acting on

an acknowledged expert

the set of three propositions enumerated above

on

meant

46b may

suggest that he

same commitment. Rather, Socrates

only reason. This

orders from anyone, whether or not

I

at Cto.

In the

(28d).

is

consistent with the claims he

Apology he says

that if a ruler gives an order

Because of the apparent vagueness here of the

appear to conflict with Socrates' resolve always to make an
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independent determination that he acts

makes

the claim at Ap.

obey the god's order
instead like he

argument

1

is

in the

show

trying to

Kraut 1984, 23

that he is justified in

passage seems to go something

was a need

If (1), then there is a

Therefore,

based

accordance with his best

to express the strength

to philosophize (as

In Potidaea there

.

2.

(1) is

28d not merely

in

3.

in part

There

is

n.

men who

38 seems to suggest);

looks

being so determined. The

me to obey the generals' orders.
me to obey the god's order to philosophize.
for me to obey the god's order to philosophize.
for

need for

a need

rulers:

Evidently Socrates considered

Delium

his rulers,

and

according to the principle about obedience must be obeyed

may

appear to suggest that Socrates supposes that every "duly

must be obeyed (Brickhouse and Smith 1989,

likelihood not every such ruler

interests in

it

to

like this:

on the principle about obeying

unconditionally. That

constituted" ruler

Socrates

of his determination

the Athenian generals at the battles of Potidaea, Amphipolis,
and

therefore

interest.

is infallible,

mind, Socrates' commitment

11

Since in

142).

all

and not every such ruler has Socrates'

to the principle about

obedience appears to

conflict with his resolve to act according to his self-interest.

But
to rule

me

we
(oi

whom

should note that he calls these generals "the rulers

apxovTEs

.

.

.

ous upeTs eiAeoBe apxeiv pou}[.

.

.

]",

Athenian practice of appointing generals by yearly popular election.

referring to the

Now

believe that Socrates uncritically accepted the many's opinion that these

experts in warcraft, any

conferring the

title

more than he

you men chose

it

is

hard to

men were

uncritically accepted (Ap. 40a, 41a) the many's

"Adjudicators {biKaoTcd}" on those randomly chosen from the

mass of citizens who volunteered

for judicial service.

The many

as a

whole

are

nonexperts, and nonexperts are not skilled in discerning expert from nonexpert

187

(cf.

Lch.

Cm.

184de,

171bc). Furthermore,

would have acknowledged
give.

obey.

lor

It is

in fact rule are liable to err in the
orders they

often noted that Socrates believed (Ap. 32cd)

him

to be

when

whom
it

they ordered Leon's arrest.

it

of the Athenian prison.

same

would be bad

was unjust
It is

to

to

obey the

less frequently (in this

that

it

would be bad

sentenced to imprisonment and thus be forced to obey the duly
constituted

means one whose

in

who

of context) noted that Socrates evidently believes (Ap.
37bc)

"rulers"

the

that those

not need R. 1.339c to inform us that
Socrates

Socrates obviously thinks there are certain "rulers"

"rulership" of the Thirty

sort

we do

expertise

as the one

is

suggest that

I

when he speaks of "ruler"

at

Ap. 28d, he

authoritative the principle about obedience at Ap.
:

mentioned

at Cto.

47b. Socrates does not

28d

commit himself to

is

acting

accordance with the orders of anyone except experts. 12
Socrates of course does not

order

made by every

mean

to

imply that he thinks

we must

follow every

expert. His concern for never acting against his self-interest

commits him only

to unconditional obedience to

advise him to do.

He

such obedience

necessary for his pursuit of the good. Presumably, then, (given Cto.

is

therefore

46b) before he followed orders
Potidaea was in his

own

that the appointed generals

My

is

to

he

obeying other experts' orders only

first

determined whether victory

if

at

and then he determined for himself (perhaps given

his

perhaps also considering the generals' previous successes)

were experts

28d

interpretation of Ap.

Ap. 29b of the principle stated
superior

at Potidaea,

interest,

own knowledge of warcraft,

committed

is

what the expert about the good would

bad and shameful.

at

is

in warcraft.

confirmed by what seems to be a reiteration

28d. At 29b Socrates says that disobeying one's

We

cannot reasonably take "superior" here to refer to

188

at

anyone other than an individual who
question.

In fact, this passage gives us a

29a: Socrates

was saying

that

toward the orders of a god
superior

some

it

way of better understanding

would be ridiculous

—about whom

there

is

for

him

to be

no question

any

the point of 28d-

less obedient

that he is Socrates'

than he actually was toward the orders of the
generals

—about whom

there

is

legitimate question as to whether they are really
Socrates' superiors.

Now the
conflict with the

principle stated at Ap.

28d and 29b

=

(

Cto. 47b) evidently does not

one stated Cto. 46b. Though Socrates does acknowledge

need to abide by
in the

in fact is better than oneself in
the matter in

sc., that

it

would be bad

to

disobey

—

that there

is

a

the orders that a genuine expert

matter in question has given or would give one, that does not entail that
he

believes he must ever act on orders from such experts (on the above definition
of acting

"on orders"). There
acting on orders.

is

The

a clear distinction between acting in accordance with orders and
principle at Ap.

So long as one

the latter.

the relevant expert

would

28d and 29b requires the former, not necessarily

acts in accordance with the relevant expert's orders (or

order),

one complies with the principle expressed

what

in those

passages.

Now
about what

Socrates

is

apparently confident that his

independent determination

is

made

clear

when he

Ap. 28d:

someone orders himself [to

by a

own

best will not conflict with that of the expert's. This

states the principle at

If

is

ruler, there is

dol a thing that he holds to be best or

then a need, as

it

seems

to

me,

to risk abiding

by

is

ordered

it,

in

no way

taking into account/consideration either death or any other thing before [taking
into account]

something shameful.

av Tig ecxutov Ta^q qyqoauEvog (SeAtigtov e!vcii f| utt’ apxovTog
Ta X®ti> EVTauQa 5 eT, cog Epoi SokeT, pEvovxa kivBuveueiv, pqbEv uTToAoyi^opEvov
qf|TE Oavaxov qf)TE aAAo pqbEV irpo tou aiaxpoO.
*ou
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The words
principle

I

I

have emphasized would be a pointless
and

it

erroneous addition

to the

have already discussed, unless Socrates
thought himself capable of giving

himself correct orders. In the
interest

in fact

would be

G orgias he argues at great length how contrary to self-

for an ignorant person to

do whatever seemed best

simply not true of an ignorant person that there

is

to him.

It is

a need that he abide by the orders he

gives himself based on what he holds to be
best.

Nor
bona

Socrates’ "frequent" (Ap. 40a) compliance
with daimonic opposition a

is

of acting on orders, as Brickhouse and Smith

fide case

1

994 (among others) have

thought. Their attempt (192-193) to escape the
implications of Cto. 46b wreaks havoc

with Socrates’ words there. They suggest an explanation
that differs from the obvious
one.

Socrates does say that he would be persuaded by nothing but logos,
but why
that divination would fall into some category other than

must we assume

persuasive logos, for Socrates, and, hence, that Socrates would never
put his
faith in divination unless he had some (other) persuasive
logos to do so?

The answer
puts

it,

is

that the "logos"

spoken of here (46b5) clearly

is,

as Burnet 1924 (ad loc.)

"the conclusion of a process of reasoning (Xoyiopo^)"; Brickhouse and Smith

appear to neglect the participial clause in the passage: "[after having] reasoned

{Aoyi^opevcp}".

14
It is

irrelevant that, as Brickhouse

"the reliability or justification of divination"

clearly

wants Crito to think

decision (again

cf.

is

and Smith correctly point

not mentioned at Cto. 46b;

that he follows the principle in every case

15

out,

for Socrates

of practical

Burnet's note).

Brickhouse and Smith are indeed

right that Socrates reports

an activity when his daimonic sign orders

it; "[.

190

.

.]

immediately ceasing

Socrates does not wait until he can

concoct an argmnent to be persuaded
that he must stop whatever
he was about
(Ap. 40a6)

(193;

cf.

149

behavior counts against
sign

my

22, 194-195; similarly.

Reeve 1989,

no

do

69). If this kind of

interpretation of Cto. 46b, then his
policy concerning the

inconsistent with his statement at Cto.
46b; for

is

interpretation of Socrates'

fact

n.

to

think there

I

words there other than the one

real inconsistency here; indeed,
the texts suggest

I

is

no plausible

have offered. But there

is in

an explanation of the apparent

inconsistency: Socrates evidently considers
the daimonic sign not as a
conclusive

reason for a bandoning altogether his
deliberate decision to act in a certain
way, but
rather as an opportunity for further
deliberation

on whether

action that he had proposed for himself. Indeed,

cease his efforts to carry out an action; but,

I

when

to carry out the course

of

signaled, he will immediately

suggest, he

would never accept

sufficient reason for_abandoning the act altogether,
but rather

would resolve

the sign as

to

abandon

it

only

is

supported not only by Cto. 46b, but also by the otherwise
peculiar fact that Socrates

if

he calculated i ndependently of the sign that that was best.
This interpretation

ever bothers (Ap. 31d5-6, 40b6-7, 41d3-6) 16 to figure out an
explanation of why he
received the order in question.

We

are not,

I

think, to

imagine that he does so out of

idle curiosity.

The sign indeed,

as Brickhouse

and Smith point out (190-191), "trumps”

whatever ratiocination or deliberation Socrates had done prior
it

to the opposition.

17

But

trumps only his original deliberation on the matter, not the deliberation he does when

the sign induces

him

to stop

and reconsider the action. Of course, Socrates' post-

opposition deliberation always agrees with the sign's opposition; but that does not
that Socrates considers the sign sufficient reason for continued suspension

191

of the

mean

opposed

action.

It

does not even suggest

opposition deliberation:
not oppose a
not satisfy

good

that the sign's opposition
prejudices

true that he feels sure that the
sign (since d.vine)

It is

action; but (especially given
Cto. 46b)

him completely, and

out lor himself why

it

any post-

18

opposed

is difficult

it

if

to see

why

it

is

clear that such feelings do

he would bother to

such reasoning was doomed

would

to

try to

reason

be biased (and

consequently irrational). The possibility
that Socrates would have
discontinued the

opposed action ev en

own

if

he could not determine

why

the sign opposed,

reassessment of his alternatives disagreed with
the voice,

consistent with the

would not be consistent with Cto. 46b,

accept instead the interpretation

We may add that

certainly at least

I

there

it

Socrates does well to satisfy himself about

opposes the proposed

feature of the act,

of the act

is

and

is

good reason

to

have suggested.

simple fact that the voice opposes an act does not of
course

whether

if his

few examples Plato gives us of Socrates'
daimonic opposition; but

since that possibility

for the

is

and even

act altogether or only

in the latter case

some

why

let

he

is

opposed;

Socrates

know

(possibly) small accidental

mere opposition does not disclose which aspect

opposed. Imagine that the voice had opposed Socrates' leaving
home

morning before

his trial.

If

he was opposed

about to leave withou t an umbrella

1

.

(let

in the

us imagine) merely because he was

and he obeys without bothering

to figure out

he was opposed, then he could be making a huge mistake by remaining

home

why

rather

than leaving unopposed with umbrella in hand. 20

Returning to Socrates' supposed order

to philosophize,

additional reasons, peculiar to this case, for thinking

on orders.

First, in spite

of the

it

is

now want

to offer

not a bona fide case of acting

fact that the reason Socrates

192

I

most frequently

gives, at

least in the

Apology,

from the god
should

first

at

for his continuing philosophizing

Delphi

be kept

in

(sc.,

mind

the

god

is

no one

saying

it

is

that there really

out.

must be

takes

it

was no order given

22

god spoke

But

obeying an order

it

at all, as other

this evidently is not a case

daimomc

its

of divine

"liddlingly" via the oracle (21b),
and he

make an "examination {CnTpois}"

(21b8;

cf.

21e6, 22e6) of the

meaning (21e6). 23 What

I

have argued

opposition parallels exactly his reaction to
the oracle:

is

his

He

as opportunity for further examination.
Since "for a long time” (21b7) he did

not believe what the god believed
.

an<^

he came

to believe

it

kcu UTT£Aa(3ov|" (28e) 24 was

that,

is

Socrates expresses no doubt that
the oracular

true (21b6-7).

oracular statement in order to figure out
usual reaction to

he

wiser than he was Apollo's, and
Socrates thought that whatever

revelation: Socrates says that the

thought he had to

that

Apollo Pythios) (23b, 28e-29a,
29d, 30a, 33c. 37e), 21

commentators have already pointed
assertion that

is

even

it

(or

it)

—he did not even know what

the

god meant (21b3-

what he "supposed and conceived
only after his

own

investigation,

!

{cpf]0riv te

we must

conclude

Socrates did (eventually) think that the god ordered him to
philosophize

(and that therefore philosophizing was the greatest good), he
had his

own

reasons

independent of the oracle for thinking that he must philosophize and
that philosophizing
is

for all

humans

the greatest good:

25

Whatever he learned about the condition of most

humans, and whatever he concluded about the goodness of that condition and about

how

best to escape

own

observation, together with whatever preconceived views he had formed

his

own

—about

it,

he did not learn from the god, but rather arrived

the nature and value of wisdom.

193

The god did not

tell

at

through his

—
him — he

again, on

concluded by his

own

devices that philosophizing

no one was wiser than

And, again

makes

it

he.

is

good. All the oracle said was
that

26

in spite

of his claim that he

is

following an order, Socrates
actually

clear to his audience that his
reasons for continuing his practice
are his own.

At 38a, he introduces an explanation
of his choice

to continue his practices:

T]his actually chances to be the
greatest good for a human—to
make
accounts each day about virtue and
about the other things concerning
whi
hear me discussing and examining
myself and
[.

.

.

others— and

life is

Now he

not livable for a human[.

\

27

dissembling

when he

is that,

in his

as he says, the jurors will be

defense-speech he has chosen to emphasize the

case, the fact that Socrates treats these as

to philosophizing

two

If

even

is

less likely to

Maybe

latter explanation.

distinct explanations

that is

In

any

of his commitment

20

indicates that Socrates does not think philosophizing

good simply te cause he thinks he received an order
language

he

The only problem

than the explanation involving his obeying the
28
god's order.

it

tact, the

to think

represents himself as acting on divine orders.

with this alternative explanation

why

the unex

appears to offer this as an dteiMtiye to
the explanation involving his
supposed

obedience to the god, because he assumes that
the jurors are likely

believe

]
J

,].

.

at

28d suggests

someone orders himselt

a ruler, there

is

that Socrates

to

do a thing

then a need, as

seems

is

own

obeying his

that
to

to philosophize

the greatest

from the god. 30

In

order to himself:

he holds to be best or

me,

is

is

ordered by

abiding by it, in no way
taking into account/consideration either death or any other thing before
[taking
into account] something shameful.

The clause

that

I

his

own

to risk

have emphasized here would be superfluous

supposing that he was,

making

it

in the case

if

Socrates were

of his "mission", following the god's order without

independent evaluation of the acts

194

in

question

(cf.

Weiss 1998,

8ff.).

This

together with his determination
"[...] to be persuaded by none
of

other than the logos that, after having
reasoned, appears to
indicates that the idea of a divine
order
In fact, if

were not

it

tor the

is

me

my things

1

best

'

(Cto.

46b)—

a red herring. 31

Apology

,

the remaining early dialogues

would give

us no suggestion that Socrates' motivation
to philosophize was anything
other than his

own

opinion that

What
you,

which
lest

I,

for him:

you [Critias] doing?!— [by] holding that if I do
actually refute
refute for the sake of any thing other than
the very thing for the sake of

[.

I

was good

it

.

are

.]

would even thoroughly question myself about what I
am saying, fearing
unawares, suppose I know when I don't know! And
now I do, then, assert
I

that I’m

doing

perhaps for

almost for

considering the logos mostly for

that:

my

other friends.

humans

32

my own

Or do you not suppose

that

sake, but also

it's

a

common good 33

how each of the things that are stands be made
thoroughly apparent? (Cm. 166cd)* 34
all

that

Protagoras, don't suppose

I wish to discuss with
you for anything else than
thoroughly those things that I myself am each time at an
impasse
f
about. (Pro. 348c)

[.

.

.]

to consider

[.

.

.

W]e ought

[.

.

.]

all

of us

in

common

possible, mostly for us ourselves

sparing neither

Whatever

is

supposed

money nor any
to

—

for

to search for a teacher as

we need one

—and secondly

good

as

for the lads,

other thing. (Lch. 20 la) 1

be the specific nature of the ultimate end that Socrates hopes to

reach through philosophizing, he regularly represents his motives as selfish. 35

And

his

OTov
ttoieTs nyoupEvos, e’i oti paAioTa oe eAeyxco, aAAou TIV05
EVEKa eAeYXEIV f| OUTTEp EVEKO KOV EpaUTOV 8lEpEUVCOpqv Tl Asyco, cpo(3 oU|JEVOS
pf| TTOTsAdQco oiopsvos MEv ti Eibsvai, £18005 Se pq. kcu vOv 5 f) ouv Eycoys cpqpi
.

touto

.

.

tov Aoyov

qaAiGTa psv spauTou eveko, ’10005 Se 5 q Kai
ou koivov olei ayaOov eTvou oxe8ov ti ttooiv avyiyvEoOai KaTa(pavE5 ekootov toov ovtoov oTrq e'xei;

ttoieTv,

Tcov aAAcov ettitpSeicov
0 poo 7Toi 5

,

'^O npcoTayopa,

okotteTv
f|

SiaAsyEcOai ps 001 aAAo
auT05 dnTopdb ekocotote, touto 5 iaoKEq;ao 0 ai.
pf) o’iou

ti

PouAopsvov q a

KOivq TravTa5 qpa5 ^teTv paAioTa psv qpTv outoT5 5 iBaoKaAov 005 dpiOTov-- 8 E 6 pE 0 a yap— etteitcc Kai T0T5 pEipaKi'015, pqTE xpqpaTcov q)Ei8opEVOU5 pqTE aAAou pqSEvo5.

f

.

.

XPOvai

•

•

•

195

exhortation to others to philosophize

Ap. 36c)

is

really

an exhortation to be selfish (see
especially

‘

Notes

- •— <*— « » -**•

;c:::r

—

*

»-

2

Cf. R. 7.521c.
J

When

Socrates suggests (Ap. 29a) that death
could be "greatest of all the
‘° SUggeS ‘ hat “ C ° U d be
,he uitimale

„

desiderative

a^At G^M r*8 "7
aS
mS

f

"greatest
lod"^ a „H ,b
g

'

‘

'

f

ha ‘ ‘ he P ° Wer t0 ersuade
P
are

more ulUml se^e
»°
.,

if ,U

1

1999
9

l
'

know no

fer as

reatest

,!

both

is

*e

- semester or

Traditionalist thinks that Socrates
considers philosophizing

8 ood lnthe sen se of being the most

|®does accept

S°° d

this interpretation; but

it is

'ultimate'

of goods. (Beversluis"

not clear that he

is a Traditionalist.
Th! ugh Reeve 989 seems
(178) ready to accept the interpretation, he
subsequently
appears (179) to retreat from it. Even Brickhouse
and Smith 1994 who say that
1

happmess consists in virtuous action (130), allow
(1 16) that according to Socrates
philosophizing (which they think (130) is a prime
example of virtuous action) is
desirable for the sake of a further end: viz.,
presumably, for achieving a greater
happiness than philosophizing itself brings. Cf.
2000, 151-152.)

Some do, however, think that for Socrates philosophizing
has some intrinsic
value (see Vlastos 1971b, 19; Penner 1992a,
150 n. 14; Kraut 1984, 271 n 43 though
not a Traditionalist, holds this too). But there
is, I think, no evidence even for
this (cf.
Irwin 1977, 91); in fact, the evidence there is tells
against

it,

as

I

presently explain.

5

Cf. Sy. 204a.

This is, I presume, how most Traditionalists would explain
Socrates' unusual
inattention to conventionally personal and familial
matters, which comes about as a
result of his relentless care for his own soul (Ap.
23bc, 31b, 36b; cf. 36c6). (Reeve
1989, 1 13 makes a similar point, saying that philosophizing according
to Socrates

must

be

"at the center"

of one's

life.)

This can be seen whether
serious argument occurs
g

here,

it

make

According

way we choose

Burnet 1924 (188), "[t]he soul, with

its

1998 (following James

—and perhaps

—where

I

think

is

his

most

Cto. 47-48.

to translate "uEi'0eo0ai"

a difference to the sense intended.

to

well as the body and

also

tocus on Ap. 25c-e or

Or: "to be persuaded by". Whichever

will not
9

—

we

appurtenances, are

Adam)

primarily

—

is

all

included

in

its

thoughts and feelings, as

a man's ’belongings'." Weiss

right to point out (58-59) that

to Socrates' family

"my things"

refers

and friends, and specifically here

Crito, considering that the latter has just exhorted (46a) Socrates to be persuaded by
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to

2

.

h
Ilh'
t h,

rI

Ve

^rf^

iS

^

of refer

familial affairs- cf

An

a 3b

habi^

ng (n

.

.

10
t

,t

st,

2 ' ypiCal Greek

,

iSn

'

^

'° n8er

^

h° Ur *°

copa}" (46a)
" In order to
save

^

C0UnSel[

'

’

•

1

!

<°*8t (3ouA E u E o6a,

this interpretation,

Brickhouse and Smith 1989 trivialize
"obey the god more than (rrsioopa,
fc*
f
° rder 11m ‘° CeaSe hilos hizin
>
P
gAccording
°P
to Brickhouse and
-,T
Smith the claim at 0
29d does not even raise the issue of a
possible conflict between
divine authority and human authority
because Socrates realizes that the

vow a, Ap. 29d

Socrates

‘

'T

to

.

*^

tmagming there is a legal impossibility. But
Socrates
determmed to philosophize not just in the (allegedly)
he dicasts forbid it, but in every situation:
or me I will not stop philosophizing

"[.

.

{it'cooTrcp

Ttauocopa, cpiAoocxpcov} [.
escribes

is

.

.

.]»

legally impossible, he

Even
is

.]

.

paxCS

situation he
actually states that he is

legally impossible situation

as long as

av

.

I

EpTtvfco

breathe and
Kcti

it

is

oTos t e cb

is

where

possible
oil pf|

he does suppose the situation he
actually
clearly expressing a commitment
to the possibilitv
if

of disobeying duly constituted authorities".
His commitment surely does noisome
rom the con tin g ent fact that the Athenian authorities
are powerless (or at least very
hard-pressed; see Brickhouse and Smith
1989, 150ff.) to outlaw philosophizing.

'

Cf

1

Nor do passages like Cto. 51 be count against
Socrates says, in the voice of the Laws, that
[.

.

.]

in

war and

my

interpretation.

When

in the

the fatherland exhort

Dikasterion and everywhere, the things that the city
and
must be done or [there’s a need] to persuade it of what

the

by nature {xai ev ttoAepco kou ev SiKaoTqpicp Kai
TravTaxoO
TTonyrEov a av keAe up f) ttoAis «ai ij TTaTpi'5,
ttei'0eiv
auTijv rj to
n
S lKaiOV TTECpUKE},

just

he says

is

not from an unconditional principle against disobedience.
Rather, the claim
stems from what are supposed to be more basic obligations:
it is argued that in many
situations (and Socrates’ in particular) to disobey is to injure
(50b ff.), and it is argued
that citizens (and especially Socrates) have already
entered into an agreement with the
city (49e-50a, 50c, 51e, 52de). None of this commits
Socrates to obeying the city's
orders unconditionally. Were the city to order Socrates to act
contrary
this

to his self-

interest,

we may assume

that

by the

he

city's

that he

would not obey.

It is

true that Socrates argues in the

is obligated to submit to the death penalty because he
has agreed to abide
decision in this case. But this does not mean it is his only reason for

submitting; we have independent evidence for thinking that Socrates supposes
that
being put to death was in his interest.

The prohibition against breaking agreements appears
this

case because that prohibition

agreement in question

is

is

in fact to

be unhelpful

in

conditional on whether or not abiding by the

just (Cto. 49e6, 50a3); since in this case
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what

is

in dispute is

7

h

:

^.

"

S0CrateS Staying in rison
P
’

g
,

some reason

is

would beg

it

this

question to use the

to argue that Socrates

^

.

Furthe
rthermore there

is just,

agreements

must stay in prison
for thinking that the
prohibition regarding

falls under the prohibition
against harming others- First
the nrohihifn
introduced with Socrates' saying
}
it "follows from
{ uetoi
,49e5, the
ab ° Ut h0W 11 18 never corr ect/good
to do injustice (49ab) or
to injure others
9c) More importantly, it is
(
hard to see what point there is in
reiterating the fact that
Socrates had many opportunities to
opt out of his agreement with
the c ty and o
persuade the city that the agreement
was unjust, if we were not
that
ablde by a n0W after S0
of compliance,
•

d

7

0t

thmk

that

me^a^

—

’

"

b

better

''

Socrates

means onl Y morally better (a la Kraut
stating a rule to be followed in the
pursuit of any goal (moral or
nonmoral), viz. that one must act in accordance
with the opinion of the one who is
expert at achieving that goal. What
Socrates assumes is that the rule is to
be followed in
just those cases in which achieving
of the goal in question is in one's
1

984V
),

ti!
rather,

he

?

is

interest.

Indeed, this part of the passage
tieir use (247)

is altogether glossed over in
their 2000 by
of Grube’s misleading rendering of
"AoyiCopEvcp" as "upon reflection".

Tbough
...

„

.

thing" (see
16

come

my n.

that

"my

things" includes

"my

habitual divinatory
J

9).

Compare

to his

assume

safe t0

li 1S

his stressing (Ap.

37e-38a with 28d6-7 and 36c2-3) that he had
of the god's "order"—to continue

own conclusion— independently

philosophizing, to which

I

will presently return.

Cf. also Pdo. 60e-61b.

1

Vlastos 1991, 286 seems clearly wrong to disagree with
them: Brickhouse and
Smith's point here certainly reflects a most natural way
of reading
Socrates' report that

the voice
to

"[.
.

J

when

it

do \OTav yEvrjTai,

comes, a lways turns
cxei

me away from

which I'm about/going
auoTpEUEi pe toOto 6 av psAAco npaTTEiv}[. .]" (Ap.
that

.

3 Id,

my emphases). Though

I

otherwise agree roughly with Vlastos's general

interpretation (282ff.) of the contribution of the sign to Socrates'
decision-making,
also troubled by Vlastos's talk of "hunches".

According

to

Weiss 1998,

I

daimonion never opposes Socrates' reason, but
what his reason has already determined
conceive the daimonion either as a mysterious force that helps

always opposes his inclination

19, the

to act contrary to

Weiss appears to
reason overcome "temptations" or as just the power of reason itself. But it is very
difficult to suppose that Socrates thought either that reason is ever in need
of help in
overcoming irrational inclinations or that the power of reason is so enigmatic that it
sometimes is aptly dissociated from the agent and termed "daimonic".
as best.

am
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® rlckho ““ and Smith seem t0 suggest
that it does when they say
(149 n
27 ) that Socrates would always
-2)
''modify" or "adjust” his own
reasonings
so as to
8
conform to the daimonic

thJ^

signal.

<>

Recal1 that the

.'

...
,

things

,1 1

was going

si

« n °PP°ses sometimes

some way not
UeAAo.m, un o P 0co 5 rrpd^iv}" (Ap. 40a).

^ °n

fhTm
there

is

*

^

to act in

'°

"[.

correct

.

.]

even, by

{ K ctt irdvu

all

em

We may imagine that

means

in

small

oyiKpoT;

si

Tl

Socrates' getting

cou " would count as a "small" matter.

some matter

If not, we may imagine
sufficiently small so as to merit only
a small alteration o/the

proposed action, rather than a complete
cessation of it.

Naturall y some cases of daimonic opposition
would appear to call for more
deliberation than others do, depending (evidently)
on the prima facie weightiness of the
originally proposed action (on the "greatness”
or "smallness" of the matters in which
the
sign opposes, see Ap. 40a). Concerning
what appear to be very momentous actions
that
the sign has opposed, Socrates makes a
special point (Ap. 31d5-6, 40b6-7, 41d3-6)
of
giving his own account ot the justification of
the opposition in question.
,

.

.

Eud. 272e is
presumably a prima facie inconsequential case, so the
narrator naturally does not bother
to mention any further deliberation that
Socrates may have done;

was about

to leave

one of his usual haunts,

it

seems

likely that

but given that Socrates
he suspected he was

going to be able to philosophize if he remained.
We should accordingly expect that Socrates would make an even greater effort
to make his own evaluation of a course of action
when the daimonic voice simply fails
to oppose it
even if it does so consistently, when there are numerous
opportunities to
oppose. An example of such consistent failure to oppose is
of course the actions that
led to Socrates' execution. Though Socrates makes much
of the failure to oppose in this
case, and though Brickhouse and Smith 1989 make
(245-257) a good case for Socrates'
apparent attempt to draw firm conclusions from that failure, we cannot
suppose

that that

was

the real basis of Socrates conviction that what he was doing
was best. Even if we
do not consider Cto. 46b, Socrates gives ample indication that even before he
is

sentenced to death he had already come to his own conclusion about the value
of death
(Ap. 29a, 30d). It is telling that though he begins by apparently using the
daimonion's
failure to oppose to explain why what has happened to him is good
(40a4-c3), the

subsequent discussion of the two alternatives (40c4ff.) is obviously independent of the
at 40d he actually uses his fate's being good to explain why the
daimonion has not opposed.

daimonion, and finally

21

the

Cf. the "exhortation" Socrates says (Pdo. 60e) continually

"make and work at music [sc.
god [Apollo]," compare Pdo. 85b.

sleep to

(61a), philosophy]."

And on

comes

to

him

in

Socrates' "service to

22

Though I agree with Nehamas 1987, 43-45 that Socrates would not have
considered obeying the god without coming to his own independent determination of
the goodness of the order, I disagree with Nehamas' suggestion (43) that Socrates
seriously believed that the oracle or the god

may have been mistaken and
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required

r

that rea
Testing Was required “"'y t0 find
what the god was
Irnthff
li
thfully)
saying. (But, as Nehamas rightly
(
points out, even after finding
this out
haVe ° beyed " Wlth0m Sa,
ng h '"-h about the good^ss of the

V

aot""
tPdo

lltr

I

^'

e

iS

,

™l°

f,he " exhortation "

in his sleep to
’

Ihen’his

life

Note the speculative language Socrates
Cf.

Nehamas

26

In the

in

more

“

"make and work

Ph " 0S ° PhlZe bU * he qUe

this

at

musie'

“""P*”

uses. Cf. Vlastos 1991, 171-172

1987, 43-45; West and West 1998,

18.

A polo gy there may be

some indication that Socrates' divine order came
explicit terms than the Delphic oracle (see
33c). He perhaps makes so much of

the latter only because

it

was so public (though Burnet 1924, 92 points out
1
that ”[.
no great respect for the Pythian Apollo. The
oracle had taken

the ordinary Athenian had

the Persian side and the Spartan side, and
generally opposed the Athenians [. .]"). In
any case, Socrates does not give any details of these
other orders to philosophize And
the information about one of them that we do
have (Pdo. 60e-61b) indicates that
.

was—or was

have mistook

it

perceived by Socrates

at least
its

meaning

as—not

so clear that Socrates could not
(in the Phaedo he "made a trial" of the order:
it may really

have been ordering him to compose poetry, rather than to
philosophize!). Socrates is
always lepresented as having to decipher the meaning of the
divinations he receives.
27

Cf. 41c: ".
it would be an overwhelming [amount]
of happiness to discuss
with and be with and to examine
." Agamemnon,
Odysseus, Sisyphus, etc.
.

.

.

28

.

1924 notes on 3 8a 1 See also the incredulous exclamation that he
one ol his judges making in reaction to his account of his peculiar

Cl. Burnet's

anticipates (28b)

.

practice": in that reaction there
is

is no hint that the imagined judge believes that Socrates
any god; lor why would Socrates be "ashamed" in continuing a
which a god had appointed him? There is some indication of why he thinks

on a mission

practice to

for

the alternative explanation of his practice would be believed even less: His practice
does not seem to be good for him at all; in fact, it appears selfless (31b). Though
Socrates continually makes a point of how he neglects conventional concerns for self
and family (Ap. 23bc, 31b, 36b), it is clear that he does not think he is behaving
selflessly.

I

think

Reeve 1989, 155 and Vlastos 1991,

listeners at the trial,
9Q

30

miss

this

177, along with most of Socrates'

important point altogether.

Weiss 1998, 16-17 makes similar use of Ap. 38a.
as Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 106-107,

182-183, 246-247

n.

88,

248 seem

Reeve 1989 seems (62-63, 73)

to

to think (cf.

want

to distance

201

Kahn

1996, 96, and Benson 2000,

Kraut 1984, 15 with 238). Though

himself from

this

kind of

interpretative ot Socrates' motive, he
ultimately accepts (66; cf. also 1
10, 155 165) an
interpretation[according to which Socrates
is simply following an
order. Reeve does
point out (66) that Socrates follows the
order not simply because the god
gave the order
1
ecause he knows that the gods cannot command
an
action
unless the action is
„
^ virtuous so that the
good and
source of the imperative is an objective
,
virtue-ethics
independent of the god’s will. But according to
Reeve the word of god is sufficient
reason in Socrates' mind for undertaking his
"mission" (70), even though he may have
ia addltl0nal nondivme evidence for
thinking that the mission was required by
virtue
>

^

Also, it is telling that when at 3 led he explains
why he does not practice
conventional politics, he makes no mention of his divine
mission. In fact, that
mission
if it were real
would evidently be the proper excuse for his avoiding
politics; indeed, he actually makes that his
excuse when he is describing the supposed
mission (23bc; cf. 36d), and that would seem to contradict
the explanation given at
3 led.
I

do not mean

wishes. But this

is

to

deny

that Socrates thinks he

quite different from denying, as

I

is

acting in accordance with divine

do, that Socrates believes he has

received an explicit order to philosophize or believes that he
is acting on orders from a
I would say rather that, based on
his own determination that philosophizing

god.

is

good, Socrates has inferred that the god wants him (and us all) to
philosophize. (This,
assume, is what makes Weiss 1998 say that "to obey the god and to act
according to
one s own reasoned conclusions about what justice requires are, at bottom, the same
thing
at

28e

(11, cf. 17 n. 28).) This,

I

I

suggest, accounts for the speculative terms he chooses

to describe his epistemic state

concerning the supposed "order".

32

Cf. G. 458ab: It is a greater good that one's self be rid of the greatest bad thing
(having false opinion) than to rid someone else of it. Cf. R. 7.528a (cf. the more general
view (R. 1 ,347d) according to which every knowledgeable person prefers to be
benefited by another than to take the trouble of benefiting another), Pdo. 91a.
33

34

Cf. G. 505e6.

Cf. G. 453c3-4, 457e, 505e6. Also

cf.

Pdo. 66a2-3, Th. 174a.

35'

Although I agree with much of Stokes' 992 study, I disagree that Socrates'
real motives for his "mission" arise from a sense of duty to benefit others, as Stokes
appears to think (62ff). Weiss 1998, 13 believes, as do, that Socrates' pursuit of
1

I

philosophy

emphasis

is

primarily a pursuit of knowledge for himself in spite of Socrates'

(in the

,

Ap.) on benefiting others.
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APPENDIX B

THE INSTRUMENTAL LIMITATIONS OF
VIRTUE
There are some other passages

that are often

thought to show that Socrates

thinks virtue— understood as
knowledge of good and bad or as action
in accordance

with such knowledge

of them: Cto. 48b8,

is

instrumental^ sufficient for happiness.

Cm. 174bl2-c3,

G. 507c3-5.'

I

will consider three

A clear understanding of each of

these statements depends of course on
an understanding of the context in
which they are

made.

Crito

The surrounding passage
here

means nothing more than

of all, there
reiteration

is

no reason

48b8

itself gives us

good reason

living in accordance with

to think that the claim at

of the principle already introduced

concerning what kind of action

at

48b5-6

47cd

2

—

to think that "living well"

knowledge of the
is

p ood

First

anything more than a

i.e.,

a general principle

we must perform whenever we

act

—

or that 48c7-d5

anything less than an application ot that principle to Socrates'
present situation. At

48b5-6, Socrates has Crito recall a principle that they had agreed upon

in past

conversations:

N LLWM

:

The prefatory "not

It is

not living, but rather living well that must be

living"

is all

that

agreed on in 47cd.

He might have

must be made most

of."

LWM:

is 'different'

made most

of.

here from what has already been

said, "It's not peanuts, but rather living well that

Neither that nor

NLLWM says more than:

Living well must be made most

203

of.

is

Then he reminds Crito

that

MA: Living well and admirably and justly are the same
Then he makes an inference ("Therefore,
from
£K tcov

6 M oAoyoutt£vcov}[.

(48bl

.]"

.

1; cf.

(assuming presumably that Crito
understands
living justly

must be made most

AJ: The only thing that

abscond (48b 1

LWM,

then,

is

- We

Iff.,

the things that were agreed
on

48e6-7)) based on

(Oukouv

LWM and WJA

that the conjunction

of these implies

that

of):

we now must

consider

to

is

whether or not

it

is

just to

be equivalent to the principle:

m each case act according to the opinion of the expert about the

just, the

admirable, and the good (47cd).

There

no reason

is

3

48c7ff).

meant simply

must

(48b8).

to

suppose

that Socrates at

48b (any more than

at

47cd)

is

asserting anything stronger than a necessary
condition for the soul's wellness. So there
is

no reason

to think that Socrates is offering identity -conditions
or

conditions for happiness (or, for that matter, for living
happily,
different

from happiness). 5

any suggestion

In fact,

even

if that is

that he is offering

sufficient

something

more than

necessary conditions for happiness would run counter to the kind
of assumptions being

made

at

47cl-48a7:

viz., that acting

contrary to expert opinions

is

bad not by

itself,

but

because of the effects of such action.

Charmides 174bl2-c3
Certain statements in

Cm.

1

73-174,

when taken

out of context,

may

appear

suggest that Socrates wants to say here that knowledge of the good and the bad
sufficient for being happy: e.g.,

"which of the knowledges makes him happy?

204

is

{ti's

to

auxov TCOV imoTimcbv

tto.eT

EuScdMova}" (174al0-l

1);

it

is

knowledge of the good

and bad that "makes one do well and
be happy {to eS TrpdTTE.v te
ko\ eGScumovew
ttoioOv} " (174bl2-c3). But knowledge
of good and bad in the Charmides

same instrumental power and

the exact

wisdom of the
At
If

protreptic passages of the

74al0-l

1

the

1,

happy man" of 173el0. So the question
man’s knowledges makes the happy

which we must read the conclusion
.

limitations that are allotted to the

Euthvdemus

.

that the referent here

174a 10-1

at

man happy?"
at

1

(cf.

Cm. 174bl2-c3

of "him {ccutov}"

is really:

is

"the

"Which of the happy

G. 508b). This

is

the context in

that

not living knowledgeably that makes the doing well and
the being

it is

.]

allotted

Socrates asks, "[W]hich of the knowledges
makes him happy?"

one has read carefully, one recognizes

[.

same

is

happy, nor

[is

producing these] even [characteristic] of all the other knowledges
6
is about the good and bad.*

together, but rather of that one alone that

If

one reads

this

whole passage uncarefully, one might suppose

conclude that knowledge of good and bad
that Socrates

means

to

conclude

is

that

is

it is

that Socrates

sufficient for happiness,

necessary for

it

(see

1

when

means

to

really all

74c9- 1 74d 1 ).

Gorgias 507c3-5
There,

refer to.

first

seems

It

of all,

is

some question

that they refer either to

as to

what the names

for the virtues in G.

knowledge of good and bad or

to

some
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orderly

condition of the soul (or the soul's desires) that arises from the application of such

knowledge. They cannot,

.

.

.

I

think (pace Irwin 1977, 130), refer to the same condition of

OU TO ETTlOTqpOVCOS

f)V £f]V

TO 6U

TTpOCTTElV TE KCU Eu8ai|iOVE7v TTOl-

ouv, ou5e oupTTaocbv Tcbv aAAcov EuioTqpcbv,
Tfjg tie pi

to ayaOov

te «ai kcxkov.
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aAAa

qtag ouaqg TauTqg povov

the soul that

is

spoken of elsewhere as being the
ultimate end of action-which
Socrates

also calls "virtue"

at, e.g.,

470e and 478cd (see

my

Chapter

III n.

Now Socrates does not mean to assert that
everyone who
will be happy.

who

7

He just means

has done well and

"The athlete
victoty

is

who

is

good.

that

wherever

It is

trains diligently

we

good

happy person

it

in this

sense

will be a person

and well will be the victor"-meaning
only
athlete.

has good diet and exercise will have
a healthy

of the healthy

is

similar to the statement that
a trainer might make:

ch aracteristic (only) of the diligent

characteristic

find a

38).

virtue.
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a dietician:

life-meaning only

dieter/exerciser. After

emphasizes only the necessity of acquiring

Or

all,

that

"The person who

that health is

Socrates in conclusion (507d)

*

Notes

45 - 591

41

mJsssssr**

—-—

»

The point is new only with respect to
the specific consideration
of the value or
disvalue of being killed (reintroduced
at 48al0-l 1 by Socrates
on Crito's behalf)S
hat ’
Crit0 S Speciflc WOrries "3 **
P'-esent converLtn viz
H
Socrates death),
.t needs to be
reemphasized that living well (i.e.,
behaving justly) must
when faced with the risk ° f dea,h But

wT

'

.

tV

X*

Sss

'

3

Really this has been an assumption,

WM

bV
l appears
though l?
AJ really follows from
were equivalent to E.

‘TTf

.

to

I

think, since 47c. See Chapter

39.

III, n.

be weaker than E; but since Socrates
talks as
it looks like
is being u^d“as if
5

LWM + WJA,

LWM

it

grant that there are some passages in the
early dialogues that suggest that
Socrates uses "living well" to refer to happiness
itself. (It is noteworthy that the
only
explicit indication that Socrates ever accepts that
"is happy" and "lives well" are
synonymous is at R. 1 ,354a.) But we cannot allow this
observation to make us ignore
the context of the statement at Cto. 48b5-6.
6

—

The use of the genitive case— here meaning characteristic of or
belonging to
similar to the use of "appropriate to {TTpoaf]Kei}"
at Lch. 199d. For the meaning of
"appropriate" in this context, cf. 195e-196a.
is

I

think there

is

some question concerning what

Socrates means by "does well"
sometimes synonymous with "is happy".
But in other contexts, perhaps in this one, I think it is reasonable
to suppose that "does
well" simply means acts in accordance with knowledge of
good and had Thus one will
do the best possible given the circumstances if and only if one has knowledge
of good
and bad. Even if the results in such a case do not happen to be great (because
of
in this context.

It is

true that the expression

is

.

oppressive circumstances),

it is still

appropriate to characterize the action as "doing

well".
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APPENDIX C

SOCRATES' ENDORSEMENT OF TEIE LAWS' SPEECH
Verity Harte argues that since the
interests ot Socrates' friends

endorse

all

Laws seem (53a-54a) concerned about

and family whereas Socrates

is

of what he makes the Laws say (1999, 128-129;

266 and Weiss 1998,

153).

I

disagree.

The consequences

the

not, Socrates cannot

cf.

McPherran 1996, 265-

for his friends (if Socrates

escapes) are said to be bad given the assumption that Socrates
will have thereby done
injustice (see particularly the reminders that discussions
about virtue will

—

if

Socrates

does injustice by escaping— become ridiculous-sounding). That the
Laws express
concern about the

ill

effects of Socrates acts

on family and friends does not mean

they suppose Socrates' escaping frustrates an ultimate desire for their welfare;

probably only means that they suppose

harm

to Socrates' soul that

Appendix

would

result

A for further discussion).

In

it

that

it

will frustrate the ultimate desire to avoid the

from voluntarily harming others (see
any case,

at the

n.

12 in

end of the Laws' discussion of

the welfare of family and friends, they present an exhortation (54b2-4) that cannot

reasonably be interpreted as anything other than a reiteration of the statement Socrates

makes

in propria

discounts

persona

48cd. (Weiss acknowledges 54b2-4 but too easily

it.)

One of the main
that she believes the

really

open

reasons Roslyn Weiss considers the Laws' views unsocratic

Laws demand

the "persuade or obey"

were

at

absolute obedience. Against a traditional reading of

demand, Weiss maintains

to receiving

is

it

would be "odd indeed"

from citizens lessons on justice
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in lieu

if the

Laws

of obedience: "The

Laws have

their

own

understanding of justice" (1998,
106). (Weiss thinks that the

persuade" alternative consists in fawning
entreaty rather than rational
discourse.)
then does Socrates have the

Laws acknowledge

that in

demanding obedience they could

be doing "something not admirably
{pq KaAcbs ti}" (51e7;
following through with an agreement
Socratic

(cf.

49e-50a;

be unjust or "not admirable"

that Socrates introduces the

own argument

is

entirely

truth as Socrates sees

it

embrace the Laws' arguments,

and accept even though

(82-83, 146ff.).

it

Laws because

Crito has failed to

against escaping and so presents an argument
that

will be easier for Crito to understand

whole

52e4-5)? Allowing that

cf.

Ap. 35b9-c2).

cf.

Weiss 1998 thinks
understand Socrates'

may

Why

would be hard

Even

if

it

does not represent the

Socrates were not supposed to

to believe, as

Weiss does,

that Socrates

supposes Crito's soul will be improved by accepting the Laws' argument.
Weiss would
evidently have us believe that Socrates regards improvement to
consist in something
other than learning, since the Laws, according to her, do not aim

at

the truth. In fact

Socrates has no regard for anything other than the truth. (At G. 52 1 d
Socrates explaining quite explicitly that in his conversations he aims
regardless of

how

not

"[.

.

but at flattery

.]

As

[.

.

.]"

more appealing
there

is

we

find

at the truth

unpleasant his words are for his interlocutor.) This fact runs

absolutely against Weiss' suggestion that Socrates uses the

at truth

ff., e.g.,

(149)

—because he

is

—which aim

concerned that his

to Crito than foul-tasting

no good reason

Laws

medicine to a

is

.

.]

own argument

child[.

.

.]"

not

is

(150).

to think that Socrates disagrees with the substance

the Laws' arguments, Weiss' 1998 interpretation (134-140) of 54d4-6

and implausible. There

"[.

no good reason

is

unnecessary

to think that the reference to the
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of

Corybantes

rather than being simply a metaphor
for the strength of Socrates'

conviction concerning these as opposed
to other arguments

(cf.

Jon 536c)-evinces a

belief that the Laws' arguments are
specious and appeal only to emotional
listeners
rather than to rational ones. Besides,
if the

together with the use of

Laws

"booms

are not be believed,

character Crito

how

would miss

Crito

is

word

"(3oh(3eT" as

mere reference

{(3op(3 Ef}",

to Corybantic music,

were supposed

to

imply so clearly

can Plato have expected his readers

to believe that the

the implication, as Weiss supposes
that he

not perhaps very bright, but he

is

that the

is

meant to?

surely as familiar with the Corybantes
and the

any of Plato's readers.
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APPENDIX D

THE TEACHABILITY OF VIRTUE
As
is

worry

for the

teachable,

we may

that Socrates

sometimes appears

safely conclude that he thinks virtue

thing) he takes virtue to be knowledge.
the

P rotagoras Referring
:

Socrates says that

if

it

were decided whether
is

is

teachable, because (for one

this point pretty plain at the

virtue

was knowledge

or not, then

that the virtues are

is

not teachable);

knowledge, and

should convince us

(if

we were

for,

if virtue is

not already

enough, the main argument he offers (Pro.

knowledge then

2

that Socrates

)

such).

is

.

it

is

The wisest and

would

beginning

was not

And

1

teachable.

to

show

That

serious about his

if that

were not

3

19e-320b) for doubting that virtue

pretty clearly a case of ignoratio elenchi (and pretty clearly

The argument goes something
1

3

in the

he says (361b), he has been trying

claims about the teachability of virtue earlier in the dialogue.

teachable

it

teachable or not (360e-361a). Socrates
admits (36 lab)

he has been more serious about the contrary of what
he had stated

(which was that virtue

end of

doubt he expressed earlier in the dialogue
(319a-320b),

to the

be quite clear whether virtue
that

He makes

to question the idea that virtue

meant

is

to

be

like this:

best of Athenian politicians have not

made anyone

else

good

(319e-320b).
2.

If (1), then the wisest

else
3.

If the wisest

Therefore,

(I

and best of Athenian politicians cannot make anyone
have virtue cannot make anyone else good.

who
If those who have

then those
4.

5.

Virtue

virtue cannot
is

in order to

make anyone

else good,

else good, then (5).

not teachable (320b).

have expanded the argument a

need

and best of Athenian politicians cannot make anyone

good (319e).

bit to

make

explicit premises that Socrates

have a valid argument.) The reason
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for Socrates'

seems

to

immediate focus on

1

politicians as teacher-candidates

be the

'citizen's"

to teach.

is

or "political art

that the "virtue” (319e) 4 in
question

{r,

is

supposed

TToAmKr, TE Xvr)}" (319a) which
Protagoras claims

That the best place to look for teachers
of (propositional) knowledge

those that (seem to) put

to use is a standard Socratic

it

to

assumption

(cf.

Mo.

is

among

93c).

If

we

ignore the most obvious objections, 5
the argument could otherwise
be accepted if
"virtue" throughout the

supposed

to

have

1
'
.

move expressed by

argument

But

if

it

refers exclusively to the virtue
that Pericles et „i

refers to anything else, Socrates
has failed to support the

7

(3).

In fact, at the

end of the Euthydemus Socrates warns Crito
against

philosophy (307a2)—education (306e3,
practitioners

of

it

4)— is

do not do a good job. He seems

are worthless, there are a

passage, Socrates there

is

to suggest that

educators are bad, that does not

education

is

possible

committed

mean

same men who
or wise.

1

virtue.

10

to

if

he

if all existing

that education itself is pointless,

pointed out,

it

is

which means

(at

no coincidence

that Socrates' sole

11

9

he emphatically argues are not themselves virtuous

the explanation for this in the Gorgias

who

even

have virtue and wisdom but cannot teach are the very

in other dialogues

virtuous or wise; for those

not suggesting this in the

to the idea that

In the Gorgias too, Socrates claims that those

And

is

are "worth(y of)

.

As many commentators have
examples of those who seem

though most practitioners

few "serious {ottouBccToi}" ones who

certainly

inferring that

worthless because most of its (alleged)

everything {ttqvtos c^ioi}" (307a3-5). But even

least) that

ar ».

are

good

is

will not fail at

212

men

are not teachers of

that they are not themselves

making others good (515d). 12

Perhaps Socrates in the Pro ta oras expected
g
Protagoras to point
rate is

obviously (320b)

13

this out; Socrates at

eager to be disabused of his purported
conclusion.
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any

Notes
Cf. particularly Socrates' concluding
remarks at 357e.

At Pro. 328e Socrates, pretending to have
been convinced by Protagoras savs
f0mler tlme
heW tha ‘ " S n °‘ human attention fc whi ch
the good become
y
coodV"
good
{syco yap ev
xcp emtt P oo0ev xpovcp riyoiipnv ouk

^

.

‘

.

.

.

aYa0 °‘

^

.

°‘

dya9 °

W

l

at the

eTvoi av6pcoTTivr|v

vou '™}[.

But

•

if

we were supposed

to think

Socrates ot the early dialogues is really
serious about this claim, then what
supposed to be the point of exhorting people to
"attend

{EnmeXsioeai}"

winch he makes so much of in the

Ap olo gy

(cf.

the Protagoras itself?

So

we can

similarly,

satisfied (as

he says he

is:

is

to their souls

Lch. 188b) and even in the beginning of
6
B

be confident that Socrates in the Euthvdemus

"You speak admirably!") with

is

quite

Cleinias’ assumption (282c)

teachable, in spite of doubts that he appears
to raise about it
only does Socrates himself make the assumption
everywhere

is

.cl -2. Not

dialogue, but also (as he seems to be pointing
out at 282c) it
turn toward" (275a) love of wisdom if no
human

a person

effort

Likewise

come from
great a

would be

274e and

else in the

pointless to

can achieve

make

it.

Mgno, if Socrates really thought that goodness/virtue does
not
then it would be strange for him to express (86bc,
cf. 81de) how

in the

learning,

good

at

for

everyone

be eager about the search for knowledge (and
furthermore, to characterize "making remember
{avapvrioig}" as a kind of teaching

(87b7-cl;
virtue

is

cf.

Cf.

why

to say that

it is possible for us to "remember"
virtue (81c)). If
not just settle for true belief or hope for divine
dispensation?

Mo. 93a-94e.
since the opening of the dialogue, this

first

5

I

81d4-5) and

to

Though goodness had been discussed
occurrence of the word "virtue".

the

that

is

unlearnable,

3

is

it

Th e

ste P that has gotten perhaps the most attention in the literature
is the one
have expressed with (2). This move from actuality to possibility is rather implicit

Protagoras but the same

in the

,

criticism of this

move

is

made

quite explicit at

Mo. 89de

(cf.

96c). For

move, see Irwin 1995, 140-141 and

cf. Penner 1987, 318-319. Kraut
has argued that Socrates intends the if-then to be a probabilistic, rather than material
implication (1984, 289-290 and his n. 67).

6

The solution

I

present here

is

nothing novel;

it

was suggested long

ago, e.g., by

Burnet 1914, 171, 173-174.
7

Though implicit in the Protagoras
Mo. 93c (cf. 96b): If the popular

,

explicit at

one

is.

See
8

95bc;

cf.

my

the

move expressed

politicians are not

in (3) is

good

made

quite

teachers, then

no

n. 10.

politicians (Pro. 319e,

Mo. 93a

ff.,

Eup. 2c8-3a4), sophists (Mo. 90c-92d,

Eud. 274e, 306e-307b), poets (Mo. 95c-96b).
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2
1

G or g ias which I will presently comment on; but
concerning
and poets see also Ap. 21c-22c. In the
Apology Socrates is for

particularly the
politicians

more reserved about

criticizing the sophists: for

“e

the

a!on

one thing, he does not mention them

as
group that he cross-examined in his search
for a person wiser than he
(perhaps
because mentioning them would be unnecessary,
since they were not generally thought
wise except by the wealthy few (Anytus
thoughts at Mo. 91c-92e are represented^?
he typical Athenian s), whereas the politicians,
poets, and craftsmen were generally
thought wise). But I think his comment at
20de that they
a

1

some way

"are perhaps/probably wise in

that

is

greater than by

avGpcoTTOv oocpiav 00901

human wisdom {Td X dv
’

e!ev}[.

that, like the

poets and politicians,
divine dispensation.

.

if

.]" is

.

.

.

psiCco Tivd

kqt’

fj

supposed

to hint at his real opinion, which
they say or do anything that seems wise
it is by
J

is

’

The idea

that teacher-candidates have been exhausted
once the candidacy of
and popular politicians has been rejected (Mo. 96bc;
cf. 93c and Lch
86c) is a fairly transparent sham. (The sham trades on
the ambiguity of the Greek
expression "admirable-and-good {kcxAos KayaOos}"
(at Mo. 92e-93a,

sophists, poets,
1

93c. 95a, 96b):

In its colloquial sense

connotes the possession of character-traits greatly valued
in a
social context (thus the term may be rendered
"gentleman") (see, e.g., G. 484dl and
Dodds 1 959 ad loc.). But Socrates usually uses it as a technical term
referring only to
the truly virtuous (see Dodds 1959, 242-243). Indeed, in
spite of the agreement that
there are admirable-and-good" men (Mo. 95a), the conclusion
that they cannot
it

teach

virtue (96b)

makes Meno wonder whether

own

course, Socrates claims that his

there even are any

good men

Of

(96d).)

life-long search for teachers of virtue has

been

(Mo. 89e). But given the hope placed (in the Meno 8 1 dl -4, 85c 1 0-d 85el86 b 1-4) upon the Socratic method of making remember" (and in particular, the
possibility that even virtue may be "remembered" (81c7-9)), it is hard to
overlook the
possibility that Socrates himself is supposed (at least in the Meno ) to be such
a teacher.
unfruitful

1

,

3,

1

He says this of the popular politicians
501e-502d, and of sophists at 519cd.
1

~

at

502e

ff.

and

5

1

5c ff„ of poets

at

true that in the Protagoras Socrates

seems simply to assume (3 1 9e) that
Pericles (e.g.) has the virtue that Socrates calls the "citizen's art" (319a); but Socrates
cannot really believe that Pericles had the knowledge that art requires, since he
It is

maintains in the Protagoras that
to others

are

(36 lab).

And

it is

and some were "good

have meant that they had

if

a person has

knowledge then they

are able to give

it

Meno Socrates admits that some men
{ayaGoi xa TroAiTiKa}" (93a); but he cannot

also true that in the

at politics

art or

maintains that politicians have

knowledge, for by the end of the dialogue Socrates
at

most only

true belief, not

knowledge or

wisdom

to politicians,

reasonable to conclude that whenever he attributes

art.
it

It is

is at

most

some kind of craft-knowledge divorced from knowledge of good and bad (though, in
light of Ap. 21c-22a, it would seem that Socrates is not even willing to go as far as that.
Compare Socrates' concession in the Apology that the craftsmen are wise, but not in
anything admirable-and-good). In spite of Socrates' apparent respect for the politicians
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3

in the

Meno

Socrates significantly calls into question
whether the politicians ever really

do any good or produce any benefit

Mo. 98c9). Indeed, even

in the

for the city (see especially the
"eitte P eTev" clause at

G orgias

(especially those of the past) are

Socrates concedes that the popular politicians
good at being "servants {Siaicovoi} of the city"

Jbc), but this only comes to providing it with the
things
1
Eud.
292b), not making the citizens or their appetites any
(5

it

has an appetite for

(cf.

(Compare Socrates'
things but not in making others
better.

concession

at

G. 519c that sophists are wise in certain

good.) Perhaps this

is

the skill that Socrates grants to Pericles and the
others in the
this "skill" is just the knack that Socrates
grants flatterers in

P rotagoras and Meno; but
the Gorgias
1

.

Cf Mo.

not teachable,

it

89e. If Socrates in the

would be hard

to explain

Meno were thoroughly convinced that virtue
why he in quite vivid language raises the

is

possibility that

it is at the dialogue's end (100al-7).
Further indication that the
arguments of Mo. 89c ff. are not serious is the fact that Socrates there
makes a great
deal of the point (90c 1 1-9 lb) that we would be irrational and
without understanding

try to find
it.

teachers of virtue anywhere other than

among

those

who demand

a

wage

to

for

This cannot express Socrates' real sentiment (92d7-el is some indication
of this):
is notorious for being critical of the demand of
payment for teaching. At G.

Socrates

520e Socrates points out how laughable are those who demand a wage for teaching
though successfully teaching it did not guarantee that their students would be
sufficiently grateful. (The contrast of this with R. 1 ,346e-347d is interesting,
but I
virtue, as

cannot

comment on

it

here.)
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APPENDIX E

THE BASIS OF SOCRATES' CONFIDENCE
It

IN

THE GORGIAS

cannot be plausibly argued that Socrates believes
his refutations result

anything more than demonstrations of others'
ignorance

(i.e, in

in

having inconsistent

1

beliefs).

Vlastos has been widely criticized for focusing
on the Gorgias in order to
.

show

the positive contribution to

knowledge

that Socrates in the early dialogues

allegedly thinks that the "elenctic method" can make;
the dialogue

is

commonly

considered 'transitional' between Plato's early and middle
dialogues. But
argue that Vlastos's interpretation of the Gorgias
in the

itself is not

more

The
"Has

satisfactory:

to

Not even

a demonstration of the inconsistency of an interlocutor's beliefs.
Vlastos’s

primary evidence for the view that Socrates does believe
is

want

Gorgias does Socrates reveal an expectation that refutation can provide
anything

more than

and

even

I

it

naturally interpreted in such a

way

that

"crucial text" for Vlastos (1994, 19)

is

it

this

can easily be interpreted

lends no support to his view.

G. 479e, where Socrates asks Polus,

not been proved (airoSebeiKToi) that what was asserted [by myself]

(Vlastos's trans.; his brackets). Vlastos loads the deck

is

true?"

somewhat by rendering "auo-

8e5eiktoi" as the quasi-logistic "proved" (or "demonstrated" in Vlastos 1991, 143), as

though Socrates thought that the elenctic argument just produced (474d-475e)
constitutes

sort

by

itself (or together

with indefinitely

many

similar elenctic arguments) a

of self-sufficient "proof of the thesis that the doer of injustice

than his victim, which Socrates happens to think true.

"a7To8ESEiKTOi",

it

is

all-important to keep in
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mind

is

more miserable

But however we

translate

that Vlastos's "crucial text"

is

a

question directed

at Polus,

not an assertion: 3 viz., Doesn’t
Pp]us have to conclude, given

the premises he has freely accepted,
that the thesis has been proved?

way commits
interlocutor.

4

Socrates to the conclusion that

(Though Vlastos 1991, 140-144 shows,

nonetheless thinks (147-148) that Socrates

admits (1994, 20

n.

60) that

Socrates' other

the argument

unaware of the

is

in

no

a proof for anyone but the present

is

it

The question

is

unsound, he

fallacy.) Vlastos

two descriptions of the

result (G.

himself

479C4-7

480B2-5) go no further than pointing out the
demonstrated inconsistency between
Polus' thesis and the premises to

Vlastos

s

other star example of Socrates' supposed
confidence in the positive

of the elenchus

results

which he has agreed."

is

G. 508e-509a, where Socrates asserts that the
conclusions of

the elenctic arguments against Callicles

"[.

.

.]

are held

and adamantine logoi {KcxTEXETai kou BeSetqi
Aoyoic;}

his

[.

.

.]."

interpretation, he clearly

of the passage elsewhere

had good reason, however, not
assertion

explicitly

is

.

.

oibqpoTs

Although Vlastos does not use the passage

standard elenchus

citation

.

down and bound

to

would have

in similar contexts

have used

it

in

kcci

in his

.

.]"

.

.]

by iron

abapavnvois
main argument

for

liked to, given his frequent

(1994, 34, 41, 59, 67

n. 2, 137).

He

support of his interpretation: for the

and immediately qualified with the phrase

anyway (cog yoOv av 5o£eiev outcoo(}[.

[.

(509a2).

5

"it

would seem

so

So, again, just as with

Socrates' refutation of Polus, Socrates clearly thinks that the adamantine strength of the
refutations

is

anyone else

who

When
assured

it

is

only an appearance

he

—an appearance

cannot say what

is

wrong with

tells Callicles that if

they

come

specifically for his interlocutor, and

the arguments.

to

an agreement then they can be

the truth (G. 486e, 487e), Socrates says this only under the
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shammed

assumption (487a;
seriously

out of

him

when he

shame and

seriously.

been "held
this for the

be assured

wise

man

489a, 489d) that Callicles

cf.

wise.

6

He

clearly cannot be taken

says (487b) that Polus too was wise
but failed to teach Socrates only

lack of straightforwardness! Callicles
clearly (489e) does not take

So

it

is

natural to think that

down and bound" by
same reason
it is

is

that he

when

Socrates concludes that his theses have

the arguments in his refutation

had said

that if they

the truth (G. 486e, 487e):

sc., that

agrees with an argument, then surely

Socrates certainly says (509a;

cf.

it

come

to an

Callicles

is

of Callicles, he

saying

is

agreement then they can

supposed to be wise.

If

a

must be sound.

474a5-6) that no one he has encountered has

been able to deny Socrates’ theses without,

like Polus,

making himself ridiculous

(i.e..

without contradicting himself). So although Socrates evinces
doubt about the
lgurnents he here uses, he shows no real doubt about his position;
he clearly thinks that

fl

his theses

cannot be refuted (473b 10-1

believes he

knows

1; cf.

509a6-7), and this

is

a sign not only that he

that they are true, but (given that his confidence

refutations themselves) also that the source of his confidence

success in refutation.

It is

is

is

not in the

something other than

true that he invites his interlocutors to refute him; 7 but his

sarcasm reveals that these invitations do not imply that he thinks they or anyone could
o

ever succeed.

It is

surprising that Vlastos 1994

is

so confident (27 n. 68) that Socrates’

disavowal of "education"

at

527de

disavowals of knowledge

at

506a and 509a. The disavowals

hand: in

all

of them Socrates

interlocutors, as

is

is

insincere, but takes so seriously (33 n. 6) the

all

seem

to

go hand

in

depicting himself as being at the level of his

though they have just as good a chance of refuting and defending as he
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does. But this

reveal

what

is

merely an

act.

His confident words’ and his
unmistakable sarcasm

his disavowals cannot hide (and
probably, are not

even meant

to hide):

Socrates never seriously believes that his
interlocutors here or in the future could
refute

him. After

(473b)

how could

all,

—be

the

spokesman of philosophy (482a) itself— and of
truth

refuted?!

Socrates never says (as Vlastos 1994, 59

Brickhouse and Smith
these theses are true.

{aSuvaTov}"

1

994,

When

to refute

1

n.

47 practically says he does

8) that this success in refutation is the reason he thinks

Socrates says that his

because "what

is

true

is

own

theses are "impossible

never refuted (to

ouSettote EAsyxETai}" (473b), why should we believe
impossible

is

inductive

him

this

means

Why

should

we

aXr)0£g

that his reason for thinking

confidence?

It is,

in the

points out (250-251),

47) that

n.

elenchus—or pragmatic considerations

Vlastos would argue, because the elenchus

for establishing moral truths.

is

much of the

last part

of the Gorgias

becomes

his

Socrates' confidence that everyone agrees with his theses

(1994, 20-24)

makes

it

is

that give

But Vlastos offers no proof of this. 10 And, as

a yes-man, and in that one striking passage Socrates

can be made

it

Socrates' only

itself is filled

constructive, rather than elenctic, argumentation (after his refutation, Callicles

either agrees or

it

as the arguments he has used in refuting the present

think (with Vlastos 1994, 20-21, 26, 59

evidence— his success

Kahn 1992

yap

anything other than his belief that he has sound arguments
for them

which are not necessarily the same
interlocutors?

say; cf.

own

with

becomes

interlocutor).

(sc., that

everyone

to contradict themselves) is not as surprising as Vlastos

out to be.

It is

just the confidence that

anyone has who thinks

they have convincing reasons that support the truths they believe
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in.

It is

true that

Socrates

is

is

not altogether forthcoming about
what these convincing reasons are;
but that

no reason

to

conclude that he has none other than
his past success

his expectation that he will continue
to succeed at refuting those
In fact Vlastos

himself makes a suggestion that would
explain

does not present

From

all

in refutation

who

and

disagree with him.

this omission: Socrates

the details because he wants people
to find out for themselves.

the tact that Socrates

is

confident that he can defend certain
moral theses

against refutation, Vlastos derives
(1994, 24) what he calls Socrates’ "assumption":
that

any interlocutor he encounters

As

Socrates' theses.

I

will

have beliefs that are inconsistent with the denial
of

have argued, there

not instead imagine that Socrates infers

arguments for the theses

in question?

it

is

no reason

from

to call this

an "assumption".

his belief that he has convincing

But Vlastos makes a further interpretative

he decides (1994, 25) that the "tremendous assumption" must
be stated
generality" so that

will

always have

But there

is

it

is

at the

true of any true moral thesis:

same time

cites in

a false moral belief

for thinking that Socrates

defense of his interpretation, Socrates shows confidence

it

is

natural to

assume (on

in

is

committed

true.
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to this

that Vlastos

being able to defend

the principle of charity)

he has what he thinks are very convincing reasons for thinking

moral theses are

"in fullest

of the "tremendous assumption". In the texts

only a few specific moral theses; and
that

"Whoever has

error:

true beliefs entailing the negation of that false belief."

no textual evidence whatever

"fully generalized" version

Why

that these particular

Notes

Se 6 Be nSOn
t
is th
the nnl
only f
function
•

00 0 57ff for detailed argument that
j?
of refutation in the early dialogues.
’

.

is

supposed

to

show

that this

2

r

Vlastos admits (1994, 34), "In previous
dialogues [Socrates] prefers weaker
etoric, describing the elenctic refutation
of p by saying that not-p 'has become
evident

to us

(E9avr|

nmv),' or that the interlocutor now 'sees' or 'knows'
that not-p ." I would
rather say that language in those "earlier"
dialogues is no weaker than it is in the
or s ias Socrate s' point is always simply
that the refutation offered reveals
an
inconsistency in the interlocutors' beliefs, not that
the refutation offers some kind of
independent proof of a Socratic thesis.

—

-

2

Vlastos 1994, 20 says that Socrates, on the strength
of the argument at 474dempowered to tell Polus [. .] that his own thesis [.
.] has been proved
true" (my emphasis). Vlastos also calls the
question at 479e a "claim" (20 n 60) an

475e, "feels

.

.

'

"assertion" (20).

Brickhouse and Smith 2000, 85-86 come to the same conclusion
and add
is aware (480e) that Polus could retract
one or more of the

that

since Socrates

premises that
led to his refutation, Socrates cannot think has offered
a proof of anything but Polus'

inconsistency.

Vlastos was well aware of this in spite of his lack of diligence in
representing
When quoting the passage he includes the qualification at 509a2 only once
(137), but omits it every other time he quotes the passage, and uses ellipses to mark
the

the passage:

omission only once (59).
6

(Cf.

Benson 2000, 230

n. 27.)

I

am

rather inclined to accept Dodds' 1959, 279-

280

interpretation of "excessive value" attributed here to the Socratic method: Though
Socrates claims that Callicles' agreement will ensure that the agreed on propositions are

true, "[.

.

.]

he seeks to justify

Callicles." Vlastos

1994 (28

explanation of these passages

it

on special grounds, namely the special qualifications of
44 n. 19, 56 n. 42) thinks instead that the

n. 71,
is

that Socrates accepts the

"tremendous assumption."

Though Vlastos has apparently not overlooked Socrates' transparent and highly typical
(cf. Eup. 4ab, Pro. 328de, R 1.338bc) way of treating his interlocutor as though he has
knowledge

to give Socrates (see 45 n. 20), Vlastos nonetheless fails to recognize the
consequently obvious explanation for Socrates' (dissembling) claim that Socrates will
be confident that his beliefs are true if Callicles agrees with those beliefs: Socrates will

be confident simply because Callicles "knows". That Socrates
explanation of his (alleged) confidence

and 487e3 and the "ouv"
7

at

is

clear

from the

treats this as the

text (note the

"yap"

at

486e6

487e6).

At 458a, 470c, 504c, 506a, 506c, 509a. Significantly, the two explicit
at 506a and 509a arise just when he is inviting refutation.

disavowals of knowledge

222

8

See 46 led, 487b6-7, 488a, 489d7-8,
497bl 509a2-3
Dodds 1959 ad loc.

"youthful" at 509a3, see
9

See G. 473M0-1

1

(cf. "truth itself' at

On

the sarcasm of

Cto. 48a7), G. 482a4-5, 509a6-7.

10

n fa
as 1 am ar 8 uin S. Vlastos's claim is false
’,
because Socrates does not
f‘>
ofler the elenchus as proof of his theses; he offers
the elenchus only as a way of
showing individuals that they cannot disagree with
him without contradicting
&

„

.

themselves.

The (disputable)

fact that Socrates does not actually
present any non-elenctic
any of the early dialogues would not show that we are
supposed to think
that he is the sort of person who would not
give such argument or even that he had
never given such arguments. In fact, it is simply a
necessary outcome of Vlastos's
groupings of the dialogues: any character who uses some other

arguments

in

method just

real Socrates.

223

is

not the
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